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Since the birth of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, the Supreme Court has been 
charged with being an extremely activist Court responsible for initiating fundamental policy 
reform via its remedial powers (s. 24(1)). Relatively few studies exist, however, which attempt to 
evaluate the truth of these claims. Stated differently, few have studied whether judicial 
invalidation actually results in fundamental policy change. Utilizing dialogue theory as the 
framework of analysis, complemented with a modified approach to Matthew Hall’s (2010) 
theory of final appellate courts as ‘implementer-dependent’ institutions, the study attempts to fill 
this gap. By conducting six case studies of salient and controversial issues of public policy, and 
by analyzing the corresponding legislative sequels introduced by federal or provincial 
governments in response to judicial invalidation, the study attempts to measure the policy impact 
and legacy of the McLachlin Court, and to understand the conditions under which the Supreme 
Court behaves as a powerful policymaking institution. The thesis demonstrates that the Court’s 
policy clout is contingent on whether the federal or provincial legislatures, as the designers and 
implementers of public policy, create conditions favorable to judicial policymaking and the 
judicialization of politics. The findings illustrate that, given the right set of circumstances – 
namely when the Court delivers a decision that proves to be unpopular with the non-judicial 
actors responsible for enforcing the judicial ruling, and, as a result, when the responsible 
 iv 
legislature introduces reply legislation that challenges, or ineffectively implements, the Court’s 
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The adoption of bills of rights worldwide has sparked scholarly interest in studying the powers of 
final appellate courts. The birth of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982 is 
certainly no exception. 1  As the ‘umpires of federalism,’ courts have traditionally acted as 
mediators in disputes arising from issues related to the division of powers and, in this respect, 
have always played an important constitutional role.2 April 27th, 1982, however, marked the 
beginning of a new era for Canadian courts. Armed with strong remedial powers, they were now 
in a position to transform into a powerful policymaking institution.  
In Canada, a system structured by the principle of parliamentary democracy, judicial 
power and policymaking is troubling because it empowers the courts – an unelected and 
unaccountable institution incapable of addressing complex issues of public policy, and which 
lack the information required to balance competing interests in society3 – to claim “responsibility 
for the community’s future.”4 In other words, right-wing/conservative critics have questioned the 
legitimacy of judicial review on the grounds that section 24(1) of the Charter (the remedial 
provision) allows Canadian courts to participate in salient and controversial issues of public 
policy, which, in their opinion, are debates better left to the discretion of federal and/or 
provincial legislatures.5 According to conservative critics, the Supreme Court’s activist approach 
 
1 Leclair 2004, 545; Hogg 1987, 88.  
2 Kelly and Manfredi 2009, 6.  
3 Macfarlane 2014, 59.  
4 Webber 2019, 135.  
5 Petter and Hutchinson 1989, 532. 
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to interpreting and enforcing the Charter of Rights has resulted in the judicialization of politics, a 
term meant to explain the transfer of policymaking power from the legislatures to the judiciary.6   
Undeniably, right-wing critics are correct to assume that, post-1982, the Supreme Court 
of Canada (SCC) has played a more important policy role than ever before in the history of the 
institution. Virtually no constitutional scholar contests this fact. Thus far, however, the 
scholarship has left the impression that judicial invalidation automatically leads to fundamental 
policy change. Stated differently, the assumption has been that when the Supreme Court chooses 
to strike down legislation for its inconsistency with the Charter, the legislatures – save for 
exceptional circumstances where the notwithstanding clause (s. 33) is invoked – will have no 
other choice but to comply with the Court’s decision.7 It is difficult to uncritically accept such 
bold claims, however, given that there have been relatively few attempts to measure the policy 
clout and impact of the Supreme Court of Canada post-invalidation.8 To date, the judicialization 
literature has focused heavily on legal mobilization efforts and the Court’s remedial activism, 
without paying sufficient attention to the ways in which the federal and provincial legislatures 
can temper judicial power by introducing positive legislative sequels that “reverse, modify or 
avoid a judicial decision.”9  
The truth of the matter is that the judicialization of politics requires that three conditions 
be met: a constitutional bill of rights that entrusts courts with the power to review (and strike 
down) legislation; a final appellate court that is eager to participate in salient and, at times, 
highly controversial issues of public policy; and perhaps most importantly, a political 
environment that empowers the Supreme Court as a powerful policymaking institution.10 While 
 
6 Hirschl 2006, 721-22.  
7 Kelly (In progress), 13 & 36.  
8 Macfarlane 2018, 395; See also Roach 2004, 52.  
9 Hogg, Bushell-Thornton and Wright 2007, 45.  
10 Hirschl 2009, 270. 
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right-wing scholars have convincingly demonstrated that the first two conditions are met in the 
Canadian context, these scholars have failed to demonstrate whether the same applies for the 
third condition. Essentially, it is impossible to accurately measure the policy influence of the 
SCC without first evaluating the legislative responses introduced by the federal and/or provincial 
governments – the institutions that are responsible for complying with, and enforcing, these 
judicial rulings.11 By adopting court-centric approaches to the study of judicial power, scholars 
have unfortunately overlooked the crucial role played by legislatures in constitutional politics as 
the designers and implementers of public policy in response to judicial invalidation. For this 
reason, it is entirely possible, perhaps even likely, that the right-wing scholarship has 
exaggerated (or overstated) the policy influence and impact of the Supreme Court of Canada 
post-entrenchment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.   
 
1.1 Research Question and Scope of Study 
That being said, the thesis addresses this gap in the literature by empirically measuring the policy 
clout and legacy of the McLachlin Court – the first female, longest serving and, arguably, the 
most liberal Chief Justice to sit on Canada’s highest court. From same-sex marriage and 
physician-assisted suicide, to safe injection facilities and reasonable trial delays, the McLachlin 
Court has decided critical issues of public policy. Out of a total of 94 Charter cases involving 
primary legislation reviewed by the SCC between 2000 and 2017, the McLachlin Court either 
invalidated (suspended or immediate) or amended 38 federal or provincial statutes (see Appendix 
2). In just over 40 per cent of cases, therefore, the McLachlin Court attempted to judicialize 
politics through its remedial activism.   
 
11 Hall 2010, 15-8; See also Kelly (In progress), 5.  
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 As a result of these ‘strong-type’ decisions where the Supreme Court invalidated federal 
and/or provincial legislation, the McLachlin Court has gained a reputation for being an extremely 
activist Court responsible for spearheading fundamental policy change.12 The fact of the matter, 
however, is that relatively few scholars have studied the policy impact of her Court. This thesis 
project attempts to address this limitation by analyzing reply legislation introduced by the federal 
or provincial legislatures in an attempt to understand what happens after the Supreme Court 
invalidates legislation for its inconsistency with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, or, in the 
case of Chaoulli, the Quebec Charter of Human Rights. In so doing, the research project 
provides an opportunity to challenge inaccurate assumptions about the McLachlin Court’s policy 
impact and influence. 
Utilizing dialogue theory as the framework of analysis, complemented with a modified 
approach to Hall’s (2010) theory of courts as ‘implementer-dependent’ institutions, the paper 
asks the following research questions: 
• What is the policy legacy of the McLachlin Court in key examples of judicial 
invalidation involving salient federal and provincial statutes? 
• Have the Court’s Charter judgments influenced the design and implementation of 
federal and provincial public policy responses to judicial invalidation? If so, to 
what extent? 
• How can we measure the policy impact of judicial decisions? 
 
The attractiveness of dialogue theory as an analytical framework stems from its attention 
to interinstitutional interactions or exchanges under the Charter of Rights.13 The theory suggests 
that judicial invalidation is the beginning of a ‘dialogue,’ whereby legislatures respond to the 
Court by introducing new legislation, or re-drafting old legislation, in ways that challenge the 
 
12 Delacourt 2017.  
13 Hogg and Bushell 1997; Hogg, Bushell-Thornton and Wright 2007; Roach 2004.  
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Supreme Court’s decision. In effect, dialogue theorists maintain that the legislatures can 
constrain judicial power via legislative noncompliance. 14  Similarly, Hall’s (2010) theory of 
courts as ‘implementer-dependent’ institutions demonstrates that the Supreme Court’s 
policymaking power (or influence) is contingent on whether the party responsible for 
implementing the decision complies with, and thus implements, the judicial ruling. In vertical 
issue areas, where lower courts implement a judicial decision, the Supreme Court habitually 
wields extensive power. However, in lateral issue areas, where non-judicial actors implement the 
Court’s decision, judicial power is conditional on the likelihood that it is a decision 
favored/desired by the party responsible for its enforcement.15 Taken together, these theories 
demonstrate that the legislatures can, through the enactment of reply legislation, mitigate the 
effects of judicial activism and significantly constrain the Supreme Court’s policymaking power. 
Finding inspiration in Hall’s (2010) theory of courts as implementer-dependent 
institutions, the thesis project contends that the Supreme Court of Canada’s (SCC) policy 
influence and power rests fundamentally on whether the actor responsible for implementing a 
judicial decision – in this case, the provincial and federal legislatures – accept, and thus 
implement, the Court’s ruling. The thesis maintains that in cases involving lateral policy issues, 
the type of legislative sequel introduced in response to judicial invalidation (i.e., positive or 
negative) is contingent on the popularity of the judicial decision. In cases involving ‘popular’ 
judicial rulings, whereby the relevant legislature perceives the judicial decision to be a valid or 
viable approach to public policy, legislatures will likely enact reply legislation that complies with 
the Court’s ruling (negative dialogic response). In these cases, the Court will be in a position to 
influence or dictate public policy outcomes, and will therefore behave as a powerful 
 
14 Hogg, Bushell-Thornton and Wright 2007, 45.  
15 Hall 2010, 15-6.  
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policymaking institution. In cases involving ‘unpopular’ judicial rulings, whereby the relevant 
legislature perceives the decision to be an unviable or unacceptable approach to public policy, 
reply legislation will likely challenge, or ineffectively implement, the Court’s decision (positive 
dialogic response). In these cases, the Supreme Court’s policymaking power will be constrained 
via legislative noncompliance.16   
As the thesis project demonstrates, all six cases under review are key examples of 
‘strong-type’ Supreme Court of Canada decisions delivered during the McLachlin era whereby 
the Court struck down primary legislation for unjustifiably violating the Canadian or the Quebec 
Charters (Chaoulli). In response to these unpopular decisions involving lateral policy areas 
(health, criminal justice and minority-language education), the relevant federal or provincial 
legislatures introduced positive dialogic sequels to address judicial invalidation. In other words, 
Bills 115 (in response to Nguyen and Solski), C-36 (in response to Bedford), C-2 (in response to 
PHS Community), 33 (in response to Chaoulli) and C-14 (in response to Carter) are, properly 
interpreted, examples of legislative noncompliance. As the thesis argues, this outcome is in large 
part explained by the fact that all six cases were unpopular with the non-judicial actors 
responsible for enforcing these judicial decisions. That is to say, the Court’s decisions were 
fundamentally at odds with the policy objectives of the federal or provincial legislatures. 
Accordingly, the thesis demonstrates that in cases involving lateral policy areas, the extent of the 
Court’s policy power is contingent on the legislatures’ willingness to create conditions favorable 
to the judicialization of politics and judicial policymaking under the Charter.  
Despite the McLachlin Court’s best attempts to judicialize healthcare, criminal justice 
and minority-language education policy through its remedial activism, therefore, the policy 
impact of her Court was rather limited, as the relevant legislatures chose not to create conditions 
 
16 Macfarlane 2012, 44.  
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favorable to the judicialization of politics. Contrary to the position advanced by right-wing 
judicial critics, the thesis demonstrates that judicial invalidation often leaves room for an 
independent legislative response, even in cases where the Supreme Court issues ‘strong-type’ or 
authoritative decisions.  
 
1.2 Methodological Approach 
Essentially, by analyzing judicial-legislative policy interactions in six cases involving statutes 
(primary legislation) invalidated by the McLachlin Court (2000-2017),17  the study seeks to 
understand how legislatures can, through the enactment of reply legislation, constrain judicial 
power and policymaking. These six cases include: Chaoulli v. Québec (2005); Solski (Tutor of) 
v. Québec (Attorney General) (2005); Nguyen v. Québec (Education, Recreation and Sports) 
(2009); Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community (2011); Canada (Attorney General) v. 
Bedford (2013); and Carter v. Canada (2015). 
The objectives of the research flow directly from the research questions it seeks answers 
to, and include the following considerations: 
1. Utilize dialogue theory as a framework for analyzing interinstitutional policy dynamics 
between the McLachlin Court (2000-2017) and the federal and provincial legislatures;  
 
2. To use these findings as indication of the Court’s capacity (or incapacity) to effectively 
influence public policy outcomes. In other words, to analyze the policy legacy (or 
failures) of the McLachlin Court; and 
 
3. To apply a modified version of Matthew Hall’s theory of courts as ‘implementer-
dependent’ institutions in the context of the Supreme Court of Canada to measure judicial 
impact and contribute to theory-building initiatives in Canada.  
 
17 The selection criteria are explained in the “Case Selection and Data Analysis” section.  
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It is important here not to overstate the significance of the study’s findings, particularly in 
relation to theory-building initiatives in Canada. The study applies dialogue theory, and a 
modified version of Matthew Hall’s theory of the Supreme Court of Canada as an ‘implementer-
dependent’ institution, to six cases of judicial invalidation involving controversial and salient 
issues of public policy. Accordingly, the study does not offer a comprehensive review of judicial 
power and policymaking in Canada, more generally. Nonetheless, the study provides an 
opportunity to revitalize the use of dialogue theory, specifically the negative/positive typology, 
as a useful framework for analyzing interinstitutional exchanges between the Court and the 
legislatures in an attempt to understand when and how legislatures respond to judicial 
invalidation, and what this means for judicial power and policymaking under the Charter.  
Similarly, the study recognizes that, in Canada, the explanatory power of Hall’s theory of 
the Supreme Court as an ‘implementer-dependent’ institution is limited. In effect, Hall’s theory 
applies exclusively to cases involving unpopular lateral issues where the Court strikes down 
legislation for its inconsistency with the Charter. Nevertheless, Hall’s theory contributes to the 
judicialization literature in Canada by demonstrating that, given the right set of circumstances 
(i.e., when the Court delivers an unpopular decision involving a lateral issue area), judicial power 
can be constrained via the provincial and/or federal legislatures’ decision to ineffectively 
implement the judicial ruling.  
 
1.3 Institutional Focus and Units of Analysis 
Given the study’s focus on interinstitutional policy dynamics when statutes (primary legislation) 
are invalidated as inconsistent with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, two units of analysis 
were relevant: first, the Supreme Court of Canada, as this institution is the final arbiter of 
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constitutionality, and; second, Parliament and the provincial legislatures, as the institutions that 
first enact statues invalidated by the Supreme Court, and those tasked with responding with new 
legislation when statutes are declared inconsistent with the Charter of Rights.  
While the SCC does not hold a monopoly over constitutional review, two reasons justify 
the exclusion of lower courts. First, the Supreme Court of Canada can overturn lower court 
decisions and have at times done so, whereas the latter cannot challenge the former. Second, and 
related, the Supreme Court is the final appellate court in Canada. Thus, the SCC speaks on behalf 
of all Canadian courts.  
 Moreover, the principle of federalism, and its central place in Canadian democracy, 
suggests that an accurate analysis of interinstitutional policy relations requires paying attention to 
both the federal and provincial statutes reviewed by the McLachlin Court. By focusing 
exclusively on judicial invalidation of provincial statutes, the study would overlook the Court’s 
policy clout in the largest area of Charter review, criminal justice policy. Conversely, an 
exclusive focus on judicial invalidation of federal statutes would overlook the Court’s influence 
in key areas of provincial jurisdiction, which may represent the most important and salient areas 
of public policy reviewed by the Supreme Court led by Beverley McLachlin, such as education 
and healthcare policy. In any case, the study could potentially underestimate or overestimate the 
Court’s policy influence, in turn compromising the significance of its findings.  
 
1.4 Case Selection and Data Analysis 
Two databases were utilized to determine which Supreme Court decisions to review for the 
purposes of selecting significant Charter invalidations: CanLII and Lexum. In addition, websites 
such as ‘openparliament’ were reviewed to assess whether Parliament or the provincial 
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legislatures introduced legislative responses when the Court invalidated statutes as inconsistent 
with the Charter. 
For the case study component of the research, the cases were purposely and strategically 
selected. The extensive number of Charter-based cases reviewed by the McLachlin Court 
rendered it fundamentally impossible to conduct an in-depth analysis of each decision: Out of 
1290 cases (2000-2017), 239 cases, or roughly 18.5 per cent of the Court’s docket, involved 
Charter rights and freedoms (see Appendix 1). Given the study’s focus on the policy legacy of 
the McLachlin Court, however, only cases involving primary legislation were relevant. While the 
Supreme Court is also responsible for ensuring that the conduct of government officials 
(ministerial discretion, police force, judges etc.) and secondary legislation (regulations/rules) are 
Charter-compliant, primary legislation is arguably a more accurate indicator of the policy clout 
of the SCC given that it relates to policies that have been enacted by Parliament or a provincial 
legislature. As a result, the study excluded all conduct cases and secondary legislation. Reference 
questions were also omitted from the study given that they involve advisory opinions and do not 
involve a finding of statutory invalidation. Therefore, a total of ninety-four cases involved 
primary legislation, or statutes, during the McLachlin era (see Appendix 2).  
Additionally, the use of dialogue as the framework of analysis implies that all cases 
where the Court determined that legislation did not infringe on rights, or was a justifiable 
infringement, must also be excluded. This is because dialogue theory requires a legislative 
response to a previous finding of unconstitutionality to occur, which involves the Supreme Court 
exercising its remedial powers under section 24(1) of the Charter of Rights. This produces a 
subset of cases that involve thirty-eight examples of remedial activism (see Appendix 3).  
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From this list, an additional nineteen cases were excluded, as the responsible legislature 
either repealed the offending provision, or did not introduce a legislative response to address 
judicial invalidation. According to Manfredi and Kelly (1999), these are examples of ‘negative 
responses’ that cannot be considered examples of Charter dialogue theory in practice.18 Further, 
Hall’s theory can only be tested in cases where the legislature responded to judicial declarations 
of unconstitutionality, as this requires a legislative response on the part of the responsible 
political actor to test the Supreme Court as an ‘implementer-dependent’ institution. In effect, 
only in cases where the legislature introduces legislation in response to a judicial finding of 
unconstitutionality can this research project test the policy impact of judicial review.  
 These criteria, therefore, reduce the number of cases where the conditions exist to 
evaluate the Supreme Court as an ‘implementer-dependent’ institution to nineteen cases. From 
this list, and given the parameters of a Master’s thesis, six judicial decisions were selected to 
conduct a case study of judicial policymaking, and its impact, during the McLachlin years: 
Chaoulli v. Québec (2005); Solski (Tutor of) v. Québec (Attorney General) (2005); Nguyen v. 
Québec (Education, Recreation and Sports) (2009); Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS 
Community (2011); Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford (2013); and Carter v. Canada (2015). 
These cases were selected for the following three reasons: 
 
1. they address key areas of public policy, such as criminal justice (PHS Community and 
Bedford), language (Solski and Nguyen) and health policy (Chaoulli and Carter). In this 
respect, they represent the core responsibilities of the two orders of government;  
 
2. they represent landmark SCC decisions delivered during the McLachlin era, and;  
 
 
18 Manfredi and Kelly 1999, 520-22.  
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3. they address politically, culturally, and socially salient and controversial issues of public 
policy, involving minority language education rights in Quebec, medical assistance in 
dying, prostitution reform, private health insurance, and safe injection facilities. 
 
Additionally, all of the cases, with the exception of Chaoulli, are unanimous decisions; 
two of these cases, Carter and Solski, were judgments authored by ‘The Court.’ Unanimous 
decisions are particularly interesting because they are generally perceived as ‘strong’ or 
‘authoritative’ judgments and, as a result, are less likely to witness a legislative response. 
Therefore, in speaking with one voice, the Court creates conditions favorable to judicial 
policymaking. Dissenting opinions, by contrast, lack the same degree of authority, and split 
decisions (especially when it is a narrow majority) create conditions favorable to the introduction 
of independent legislative responses because they are marked by “legal uncertainty.” 19  The 
expectation of this study, therefore, is that dissenting opinions are more likely to see a legislative 
response, whereas unanimous decisions are less likely. In regard to the cases chosen for analysis, 
five involved unanimous decisions that witnessed legislative responses, making them particularly 
interesting cases to study because of this paradoxical outcome.  
It is also important to note that the Chaoulli decision is an outlier in two important 
respects: first, it is a split decision (4:3); and second, a very narrow majority found that the 
impugned provisions violated the Quebec Charter of Human Rights, but were split evenly on the 
issue of whether the provisions infringed the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
Nonetheless, its inclusion is justified on a number of grounds. First, Chaoulli is one of the rare 
cases to deal with healthcare policy – a core area, and perhaps the most important area, of 
provincial jurisdiction. The fact that billions of dollars annually are injected into the healthcare 
system demonstrates the importance of health policy to provincial governments and, to a lesser 
 
19 McCormick 2005, 5; Macfarlane 2010, 401; Mathen 2003, 325 & 327.  
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degree, the federal government.20 Second, the quasi-constitutional status of the Quebec Charter 
of Human Rights, when compared to other provincial human rights codes, justifies its inclusion. 
In fact, the Quebec Charter applies to both private and public law and, in this respect, functions 
as a quasi-constitutional document.21 As a result, the Quebec government is more likely to take 
legislative action than its provincial counterparts in cases where the Court declares legislation to 
be incompatible with a human rights code, such as the Quebec Charter. The fact that Chaoulli 
was followed by a legislative response attests to this claim.  
PHS Community is also an exceptional case in that the SCC ruled on the unconstitutional 
application of ministerial discretion, and did not centre on the constitutionality of the statute that 
authorized ministerial discretion. Nonetheless, the Minister’s power to issue exemptions for safe 
injection facilities under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) stems from the 
statute itself. While the Court’s decision did not challenge the constitutionality of the legislation, 
it did implicitly challenge the statute by questioning the use of ministerial authority under the 
CDSA. The fact that the federal government responded to the Supreme Court’s decision by 
introducing new legislation with respect to exceptions under the CDSA suggests, at least to some 
degree, that the Harper Conservatives interpreted the decision not only as an attempt to overrule 
the Minister of Health’s decision, but also as an implicit ‘attack’ on government legislation.  
 
1.5  Measuring and Operationalizing Judicial Policy Impact 
To reiterate, the study seeks to analyze the policy legacy of the McLachlin Court by employing 
dialogue theory as the framework of analysis, complemented with a modified approach of 
Supreme Courts as ‘implementer-dependent’ institutions. This required looking at the Court’s 
 
20 Manfredi and Maioni 2002, 221; Gilmour 2006, 329.  
21 Bateman 2006, 321; Manfredi and Maioni 2006, 264.   
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remedial activism and the substance/content of their decision – namely the policy prescriptions 
and directives provided by the Court via their judgment, particularly section 24(1) of the 
Charter. It also entailed reviewing legislation introduced in response to statutory invalidation to 
determine whether reply legislation qualified as negative or positive dialogue.22  Finally, the 
study cross-compared the data in an attempt to measure the Court’s policy impact i.e., their 
capacity to influence public policy post-constitutional review.    
Court decisions fall into one of four categories: the Court invalidates legislation; 
suspends a declaration of unconstitutionality; amends legislation; and finally, determines that 
legislation is Charter compliant (upheld). Invalidation refers to situations where the Court strikes 
down legislation, whereas suspended invalidation refers to situations where the Court declares 
that a statute is incompatible with the Charter but provides the legislatures with a certain amount 
of time to remedy the defects. Three situations count as judicial amendment. The Supreme Court 
either reads-in provisions (they add sections to the statute), reads-down (they remove sections), 
or severs statutes (they remove/add words or sentences).23  
Legislative responses fall into one of four categories: (1) no legislative response; (2) the 
invalidated legislation is repealed and never replaced; (3) the invalidated legislation is repealed 
and replaced; and (4) the invalidated legislation is amended. Categories 1 and 2 are coded as 
examples of negative dialogue because the legislature made no attempt to challenge the Court’s 
decision. By failing to respond to Court declarations of unconstitutionality, the legislatures allow 
the Court, by default, to influence public policy outcomes and thus to act as policymakers.24 
Classifying responses that fall into categories 3 and 4 requires analyzing legislative responses to 
determine whether new legislation accomplishes the same policy objectives as its predecessor 
 
22 Manfredi and Kelly 1999, 520-22.   
23 Macfarlane 2012, 49.  
24 Macfarlane 2012, 44.  
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(positive dialogue), or whether it compromises/abandons its initial objectives (negative 
dialogue).25 The fifty per cent mark can be used as a point of reference for measuring the policy 
influence of the McLachlin Court. The higher the number of positive responses, the less 
influence the Court exercises over public policy outcomes. Conversely, the lower the number of 
positive responses, the greater policy influence the Court exercises.  
Finally, Hall’s (2010) theory of the Court as an implementer-dependent institution claims 
that in lateral issue areas, implementation by non-judicial actors depends heavily on the 
popularity of the Court’s decision.26 The present research develops a proxy for distinguishing 
between popular/unpopular issues: campaign platforms of incumbent governments, as this “helps 
to identify the importance of a policy issue to the government of the day.”27 This is important 
given that, in a substantial number of Charter cases, the legislature tasked with responding to 
judicial decisions is not the government responsible for its original enactment. The expectation 
of this study is that the legislatures are more likely to make room on a crowded agenda, and thus 
respond to judicial invalidation or amendment by introducing positive legislative sequels, when 
the issue at stake is important to their party. Party platforms are arguably a more accurate proxy 
for measuring the ‘popularity’ of judicial decisions in the Canadian context when compared to 
public opinion polls, as Hall’s study centred on judicial power in the American Congressional 
system.  
 
1.6 Outline of Chapters 
Excluding the present chapter, the thesis is structured into five chapters. The second chapter 
includes a comprehensive literature review that draws on four bodies of literature: the left-wing 
 
25 Manfredi and Kelly 1999, 521-22.  
26 Hall 2010, 18; See also Kelly 2018, 251.  
27 Macfarlane 2018, 409.  
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position, dialogue theory, the judicialization and the judicial policymaking literatures in Canada. 
It highlights some of the limitations of existing work and the ways in which the present research 
seeks to overcome these limitations. With respect to Hall’s theory, it draws on institutional 
differences between Canada and the United States in an attempt to demonstrate that Hall’s 
framework must first be reformulated to ensure its applicability to a parliamentary system of 
government.  
  Chapters three through five are dedicated to the case study component of the research. 
Each chapter focuses on a specific policy issue. Chapter three addresses criminal justice policy 
(PHS Community and Bedford), chapter four reviews health policy (Chaoulli and Carter) and 
chapter five explores minority-language education policy in Quebec (Solski and Nguyen). Each 
chapter provides an overview and summary of the cases – including the policy issue at stake, the 
litigants involved, and also draws on important historical, political and/or social facts relevant to 
the case. Additionally, each chapter outlines the facts and outcome of the cases, applies dialogue 
as a framework for analyzing the substance of legislative responses to judicial invalidation, and 
interprets what these findings reveal about judicialization in Canada and the policy clout of the 
McLachlin Court.   
 Here it is important to recall that three factors contribute to the judicialization of politics: 
“a constitutional framework that promotes the judicialization of politics; a relatively autonomous 
judiciary that is easily enticed to dive into deep political waters; and above all, a political 
environment that is conductive to the judicialization of politics.”28 The inclusion of a strong 
remedial provision in the Charter (s. 24(1)), combined with the Court’s  ‘activist’ approach to 
judicial review, suggests that the first two conditions are met in Canada. Indeed, and as 
previously suggested, a review of the McLachlin Court’s Charter docket (primary legislation) 
 
28 Hirschl 2009, 270.  
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demonstrates that they have, generally speaking, been a particularly activist Court. For example, 
roughly two in five cases involving federal or provincial statutes witnessed the McLachlin Court 
strike down legislation for its inconsistency with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
If one considers the legal outcome of these cases alone, therefore, it appears that the McLachlin 
Court successfully judicialized politics during its time in power.29  
Right-wing critics have thus far failed to demonstrate, however, whether the ‘political 
environment’ creates conditions hospitable (or hostile) to judicialization. In other words, they 
have failed to evaluate the impact of these legal decisions, or, put differently, they have failed to 
“understand what happens after a statue is declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of 
Canada.”30  In applying Hall’s theory of Courts as ‘implementer-dependent’ institutions, the 
present paper seeks to fill this gap by demonstrating that judicialization depends on which actor 
is responsible for implementing the Court’s decision (judicial or non-judicial) and, in the case of 
lateral issues, whether the decision is popular.31  
  The final chapter is the conclusion. It summarizes key findings, paying specific attention 
to Hall’s (2010) theory of Court’s as ‘implementer-dependent’ institutions and its relevance to 
the study of the Supreme Court of Canada’s power and policy impact. It also highlights the 
significance and implications of the research, including its contributions to the judicialization of 
politics literature in Canada. Further, the conclusion draws on the limitations of the research 




29 See Appendix 2 
30 Kelly (In progress), 5. 
31 Hall 2010, 18.  
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2 
The Judicialization of Politics and Judicial Policymaking in 
Canada  
 
The present chapter surveys four bodies of literature relevant to the study of judicial power and 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s policy impact post-entrenchment of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. Accordingly, the chapter is divided into four sections: the left-wing 
critical position, the judicialization of politics and the right-wing critical position, dialogue 
theory, and the judicial policymaking literature, with a specific focus on Hall’s (2010) theory of 
courts as ‘implementer-dependent’ institutions. In so doing, it addresses a series of normative 
and empirical debates concerning judicial activism and the legitimacy of judicial review in 
Canada post-1982.   
This review seeks to demonstrate that, in spite of its contributions, existing literature on 
judicial policymaking power in Canada is limited for a number of reasons. For starters, the 
arguments advanced by left-wing critics are unsatisfactory insofar as they are based heavily (if 
not entirely) on scholars’ subjective opinions about the ‘best-suited’ approach to rights protection 
in Canada. In this respect, it offers little to the study of judicial power and the Supreme Court’s 
policy clout.  
With respect to the right-wing critical position, a debatable narrative has developed 
which depicts the Court as an ‘all-powerful’ and ‘policy-hungry’ institution.1  These claims, 
however, remain largely speculative given that there have been relatively few attempts to 
empirically measure judicial power and the Court’s policy impact. 2  A more serious flaw, 
 
1 Monahan 2001, 387; Kelly 2005, 35; Morton 1992, 627; Morton and Knopff 2000, 22.   
2 Macfarlane 2018, 395; See also Roach 2004, 52. 
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however, is the fact that right-wing scholars have generally adopted court-centric approaches to 
the study of judicial power, which focus heavily on judicial activism and legal mobilization 
efforts. Undeniably, conservative critics have contributed to the judicialization literature by 
demonstrating that the Court plays an important policy role as ‘agenda-setters’ given their 
capacity, and, at times, willingness, to invalidate legislation for its inconsistency with the 
Charter. Right-wing judicial critics have mistakenly assumed, however, that judicial invalidation 
automatically translates into, or results in, fundamental policy change. 3 The question remains, 
does judicial invalidation actually lead to policy change?   
Arguably, dialogue theory and Hall’s (2010) theory of courts as  ‘implementer-
dependent’ institutions provide a useful means for addressing these gaps in the existing literature. 
As dialogue theorists rightfully suggest, the legislatures can introduce an independent legislative 
response to address judicial invalidation in ways that challenge the Court’s decision and, as a 
result, can temper the effects of judicial activism. 4  Similarly, Hall’s (2010) theory of final 
appellate courts as ‘implementer-dependent’ institutions demonstrates that the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s policy power and influence is contingent on whether the actor responsible for 
implementing a judicial decision accepts, and thus complies with, the decision. In cases where 
non-judicial actors implement judicial rulings (lateral issue areas) – for example, the federal and 
provincial legislatures – the Court’s power is conditional on the likelihood that it is a decision 
favored/desired by the party responsible for its enforcement. 5  While Hall’s theory requires 
modifications before it can be applied in the Canadian context, it nonetheless serves as a useful 
way of understanding the conditions under which the Supreme Court of Canada behaves as a 
powerful policymaking institution.  
 
3 Kelly (In progress), 13  
4 Hogg, Bushell-Thornton and Wright 2007, 45.   
5 Hall 2010, 15-8.  
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In short, this review seeks to demonstrate that right-wing judicial critics have mistakenly 
downplayed the key role played by the federal and provincial legislatures in constitutional 
politics as the designers and implementers of public policy in response to judicial invalidation. 
As a result, conservative critics have potentially exaggerated the extent of the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s policy influence and impact post-1982.  
 
2.1  Left-Wing Charter Critics 
Two critical positions emerged in response to the Charter: left- and right-wing critics. On the 
one hand, left-wing critics, such as Fudge, Hutchinson and Petter, are critical of the Charter as a 
document. Conversely, Manfredi, Morton and Knopff, dubbed right-wing judicial critics or 
conservative critics, are critical of the Court’s activist approach to constitutional review.  
 For left-wing scholars, the Charter has failed to fulfill its promise of being a 
‘transformative document’ capable of addressing and resolving structural discrimination and 
inequality.6  Two reasons explain this outcome. The first stems from the type of rights and 
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, while the other stems from the nature of the institution 
charged with its interpretation and enforcement.7  
 Left-wing scholars claim that the Charter has adopted a negative and, ultimately, 
restrictive approach to protecting rights and liberties.8 In excluding social and economic rights, 
these scholars contend that the Charter serves as an ineffective tool for combatting persisting 
disparities in wealth and power in Canada.9 Rather, the Charter has served as a “potent political 
weapon” utilized almost exclusively by powerful corporations and other powerful interest groups 
 
6 Fudge and Glasbeek 1992, 52; Hutchinson and Petter 1988, 283.  
7 Petter 1989, 152.  
8 Fudge and Glasbeek 1992, 52; Hutchinson and Petter 1988, 283.  
9 Petter 1989, 152-53.  
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to advance their policy interests.10 The costs of Charter litigation have in turn served to deter the 
underprivileged and marginalized – those who would benefit from a progressive rights document 
– from using the courts to advance their policy interests, effectively denying them the same 
privilege it has granted powerful groups.11  
According to the left-wing position, the Charter’s progressive potential is thwarted 
because it applies exclusively to the public sphere and thus does not apply to the private sphere, 
the place where rights injustices frequently occur. More worrisome is the fact that the Charter 
grants the courts – an elitist institution composed largely of affluent, white, middle-aged, and 
male justices – unfettered discretion in making the public/private distinction. The privileged 
status of courts implies that they will be more sympathetic to the concerns and interests of 
business elites than those of the disadvantaged and marginalized. 12  In ruling that powerful 
corporations fall outside of the meaning of ‘public,’ Canadian courts not only immunize certain 
groups from being accountable to the Charter, they also permit corporations to “mobilize the 
Charter as a weapon to resist government regulation and to insulate [themselves] from popular 
scrutiny and control.”13  
While left-wing scholars raise a number of issues associated with the Charter, their 
arguments are wholly unconvincing. For left-wing scholars, the assumption is that because 
Canadian courts are elitist and unrepresentative, the courtroom is a venue unsuitable for 
addressing the interests of the economically and socially disadvantaged. Interestingly enough, 
this critique of the Court was made at a time when the composition of both Houses of 
Parliament, the institutions left-wing scholars suggest are better equipped to serve such interests, 
 
10 Hutchinson and Petter 1988, 279.  
11 Fudge and Glasbeek 1992, 52; Hutchinson and Petter 1988, 283; Petter 2009, 39; Petter 1989, 155.  
12 Petter 1989, 157.  
13 Hutchinson and Petter 1988, 284.  
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were demographically similar to that of courts; politicians tended to be wealthy and powerful 
men, and, in this respect, could have also been said to be unrepresentative of Canadians and 
unresponsive to the interests of the underprivileged.14  In more recent years, this argument may 
be even less compelling given that the Supreme Court of Canada is, overall, a relatively gender-
balanced institution.  
Moreover, left-wing scholars claim that the Charter promotes a regressive, formal and 
classical-liberal approach to protecting rights and liberties.15 Thus, the undemocratic critique is 
based heavily on the fact that the document is inconsistent with their preferred version of a 
‘social-democratic’ Charter. A central limitation associated with the left-wing position, 
therefore, is that it “is more an attack on liberal democracy than it is an analysis of Charter 
review by the Supreme Court.”16 Here it is important to recall that the central objective of the 
present research is to gain a better understanding of the policymaking power of the Supreme 
Court under McLachlin’s leadership. Therefore, the arguments and concerns raised by right-wing 
critics, specifically those related to judicial activism and the judicialization of politics, are better 
suited for addressing the study’s objectives.  
 
2.2 Right-Wing/Conservative Judicial Critics 
Constitutional scholars agree that, post-1982, the courts have played a more important policy 
role than every before in the history of the institution.17 This phenomenon, one that is also 
making wave in other countries with constitutionalized bills of rights, is now commonly referred 
to as the ‘judicialization of politics,’ which is meant to explain “the ever-accelerating reliance on 
 
14 Sigurdson 1993, 142-43.  
15 Petter 1989, 152 & 156; Hutchinson 1990, 6.   
16 Kelly 2005, 26 & 32.  
17 Russell 1994, 165-66; Hirschl 2008, 93; Morton 1987, 32; Dodek 2009, 94; Kelly and Manfredi 2009, 4; Russell 1995, 137.  
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courts and judicial means for addressing core moral predicaments, public policy questions, and 
political controversies.” 18  In Canada, the ‘judicialization debate’ stems from competing 
understandings of the degree or extent of judicialization in Canada, and secondly, from 
conflicting understandings of the democratic implications of judicial review. Two groups have 
actively participated in these ongoing debates: right-wing judicial (or conservative) critics and 
dialogue theorists.  
 From the onset, conservative critics worried that the Supreme Court’s capacity to exert 
significant policy influence in areas falling within the scope of the Charter would result in 
‘judicial supremacy,’ an outcome that would have debilitating effects on the legitimate 
functioning of Canadian democracy. For these scholars, it is the Supreme Court’s activist 
approach to the Charter, rather than the Charter in and of itself, that is the root cause of 
judicialization.19 According to conservative critics, the Court has:  
• embraced an ‘open-door policy’ for interveners,20 allowing powerful interest groups to 
use the courts as a venue for advancing their policy interests;21  
• adopted “one of the most liberalized standing regimes in the world”;22 
• gained near complete discretion over its docket and thus controls the number (and nature) 
of rights-based issues that it hears;23 
• applied a liberal or ‘living-tree’ approach to constitutional review, thus allowing the 
Court to establish the boundaries of the Charter by shaping its meaning and application 
through its judgments;24 
 
18 Hirschl 2006, 721-22.  
19 Morton and Knopff 2000, 40 & 57; Vaughan 2001, 16. 
20 Morton and Knopff 2000, 55 
21 Mintz, Tossutti and Dunn 2014, 352; Webber 2019, 156; Huscroft 2009, 53; Morton and Knopff 2000, 26. 
22 Huscroft 2009, 53; See also Manfredi 2014, 147.  
23 Manfredi and Maioni 2002, 216-17.  
24 Morton, Solomon, McNish and Poulton 1989, 408; Morton 1992, 629; Hogg 1987, 97; Morton and Knopff 2000, 15; Manfredi 
2014, 147.  
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• used the reasonable limits clause (section 1) of the Charter, or the Oakes test – a 
judicially created and enforced tool – to determine whether rights infringements are 
justified, therefore choosing “how to balance competing interests or purposes,”25; and 
• behaved as a policy influencer and shaper through its remedial activism.26 
 
Right-wing critics contend that the judicialization of politics, or judicial activism, is 
incompatible with the legitimate functioning of a constitutional democracy: the Supreme Court is 
an unelected, unaccountable and elitist institution that has stripped the legislatures of their 
policymaking power.27 
Initially, participants in the ‘judicialization of politics’ debate in Canada focused on the 
method of judicial review that was necessary to ensure that the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
approach to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms was consistent with the role of courts in a 
constitutional democracy. 28  Generally speaking, this theoretical justification centred on the 
interpretivist/non-interpretivist approaches.  
The distinction between ‘interpretivism’ and ‘non-interpretivism’ stems from the 
interpretive flexibility scholars are willing to grant the courts. Sometimes labelled as the ‘frozen-
rights’ or ‘originalist’ approach, interpretivism is the idea that courts should interpret and apply 
the Charter in ways that adhere to the original meaning or understanding as intended by its 
framers.29 On the other hand, ‘non-interpretivism,’ sometimes called the ‘living tree’ or ‘non-
originalist’ approach, suggests that courts should actively update the meaning of the Charter via 
judicial review in an attempt to allow for the possibility of constitutional growth and evolution.30 
 
25 Tushnet 2003, 94.  
26 Kelly and Manfredi 2009, 10. 
27 Vallinder 1994, 91; Hirschl 2000, 92 & 94.  
28 Hogg 1987, 95.  
29 Hogg 1987, 91; Kelly 2014, 100; Kelly 2005, 34.  
30 Jackson 2006, 954.  
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Whereas interpretivism seeks to minimize judicial discretion in interpreting and applying the 
Charter, non-interpretivism seeks to maximize it.31  
The crux of right-wing critics’ argument is that in deviating from the language or 
wording of the Charter, the Court transforms into an institution responsible not for enforcing 
laws, but rather, one that creates laws.32 The ‘undemocratic’ critique, therefore, is premised on 
the fact that in adopting a ‘non-interpretivist’ approach to constitutional review, and in 
encouraging an expansive understanding and application of rights and freedoms, the Court 
increases the number of policy issues that fall within the scope of the Charter’s protection.33 By 
extension, it creates an environment where virtually all government statutes are susceptible to 
judicial review, and thus judicial nullification.34 
Importantly, theories of interpretivism/non-interpretivism were first introduced in the 
United States.35 While this approach to understanding the judicialization of politics is relevant to 
the study of judicial power in the United States, where these approaches were developed and 
continue to dominate academic discussion, they may be less relevant when applied in the 
Canadian context. In placing too great of emphasis on the provincial premiers as key drafters, 
right-wing critics have “diluted the significance of more important figures – such as Trudeau, 
officials within the Department of Justice, [interest groups], and the [Special Joint Committee] 
(SJC).”36 Given their concern with the Charter’s centralizing effect, especially when considering 
that the Supreme Court is composed of federally appointed justices, it is evident that the premiers 
 
31 Morton and Knopff 2000, 45.  
32 Kelly 2005, 33-4; Hirschl 2002, 214; Morton and Knopff 2000, 28; Oliphant 2015, 242; Harrington 2012, 184; Morton 1992, 
629. 
33 Morton 1992, 629. 
34 Hogg 1987, 91; Morton 1987, 34. 
35 Hogg 1987, 91. 
36 Kelly 2005, 86. 
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favored a Charter that would limit judicial power.37 Indeed, most premiers outright opposed the 
idea of a constitutional bill of rights, preferring instead to engage in constitutional negotiations 
that would address the limitations of the current approach to federalism and the division of 
powers. In particular, the premiers worried that the Charter – which, unlike the Bill of Rights, 
would apply to both provincial and federal governments – would undermine their policymaking 
autonomy and would serve as “a direct assault on the principle of legislative supremacy.”38 In 
fact, the inclusion of section 33 (the notwithstanding clause), which had not been originally 
considered by the Trudeau liberals in the original draft of the Charter, was inserted to appease 
provincial concerns and to avoid a constitutional stalemate.39    
If one takes the view that the premiers were the sole (or even primary) drafters, therefore, 
it appears that an activist Court operates contrary to framers intent. Once one factors in the 
various other ‘drafters,’ however, the argument loses its value. Arguably, the Trudeau Liberals 
welcomed judicial activism and, importantly, advocated for a ‘living tree’ approach to judicial 
review.40 As Kelly (2005) convincingly argues, the inclusion of a strong remedial provision (s. 
24(1)) in the final draft of the Charter – a provision nonexistent in the Charter’s predecessor, the 
Bill of Rights – supports this claim; its inclusion was a deliberate choice made by the drafters to 
strengthen the role of courts in constitutional politics.41  
A review of the debates surrounding the Charter, specifically the arguments advanced by 
groups appearing before the SJC, also suggests that, overall, the public supported a strong 
Charter that would empower the courts as ‘guardians’ of rights and freedoms.42 With respect to 
section 1 (the reasonable limits clause), for example, the premiers favored a provision that would 
 
37 Hirschl 2002, 212; Bayefsky 1987, 812; See also Sigurdson 1993, 120.  
38 Hiebert 1990, 107; See also Fraser 2003, 19-20.  
39 Anand 2006, 94.  
40 Kelly 2005, 12, 80 & 91.  
41 Kelly 2005, 85.  
42 Hiebert 1990, 126.  
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maximize provincial and federal discretion in limiting rights and freedoms. However, groups that 
appeared before the SJC preferred a provision that would limit the potential for government to 
justify infringements on protected rights.43 In short, the provincial premiers appear to be the only 
framers who sought to limit judicial power and activism under the Charter.  
The fluid and broad wording of the Charter is perhaps further indication of the framers’ 
intention to draft the Charter in ways that would allow the Court to adapt its meaning to 
changing political, social and cultural landscapes. In effect, there is no evidence, at least no 
strong evidence, to support right-wing critics’ claim that “the framers had clear views about the 
[precise] meaning of the words they were adopting and intended that these meanings should be 
forever conclusive.”44 A number of public statements made by Jean Chrétien, who at that time of 
the negotiations served as Trudeau’s Minister of Justice, support this claim. As Fraser (2003) 
demonstrates, Chrétien repeatedly asserted that the Charter was intentionally drafted in such a 
broad and fluid manner so as to allow for the possibility of constitutional growth via judicial 
review.45 Paradoxically, right-wing criticisms of the Court, and on the undemocratic nature of 
judicial review, rest largely on the assumption that the framers intended the Court to adopt a 
‘frozen-rights’ approach.  
Contrary to the United States, therefore, the utility of the ‘interpretivist’ model, and its 
use as a framework for understanding and measuring judicial power, is not as convincing when 
applied to Canada. This is in part explained by the fact that right-wing critics have exaggerated 
the importance of the premiers as key players in the debates, and in part explained by the fact 
that they have misunderstood the intentions of the remaining drafters who, as the proceeding 
analysis demonstrates, welcomed judicial activism.  
 
43 Hiebert 1990, 122.  
44 Hogg 1987, 96.  
45 Fraser 2003, 19-20.  
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Conservative skeptics have also been criticized for their tendency to exaggerate the extent 
of judicialization in Canada by overlooking a number of constraints that limit judicial 
policymaking. These constraints flow from the types of rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Charter, as well as the Court’s approach to the Charter.46  
The first constraint arises from the fact that the Charter is framed in terms of negative 
rights and freedoms. 47  With the exception of section 23 (the official minority language 
provision), therefore, the Charter of Rights does not impose positive obligations on the state to 
take policy action.48 In effect, the positive/negative rights distinction is an important one to make 
given that it has very different implications for judicial policymaking and power. As Macfarlane 
(2012) suggests, a ‘negative’ approach requires that government abstain from interfering with 
protected rights and freedoms, whereas a ‘positive’ approach requires government to “deliver or 
ensure access to the rights in question.” Thus, a positive rights approach is more troubling from a 
democratic standpoint because it allows the Court – by providing “entitlement[s] to … new 
benefit[s],” and thus placing financial obligations on government to deliver services – to act as 
policymakers.49  
 In spite of the fact that the Charter is a ‘negative’ rights document, there is some 
evidence that suggests that the Supreme Court has interpreted and applied the Charter, 
particularly section 7, or ‘legal rights,’ in ways that transform negative rights into positive 
entitlements. This was the case in Carter v. Canada, where the Court required that the 
legislatures establish programs for medical assistance in dying; 50 in Vriend v. Alberta, a case 
 
46 Russell 1995, 141. 
47 Russell 1995, 141.  
48 Macfarlane 2014, 51.  
49 Macfarlane 2014, 50 & 53. 
50 Macfarlane 2016, 121; Macfarlane 2018, 397; Chan and Somerville 2016, 158.   
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involving sexual orientation; 51  and in Eldrige, a case involving government funding for 
translation for the hearing impaired.52 While the Court has at times imposed positive obligations 
on government, these cases tend to be exceptions. For example, in Egan (old age pension plans) 
and in Adler (funding for Jewish schools), the Court did not require that the legislatures use 
public funding in ways that would extend protection to litigants. Similarly, while Vriend required 
that the legislature extend equality protections to include sexual orientation, the decision did “not 
place a substantive obligation on the state to address discrimination.”53 In short, cases involving 
positive rights represent a minority of successful Charter challenges heard by the Supreme Court 
(for example, just under 40 per cent between 1982 and 1999), suggesting that the Court 
infrequently imposes positive obligations on government to protect rights.54 
 Additionally, while the Charter guarantees a number of rights and freedoms, other rights, 
such as health, economic and property rights, are excluded.55 This suggests that while criminal 
policy is heavily judicialized, other key policy areas are immune from the Charter, thus 
rendering them ‘non-judicializable.’ 56  The problem, however, is that the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning, and the ways in which it exercises its remedial powers under the Charter of Rights, 
might mean that in non-criminal cases, the Court plays a more direct role in the policymaking 
process despite the fact that such cases occupy a relatively small percentage of the Court’s 
Charter docket. Nonetheless, and as Kelly (2014) demonstrates, the Court has adopted a rather 
restrained approach to constitutional review in non-legal rights cases: in approximately 75.1 per 
cent of these cases, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of government. Further, in a majority of 
‘activist’ Charter challenges where the Supreme Court ruled in favor of litigants, the issue at 
 
51 Zanoni 2018, 74. 
52 Flood and Xavier 2008, 634; Macfarlane 2014, 53 
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54 Kelly 2014, 104.  
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stake involved the constitutional obligations of the police and abuses of power. From a 
democratic standpoint, activist decisions involving police conduct are less troubling because they 
typically involve negative rights, and because they are often concerned with criminal policy 
and/or involve legal rights issues – a policy area for which the courts are often assumed to be 
experts. On the flip side, judicial invalidation of statutes is worrisome because it has the potential 
to threaten the policy autonomy of legislatures, and because it creates an opportunity for the 
Supreme Court, an unaccountable and unelected institution, to dictate policy outcomes.57  
 Taken collectively, these studies demonstrate that judicialization is not as robust as 
contended by right-wing scholars because the Charter largely protects negative freedoms, and 
does not compel a public policy response via positive rights obligations. Indeed, positive rights 
are generally absent from the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, save for the minority language 
education rights protection in section 23. Moreover, these scholars demonstrate that conservative 
critics’ fears may be misplaced in regard to public policy obligations placed on Parliament and 
the provincial legislatures as a result of judicial participation in policy debates via the Charter.  
 
2.3  Dialogue Theory and the Supreme Court of Canada 
Dialogue theorists, such as Hogg, Bushell and Roach, have similarly challenged conservative 
critics’ claim that judicial review is undemocratic.58 For these scholars, judicial invalidation is 
the beginning of a ‘dialogue,’ or inter-institutional conversation, between the Court and the 
legislatures.59 More specifically, they contend that there are two dialogic instruments capable of 
constraining judicial power: section 33 (the notwithstanding clause) and section 1 (the reasonable 
 
57 Kelly 2014, 101, 103, 111 & 120.  
58 Huscroft 2009, 50. 
59 Mintz, Tossutti and Dunn 2014, 49; Hogg and Thornton 2001, 107; Hogg, Bushell-Thornton and Wright 2007, 26; Hogg and 
Bushell 1997, 79-80. 
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limits provision).60 Section 33 grants Parliament or provincial legislatures the opportunity to 
override court decisions for a renewable five-year period if certain conditions are met,61 while 
section 1 allows government to justify limitations on protected rights and freedoms in cases 
where the infringement is ‘demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.’62  
 Dialogue theorists’ assertions, however, fail to alleviate the concerns raised by right-wing 
critics regarding the political role of the Court in fundamental policy debates. Scholars often cite 
the limited use of section 33, and the fact that it has only been successfully invoked once in over 
thirty years, as evidence of the dialogic incapacity of the provision.63 Even if Canada were to one 
day witness the revival of section 33, its dialogic capacity would nonetheless be limited. This is 
because section 33 does not apply to all rights and freedoms protected under the Charter; it 
applies exclusively to sections 2 and 7-15. Certain core provisions, such as democratic and 
language rights, are exempt from the legislative override, thus rendering the notwithstanding 
clause a viable means of curbing judicial activism in only a select number of cases.64  
 Similarly, while section 1 allows governments to justify limits as reasonable in a free and 
democratic society, there is no guarantee that the Court will be receptive to such a defense.65 As 
Hiebert (2004) argues, the courts apply the Oakes test – a judicially created and enforced tool – 
to determine whether rights infringements are demonstrably justified. In utilizing this two-stage 
test, courts first determine whether the legislature’s policy objective is ‘pressing and substantial.’ 
If it passes the first part, they then determine whether legislation is rational, proportional and 
importantly, whether it minimally impairs on rights. In effect, the multi-tiered and vigorous 
approach adopted by the Supreme Court, coupled with the fact that it provides the courts wide 
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latitude in determining whether rights infringements are justified, renders it relatively difficult 
for legislatures to succeed in section 1 defenses.66 In the context of section 7 (the right to ‘life, 
liberty and security of the person’), for example, the Supreme Court has never, in over thirty-five 
years, determined that legislation constituted a justifiable infringement on rights.67  
 Studies on the ineffectiveness of section 1 and 33 have led scholars to assert that Canada 
functions as a strong-form system. First introduced by Mark Tushnet, the strong/weak typology 
became a popular method for distinguishing between different systems of judicial review.68 In 
strong-form systems, the remedial powers of courts include the ability to invalidate and/or amend 
legislation.69 Further, Court decisions are ‘authoritative’ given that such rulings can only be 
overturned in one of two ways, both of which are highly unlikely: the Court can reverse its 
previous decision, or the legislature(s) can amend the constitution. Conversely, weak-form 
systems are characterized by limited remedial powers of courts (statements of incompatibility) 
and a formal override provision.70 
Court decisions in both strong- and weak-form systems can be overturned; the key 
difference is the time frame of reversal. In weak-form systems, court decisions can be overturned 
in the short-term because mechanisms of reversal are easier to deploy, and because judicial 
review is non-binding on government. In strong-form systems, judicial decisions tend to endure 
in the long-term because mechanisms of reversal are more difficult to deploy, and because 
judicial review is binding on government.71 
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 In Canada, the Supreme Court’s strong remedial powers, coupled with the ineffectiveness 
of sections 1 and 33 as dialogic instruments, suggests that it operates as a strong-form system. 
And yet this claim seems to be at odds with Tushnet’s (2003) assertion that Canada operates as 
weak-form,72 a claim that does not stand up to scrutiny once all the evidence is considered. 
Indeed, the weak/strong-form distinction “begins to lose some of its purchase” when one 
considers the clear disjuncture between judicial review systems in theory (Canada as weak-
form), and in practice (Canada as strong-form). 73  In focusing exclusively on constitutional 
design, the strong-/weak-form typology assumes that systems of judicial review are fixed or 
static. The Canadian case demonstrates, however, that weak-form systems can indeed transition 
into strong-form, and vice versa. More importantly, in drawing heavily on the ‘formal channels 
of disagreement’ available to legislatures, the strong-/weak-form typology risks purporting the 
false perception that ss. 33 and 1 are the only two means with which the legislatures interact with 
the Court. 74  Methodological issues aside, the benefit of dialogue theory is its ability to 
demonstrate that Canadian legislatures have a third dialogic instrument at their disposal: 
responding to judicial invalidation through ordinary legislation75 in ways that “reverse, modify, 
or avoid a judicial decision.”76  
In analyzing sixty-five Charter cases heard by either the SCC or lower appellate courts, 
dialogue theorists Hogg and Bushell (1997) studied the frequency of legislative responses to 
judicial invalidation. They found that in a majority of cases (80 per cent), the legislatures 
responded to the courts.77 In their follow-up study, Hogg, Bushell-Thornton and Wright (2007) 
analyzed twenty-three additional Charter cases. Their study revealed, yet again, that the 
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legislatures frequently responded to unpopular court rulings through legislative amendment 
(sixty-one per cent).78  
Both studies were essentially responses to the counter-majoritarian critique of judicial 
review advanced by right-wing critics. Hogg and his co-authors sought to demonstrate that in 
spite of the Court’s enhanced powers post-1982, and in spite of Canadian courts’ activist 
approach to constitutional review, the Charter of Rights had not radically transformed the 
institutional roles of the legislatures and courts; the high number of legislative responses to 
judicial invalidation recorded in both studies demonstrates that policymaking power continues to 
reside with the legislatures.79 Contrary to judicial critics, dialogue theorists argue that judicial 
review actually enhances the democratic process as it serves as a check on unconstrained 
legislative power, and because it forces legislatures to be better aware, and more respective of, 
rights.80 
In spite of its contributions, there are a number of methodological and conceptual issues 
with Hogg and Bushell’s (1997) study that render their findings questionable. First, Hogg and 
Bushell (1997) restrict their analysis to cases where the courts’ chosen remedy was invalidation, 
thus biasing both their sample and results. Omitting cases of suspended invalidation or 
amendment is problematic given that “judicial nullification is the selected remedy in a minority 
of successful Charter claims (46% between 1984 and 1987).”81 Additionally, and perhaps more 
importantly, the exclusion of these cases is problematic because it ignores the fact that different 
types of judicial remedies invite different types of legislative responses. When the court’s chosen 
remedy is suspended or immediate invalidation, courts provide legislatures with the opportunity 
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to remedy the constitutional defects themselves. As a result, these types of remedies invite 
independent legislative responses. In cases of judicial amendment, the court chooses to remedy 
the constitutional defects of the statute and, as a result, discourages independent legislative 
responses. 82  As Macfarlane (2012) demonstrates, higher levels of legislative activism (or 
legislative responses) were reported in cases where the chosen remedy was suspended 
invalidation (36%), in comparison to lower levels reported in cases of immediate invalidation 
(16%), and extremely low levels in cases of judicial amendment (6.25%).83  
The second limitation of Hogg and Bushell’s (1997) study proceeds from its inclusion of 
lower appellate court decisions. This is problematic given that several cases included were 
subsequently appealed to the SCC and overturned, demonstrating that “lower court rulings are 
simply too unstable to provide unequivocal evidence of dialogue.”84 
The third (and most serious) limitation derives from how Hogg and Bushell (1997) 
conceptualize and measure dialogue. For these scholars, all legislative responses, even in cases 
where legislatures comply with the court, are classified as dialogue.85  The drawback of the 
approach advanced by Hogg and Bushell (1997) is that it looks exclusively at whether there was 
a legislative response, but fails to evaluate the substance or content of the response. 86  As 
Manfredi and Kelly (1999) rightfully suggest, there needs to be a clear distinction between 
negative and positive responses if dialogue is to be a useful tool for studying interinstitutional 
policy dynamics. According to these scholars, negative responses include the following 
situations: first, where the legislature does not respond and thus accepts judicial invalidation; 
second, where the responsible legislature repeals the unconstitutional statute; and finally, where 
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legislation is amended as requested by the Court. These three types of reply legislation are 
classified as negative dialogue because the legislatures have chosen to either abandon the statute 
altogether, or have amended/re-drafted legislation in ways that drastically change the substance 
of the statute and which distort the original policy objectives. In any event, these types of reply 
legislation make no attempt to “challenge the judicial interpretive monopoly” and, as a result, 
welcome judicial policymaking.87 Alternatively, positive dialogue includes responses where the 
legislatures revise statutes in ways that challenge the Court, and which remain committed to their 
original policy objectives. In these cases, judicial power is constrained by legislatures’ 
unwillingness to comply with, and thus implement, the Court’s decision.88 
The benefit of Manfredi and Kelly’s (1999) classification scheme is its focus on both the 
number and nature of legislative responses to judicial declarations of unconstitutionality. 
However, the classification scheme is limited insofar as it counts all instances where a law is 
repealed, even when it is subsequently replaced, as examples of negative dialogue, and thus 
potentially understates Canada’s dialogic potential. Macfarlane (2012) improves the 
negative/positive typology advanced by Manfredi and Kelly (1999) by conducting a more in-
depth analysis of cases where legislation is repealed and replaced to determine whether it is 
replaced in ways that challenge the Court (positive dialogue), or replaced in ways that comply 
with the Court (negative dialogue). 89  Nonetheless, Macfarlane’s (2012) approach to testing 
dialogue is also problematic because it counts all legislative responses that depart from the 
Court’s reasoning, even when minimal, as examples of positive responses.90 It ignores, therefore, 
the distinction between major legislative amendments (negative dialogue), or drastic changes to 
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legislation, and minor legislative amendments (positive dialogue), or minimal changes to 
legislation. Whereas the former creates conditions favorable to judicial policymaking, the latter 
does not.91 
In spite of these caveats, the critics of dialogue theory, in utilizing the negative/positive 
typology, have demonstrated the inherent weaknesses in dialogue theorists’ measurement of 
‘dialogue.’ In studying the same sample of cases in Hogg and Bushell’s (1997) study, Manfredi 
and Kelly (1999) found that only thirty-three per cent of cases could be classified as positive 
dialogue.92 In analyzing the Supreme Court’s Charter docket (1982-2009), Macfarlane (2012) 
demonstrated, yet again, that dialogue theorists have exaggerated Canada’s dialogic potential: 
only 17.8 per cent of cases examined were examples of positive dialogue.93  
Dialogue theorists are likely to criticize the positive/negative approach to testing dialogue 
theory on the basis that it casts “the notion of dialogue too narrowly,” and thus underestimates 
Canada’s dialogic potential.94 Here it is important to recall that the central argument advanced by 
Hogg and his co-authors is that the legislatures can (and frequently do) respond to judicial 
invalidation, which is taken to mean that judicial activism can (and often will) be constrained via 
legislative activism.95  In utilizing the positive/negative typology, scholars Manfredi and Kelly 
(1999) and Macfarlane (2012) have demonstrated, however, that positive legislative sequels 
infrequently follow judicial invalidation. For dialogue theorists, the low levels of legislative 
responses recorded in these studies appear to raise democratic concerns because it suggests that, 
in a majority of cases, courts have ‘final say.’  However, once one considers a number of factors 
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that motivate – or, conversely, discourage – legislative responses, Manfredi and Kelly’s (1999) 
and Macfarlane’s (2012) findings are neither alarming nor surprising.   
In Canada, as elsewhere, adjudication delays mean that, in most cases, the Supreme Court 
reviews legislation that was introduced by a previous government; by the time the Charter case 
gets to the SCC, the government responsible for introducing legislation is no longer in power.96 
In this respect, governments are habitually ‘involuntary participants’ in the constitutional 
challenge, and are thus not necessarily concerned with the outcome of the case. As Manfredi 
(2016) argues, in cases where incumbent governments disagree with the policy choices of 
previous governments, they are likely to “welcome judicial intervention against it,” and are thus 
likely to introduce a negative dialogic response. However, in cases where government supports 
the policy choices of previous governments, the expectation is that they are likely to disapprove 
of the Court’s decision, and are thus likely to introduce a positive dialogic response. 97  
Further, not all cases of statutory invalidation will witness a ‘positive’ dialogic response 
because not all cases heard by the Supreme Court involve salient and/or controversial issues of 
public policy. The expectation is that in high-profile cases, such as those dealing with abortion, 
same-sex marriage and safe injections facilities, to name a few, judicial invalidation will 
generally provoke a positive legislative response because they involve core policy areas of 
provincial and/or federal jurisdiction. In Canada, a very small minority of Charter cases address 
salient issues of public policy, which explains why, in most cases, legislatures introduce negative 
dialogic responses to address judicial invalidation.98  
For reasons already explored, dialogue theory – specifically its assertion that Canada 
operates as weak-form – has lost its theoretical appeal. Nonetheless, the negative/positive 
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approach to testing dialogue theory can be useful as a means of analyzing legislative responses to 
judicial declarations of invalidity in an attempt to understand how legislatures can constrain 
judicial power and policymaking under the Charter.99 
 
2.4 Beyond Dialogue Theory: Courts as Implementer-dependent Institutions 
For most of the Charter’s history, court-centric approaches, which focused heavily on judicial 
activism and legal mobilization efforts, constituted the dominant approach to the study of judicial 
power and judicialization in Canada. In more recent years, scholars have sought to understand 
how the legislatures can, as the designers and implementers of public policy in response to 
judicial invalidation, constrain the policy impact of the Supreme Court of Canada under the 
Charter. In particular, these scholars have demonstrated that right-wing critics, in adopting 
judicial-centred approaches, have perhaps mistakenly overstated the Court’s policy influence 
post-1982. Overall, however, the judicial policymaking literature suffers from four limitations:  
1. existing work on policy outcomes has largely been based off of a single case, rendering it 
questionable whether reported findings reflect judicial policymaking in Canada more 
generally; 
2. no scholar has yet studied the policy legacy of the McLachlin Court;  
3. the Supreme Court of Canada’s policy impact remains “an understudied topic in the 
Canadian context,”;100 and 
4. the judicial policymaking literature has generally been divorced from formal theory. 
 
The present research seeks to address all four limitations. It does so in the following 
ways. First, it analyzes SCC-legislative policy interactions involving Charter cases (primary 
legislation) that have come before the McLachlin Court. Second, it contributes to the limited 
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scholarship on judicial policy impact in Canada. Finally, it tests Matthew Hall’s (2010) theory of 
Courts as implementer-dependent institutions, and modifies its application in a parliamentary 
democracy such as Canada’s. Thus, the research project attempts to address the existing 
limitations in the scholarly debate involving the judicialization of politics, with a specific focus 
on the McLachlin Court.  
Matthew Hall’s (2010) theory is that judicial power is not absolute, but conditional, as 
courts are ‘implementer-dependent’ institutions that are reliant on lower courts, as well as 
Congress and the state legislatures in the United States, to implement judicial rulings. In this 
respect, he encourages scholars to move away from asking ‘is the Court powerful?’ to a more 
fundamental question that suggests that judicial power can be constrained via implementation – 
‘under what conditions is the Court powerful?’ In so doing, Hall’s theory serves as a reminder 
that judicial decisions invalidating the constitutionality of statutes do not automatically translate 
into policy outcomes. Given that the Supreme Court, as the highest judicial body, is not in a 
position to implement its decision, judicial policy impact is dependent on whether the actor 
responsible for implementation accepts a judicial ruling, and attempts to implement a judicial 
decision consistent with the Court’s ruling.101  
In his study, Hall (2010) makes a distinction between vertical and lateral issues, in which 
a Supreme Court is dependent on a particular type of actor to implement its ruling. For instance, 
in cases where Supreme Court decisions are implemented by lower courts (vertical issues), 
compliance is almost always guaranteed and judicial impact is direct and sustained, regardless of 
whether the decision is ‘popular.’ This claim rests on norms of collegiality and lower courts’ 
respect for the judicial hierarchy.  However, in cases where non-judicial actors must implement 
the Court’s decision (lateral issues), compliance depends heavily on whether the Court’s ruling is 
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‘popular.’ As Hall suggests, legislators may be less inclined to implement Court rulings in cases 
where American voters clearly oppose the judicial decision. Two reasons explain this. First, 
government is not bound by the same norms of collegiality, suggesting that, unlike lower courts, 
government is not under a professional obligation to comply with the Supreme Court’s ruling. 
Second, politicians require the political support of voters to get reelected, implying that, unlike 
the courts, they are highly vulnerable to public pressure.102  
In testing his theory, which was developed in the context of judicial politics in the United 
States, Hall (2010) uses public opinion polls as a measure of the popularity of the Court’s ruling 
in lateral issue areas.103  However, the transferability of the theory to the study of the Supreme 
Court of Canada, particularly the proxy he develops for measuring the popularity of judicial 
decisions, is problematic when one considers a number of important institutional differences 
between the United States and Canada: 
 
1. Canada has a system of strong-party discipline, which the U.S. lacks, suggesting that 
Members of Parliament (MPs) tend to always toe the party line;104 
 
2. In Canada, power is concentrated in the hands of the Prime Minister and (perhaps) his/her 
Cabinet, suggesting that there are fewer veto points, and therefore lower chances that 
public opinion will infiltrate the legislative process, when compared to the U.S. where 
there is greater debate and where there are multiple avenues for legislation to be opposed 
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3. Midterm elections in the United States serve as an additional means through which voters 
can express their dissatisfaction with elected representatives. Given that members of 
Congress have a vested interest in getting re-elected, midterm elections serve to “limit the 
distance that political actors can travel away from public opinion on salient issues of 
public policy;”106  
 
4. Canada has a multi-party system, suggesting that the incumbent government can 
dominate the house on a plurality of the vote. This suggests that public opinion operates 
very differently in a two-party Congressional system based on divided government, in 
comparison to a multi-party system characterized by a concentration of power, and; 
 
5. Registered voting in the U.S., which is inexistent in Canada, suggests that there is greater 
awareness of voters’ opinions on particular issues, encouraging officeholders to govern in 
ways that respect such opinions in an attempt to increase their chances of getting re-
elected in succeeding elections.  
 
These institutional differences suggest that, in Canada, opinion polls may be less useful 
as a measure of the popularity of the Court’s decision, given that the legislative arena is far more 
immune to public pressures than in the United States. Arguably, in Canada, the ‘popularity’ of 
the Court’s decision rests fundamentally on the incumbent government’s position on a particular 
issue – i.e., their party’s campaign platform. Issue salience is central to any discussion on 
legislative activism and its capacity to constrain judicial power given that, as previously 
suggested, not all cases of judicial invalidation equally incentivize positive dialogic sequels. The 
benefit of campaign platforms is its capacity  “to identify the importance of a policy issue to the 
government of the day,” and thus its ability to explain what does (or does not) motivate 
legislatures to respond to Court declarations of statutory invalidity.107  In short, the expectation is 
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that in cases where the Court’s decision does not challenge the policy objectives of incumbent 
governments, the outcome is likely to be a negative dialogic response and, as a result, the Court 
will yield significant policy influence. However, in cases where the Court challenges the policy 
choices of legislatures, government is likely to introduce a positive dialogic sequel and, as a 
result, they will be in a position to limit the policy impact of judicial decisions.  
In spite of this limitation, the utility of Hall’s (2010) theory is the ability to draw 
distinctions based on the Supreme Court’s power during the different stages of the policy 
lifecycle. The Court – given its ability to review and strike down unconstitutional legislation, 
and, therefore, its capacity to ‘force’ issues onto legislative agendas – plays a key role as an 
‘agenda-setter.’108 However, when one considers the other stages of the policy lifecycle, namely 
formulation (or design) and implementation, the Court lacks the manpower and resources 
necessary to enforce their decisions. Accordingly, they may be less powerful at these stages than 
originally perceived by right-wing critics.109  
Here it is important to recall that three factors contribute to the judicialization of politics: 
the existence of a constitutional bill of rights that empowers the courts as policymakers; an 
independent and activist final appellate court; and, most importantly, a political environment that 
creates conditions favorable to judicialization.110 The inclusion of a strong remedial provision in 
the Charter (s. 24(1)), combined with the Court’s activist approach to judicial review, suggests 
that the first two conditions are met in Canada. However, right-wing critics have thus far failed 
to demonstrate whether the ‘political environment’ creates conditions hospitable (or hostile) to 
judicialization. In applying Hall’s theory of Courts as ‘implementer-dependent’ institutions, the 
present paper seeks to fill this gap by demonstrating that judicialization depends on which actor 
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is responsible for implementing the Court’s decision (judicial or non-judicial) and, in the case of 
lateral issues, whether the decision is popular.111  
Other scholars have made similar points. Rosenberg (2008) – in drawing on the theory of 
the ‘constrained court’, which was developed in the context of judicial policymaking in the 
United States – suggests that Supreme Courts lack the ability to “bring their decision[s] to life” 
as they lack the ability to implement their rulings.112 Likewise, Moore (1992)113 and Macfarlane 
(2018) 114  demonstrate that without the support of non-judicial actors, the Court cannot 
effectively shape public policy outcomes. While it might be too premature to claim that Hall’s 
theory is a good fit for explaining interinstitutional policy dynamics in Canada, there is some 
evidence to suggest that this might be the case. Kelly’s (2018) analysis of the Charter of the 
French Language, for example, demonstrates that despite a series of strong judicial decisions 
invalidating section 73, these invalidations have “not produced consequential policy change.”115 
Similarly, Moore (1992) studied a number of cases involving police implementation of the 
SCC’s Charter decisions. Her findings suggest that in cases where the police disagreed with the 
Court’s ruling, the decision was ineffectively implemented.116  
Arguably, Hall’s theory (2010) of final appellate courts as implementer-dependent 
institutions has the potential to enrich our understanding of judicial policy influence in Canada. 
However, it is important not to overstate its explanatory power. Hall’s theory is limited insofar as 
it assumes that the Supreme Court of Canada always behaves as an implementer-dependent 
institution. While this holds true a majority of the time, this is not true of every case. Under 
section 24(1) of the Charter, courts are provided wide latitude in deciding which remedy they 
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believe to be ‘appropriate and just in the circumstances.’ When the Court suspends or 
immediately invalidates legislation, they grant the legislatures the opportunity to introduce an 
independent legislative response to address judicial invalidation. In these cases, the Supreme 
Court behaves as an ‘implementer-dependent’ institution because judicial power depends on 
whether, and how, federal and/or provincial legislatures respond to the Court’s remedial 
activism.117 In cases where the Court chooses to amend legislation, the Court does not behave as 
an ‘implementer-dependent’ institution. In ‘reading-in’ (adding sections to statutes), ‘reading-
down’ (removing sections) or severing statutes (removing/adding words or sentences),118 the 
Court chooses to remedy the constitutional defects themselves, and thus does not require that the 
legislatures (or other non-judicial actors) comply with, and thus implement, their ruling.119 In 
spite of this caveat, it appears that Hall’s theory applies to a significant majority of ‘activist’ 
Charter cases. In only 23 out of the 93 activist Charter cases (1982-2018) was the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s chosen remedy judicial amendment. Stated differently, in roughly 75 per cent 
of these Charter cases, the chosen remedy was immediate or suspended invalidation.120  
 
2. 5  Addressing the Gaps in the Existing Constitutional Literature in Canada 
This review has drawn on three bodies of literature that are relevant to the present study: the 
judicialization of politics literature, the judicial policymaking literature, and dialogue theory. In 
so doing, it has raised a number of limitations that need to be addressed in an attempt to gain a 
better understanding of judicial power and policymaking in Canada under the Charter of Rights. 
 
117 Kelly (In progress), 22-3.  
118 Macfarlane 2012, 49.  
119 Kelly (In progress), 23.  
120 Kelly (In progress), 23-5.  
 46 
As this chapter has demonstrated, conservative critics have shown that the Court, given 
their ‘strong-type’ remedial powers under section 24(1)) of the Charter, play an important role as 
‘agenda-setters.’ They have thus far failed to demonstrate, however, whether judicial invalidation 
actually results in fundamental policy change. In adopting judicial-centered approaches, these 
scholars have overlooked the crucial role played by legislatures in constitutional politics as the 
designers and implementers of public policy in response to judicial invalidation. For this reason, 
they have potentially exaggerated the policy influence and impact of the Supreme Court of 
Canada post-1982.  
Against this backdrop, one of the benefits of dialogue theory is its capacity to 
demonstrate that judicial activism can be constrained via legislative sequels that challenge or 
reverse Court decisions. Dialogue theory, therefore, is a useful analytic tool for understanding 
“how such responses […] frame judicial decisions,” and thus how legislatures can constrain 
judicial power and policymaking under the Charter of Rights.121 To date, however, the dialogue 
literature has focused heavily on how to accurately conceptualize, measure and test dialogue. 
While these are important debates to engage with, it has unfortunately come at the cost of 
empirical work on the topic. Indeed, relatively few scholars have employed dialogue theory (and 
the negative/positive distinction) as an analytical tool for understanding judicial power and the 
Court’s policy impact and influence.  
An additional limitation is that studies on the policymaking power of the Supreme Court 
of Canada have tended to be divorced from formal public policy theories. Most surprising, 
however, is the fact that no scholar has yet studied the policy impact of the McLachlin Court – 
and yet it is doubtful that this inattention arises from scholarly or public disinterest. Indeed, the 
McLachlin Court is quite often depicted as “[…] [having] seen a lot of change in this country, 
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and [having] helped provoke some of it, too.”122 The recent retirement of Chief Justice Beverly 
McLachlin, coupled with her extremely long tenure as Chief Justice and her reputation as a 
policy-influencer, thus create a unique opportunity to study the policy impact of her Court.  
In light of the aforementioned, the contributions of the thesis are three-fold. First, the 
findings of the research can be used to inform the ‘judicialization’ and the ‘democratic 
legitimacy’ debates in Canada – debates which appear to be unsettled. Second, it contributes to 
theory-building and testing initiatives in Canada by modifying Hall’s (2010) theory of the 
Supreme Court as an ‘implementer-dependent’ institution and applying it to the study of the 
McLachlin Court’s policy influence and impact. Third, it contributes to the relatively limited 
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3   
The Harper Conservatives and Criminal Justice Policy 
The chapter reviews two high-profile cases involving salient issues of criminal justice policy 
delivered by the McLachlin Court, namely PHS Community (safe injection facilities) and 
Bedford (prostitution reform). The chapter considers the Harper Conservatives’ responses to both 
cases, which include Bill C-2 – An Act to Amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 
(Respect for Communities Act) – introduced in 2015 in response to PHS Community, and Bill C-
36 – Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act – introduced in 2014 in response to 
Bedford. Additionally, the chapter reviews the Trudeau Liberals’ response to PHS Community 
(Bill C-37).  
 PHS Community and Bedford provide for particularly interesting cases given that the 
Harper government is often portrayed to have had a “combative relationship with the Supreme 
Court of Canada” during their time in power.1 This narrative is not surprising, however, given 
the Harper Conservatives’ law and order agenda.2 The 2011 Conservative campaign, Here for 
Canada, demonstrates the extent to which criminal policy was a top priority for their 
government; from guarantees to ‘keep streets safe,’ to promises to ‘protect law-abiding citizens,’ 
the Harper Conservatives’ platform was fraught with penal populist rhetoric.3  
In both PHS and Bedford, the Supreme Court advocated for ‘harm-reduction’ policy 
responses that would liberalize access to safe injection facilities and that would create safer 
conditions for sex workers, respectively. Unsurprisingly, the Court’s decisions proved to be 
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unpopular with the Conservative government.4 It is not coincidental, therefore, that the strong-
type decisions delivered by the Court in PHS Community and Bedford witnessed equally strong 
legislative responses by the Harper Conservatives consistent with, and reflective of, their ‘tough 
on crime’ policy strategies. In PHS Community, the Court required that the federal Minister of 
Health immediately grant Insite, a safe injection facility in the Downtown Eastside, an 
exemption, which would allow it to temporarily operate free from criminal prosecution under 
section 4(1) (possession of narcotics) of the Federal Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 
(CDSA). In this respect, the Conservative government fully complied with the Supreme Court’s 
decision. Bill C-2, however, introduces a series of twenty-six conditions that must be met before 
the Minister of Health can consider, let alone grant, an exemption for safe injection sites. In so 
doing, the federal government sought to ensure that no other safe injection facility, with the 
notable exception of Insite, would be granted an exemption under the CDSA.  
Similarly, in Bedford, the Supreme Court struck down three prostitution-related 
provisions of the Criminal Code. In response, the Harper Conservatives introduced Bill C-36. 
The inclusion of ss. 286.2(1) (‘material benefit’), 286.2(3) (‘financially profiting’) and 213(1)(c) 
(‘communicating’) reintroduced the Criminal Code prohibitions invalidated by the McLachlin 
Court in Bedford. More telling, however, is the fact that Bill C-36 effectively criminalizes 
prostitution in Canada for the first time in its history.  
The chapter argues that while the Supreme Court of Canada undeniably plays an 
important role as ‘agenda-setters,’ they lack the power to enforce and implement their decisions. 
In particular, it argues that in cases dealing with unpopular lateral issues – in this case, safe 
injection facilities and prostitution reform – the federal government will likely introduce positive 
legislative sequels. Indeed, the Harper Conservatives’ response to PHS Community and Bedford 
 
4 Kelly (In Progress), 9.  
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– namely, the grueling application process for establishing new safe injection facilities (in 
response to PHS Community), and the new provisions regulating prostitution in Canada (in 
response to Bedford) – are reflective of legislative noncompliance. Thus, both cases illustrate the 
limits of legal mobilization efforts. The Harper Conservatives, as the designers and implementers 
of public policy in response to judicial invalidation, were able to introduce legislation that was 
fundamentally at odds with the constitutional parameters established by the McLachlin Court in 
PHS Community and Bedford. In both cases, therefore, the policy impact of the SCC was limited.  
The chapter begins with an overview of PHS Community, including a summary of the 
constitutional issues raised in the case, the litigants involved, the statutes being challenged and 
the decisions delivered by the lower courts. It then reviews the Supreme Court’s decision, 
focusing specifically on the remedy employed under section 24(1) of the Charter, followed by an 
analysis of the Harper Conservatives’ response (Bill C-2) to the Court’s decision in PHS. The 
remainder of the chapter focuses on the constitutional challenge waged in Bedford, which 
follows a similar pattern to that employed in the context of PHS Community. Finally, the chapter 
analyzes the findings, with a specific focus on Hall’s (2010) theory of the Supreme Court of 
Canada as an ‘implementer-dependent’ institution.  
 
3.1 Overview of PHS Community 
In the mid- to late-1990s, the city of Vancouver, particularly the Downtown East Side (DTES) 
neighborhood, which is known to be the “poorest postal code” in Canada,5  experienced an 
unprecedented level of deaths related to intravenous drug use, thus sparking a health crisis in the 
community.6 By 1998, reported rates of HIV/AIDS and Hepatitis A, B and C in the DTES – a 
 
5 Ward 2012, 195; Lessard 2011, 95.  
6 Agarwal 2011, 41; Kerr, Mitra, Kennedy and McNeil 2017, 1.  
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neighborhood notorious for being home to a large number of intravenous drug users, and for 
having extremely high rates of crime, poverty, prostitution and homelessness7 – had reached 
“epidemic proportions,” with roughly 417 deaths caused by the unsafe and unsanitary sharing of 
needles and other consumption practices. 8  Addiction was rampant in the DTES, with most 
addicts injecting in alleys or other unsafe areas, typically far from trained medical staff, out of 
fear of being prosecuted under the federal Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA) for the 
possession (section 4(1)) and/or trafficking (section 5(1)) of illicit narcotics.9  
 In 2002, the Vancouver Coastal Health Agency (VCHA) submitted a proposal centred on 
harm-reduction strategies, seeking to establish a safe injection facility (SIF) in the DTES where 
addicts could safely inject drugs, and where trained medical personnel could monitor and 
supervise in an attempt to decrease the total number of fatal overdoses.10 They applied for a 
ministerial exemption under section 56 of the CDSA, which would subsequently allow Insite to 
operate free from criminal prosecution under sections 4(1) and 5(1). In September 2003, under 
the Chrétien Liberals, the Minister of Health granted Insite – Canada’s first ever injection facility 
– a three-year exemption; it was officially opened to the public on September 21st of that same 
year.11 The Conservative government later extended the exemption until June 2008.12   
Insite was in large part the outcome of combined efforts by local (the DTES), provincial 
(Vancouver) and federal authorities and governments seeking a solution to the health and safety 
risks faced by drug users in the DTES.13 With the election of the Harper Conservatives in 2006, 
however, the years of cooperative federalism, which marked the first three years of Insite’s 
 
7 Ward 2012, 195; Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 at para 9. 
8 Lessard 2011, 97.  
9 Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 at para 10.  
10 Ibid., at para 13-4.  
11 Agarwal 2011, 42; See also Young 2011, 231.  
12 Ka Hon Chu 2010, 92; Manfredi and Maioni 2018, 32.   
13 Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 at para 19.  
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operation, appeared to be coming to an end. In 2008, when it became clear that the Conservative 
government would not issue any further exemptions, the Portland Hotel Community Services 
Society (PHS Community), the non-profit organization responsible for managing Insite, and the 
Vancouver Area Network of Intravenous Drug Users (VANDU), a drug-user organization in 
Vancouver, sought relief in the courts.14  In their constitutional challenge, the Attorney General 
of British Columbia, and Dean Edward Wilson and Shelly Tomic – two members of the DTES 
who frequent, or had previously frequented, Insite – joined PHS in their constitutional 
challenge.15 For simplicity, the chapter will hereafter use ‘PHS’ to refer collectively to PHS 
Community, VANDU, the Attorney General of British Columbia and litigants Wilson and 
Tomic.  
Two issues were at the centre of the constitutional challenge in PHS. The first concerned 
the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, whereby PHS argued that the CDSA is inapplicable to 
Insite given that it involves health policy, a core area of provincial jurisdiction. The alternative 
claim centred on section 7 of the Charter, whereby PHS sought to demonstrate that the 
prohibitions under sections 4(1) and 5(1) of the CDSA infringed the right to ‘life, liberty and 
security of the person’ in a manner inconsistent with the principles of fundamental justice.16 
They argued that the prohibition served as a barrier to “essential healthcare services” that were 
shown to drastically improve the lives of intravenous drug users and, as a result, that the 
Conservative government’s failure to extend the exemption unjustifiably put the health and lives 
of users in the DTES at risk.17  
 
14 Ka Hon Chu 2010, 92.  
15 Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 at para 22.  
16 Lessard 2011, 93.  
17 Young 2011, 237.  
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The arguments advanced by the Crown, on the other hand, were consistent with the 
Harper Conservative’s ‘tough on crime’ approach to criminal justice policy. They sought to 
demonstrate that the crisis faced by the DTES community had less to do with the prohibitions 
under the CDSA, and more to do with consumer ‘choice’ and ‘lifestyle,’ in effect implying that 
consumers had to take responsibility for the outcomes (i.e., death and disease) that they 
themselves caused and/or enabled (i.e., through drug consumption).18 As a result, the federal 
government, represented by the Attorney General of Canada, contended that s. 7 rights had not 
been infringed by government’s decision to “prohibit access to safe injection facilities.”19 
 The trial judge, Pitfield J., dismissed the interjurisdictional immunity claim, basing his 
decision in large part on the doctrine of paramountcy.20 With respect to section 7, Pitfield J. 
concluded that the right to ‘life, liberty and security’ had been infringed by ss. 4(1) and 5(1) of 
the CDSA, and that this infringement was not justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter; his declaration 
of invalidity was suspended for one year.21 Justice Pitfield further granted Insite an immediate 
exemption under s. 56(1), which allowed it to operate free from criminal prosecution.22  
Pitfield J.’s decision was grounded on three factual findings: first, that addiction was the 
product of illness as opposed to choice; second, that the high rates of blood-borne illnesses 
among drug users in the DTES were a direct cause of unsafe and unsanitary consumption 
practices; and finally, that injecting drugs in a safe area, surrounded by trained healthcare 
professionals, would drastically decrease the risk of overdose, death and disease. These findings 
were based off of the Expert Advisory Committee’s report, which detailed a number of health 
and safety improvements following the establishment of Insite. For example, the report showed 
 
18 Lessard 2011, 106; Young 2011, 237 & 243; Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 
134 at para 97.  
19 Young 2011, 237.  
20 Agarwal 2011, 42; Ward 2012, 198.  
21 Ward 2012, 198; Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 at para 31.  
22 Ibid., at para 31.  
 54 
that drug-related crime and relapse rates had not increased in the DTES, and that the number of 
users injecting in public (and unsafe) areas had actually decreased.23  
 Both the federal government and PHS appealed Pitfield J.’s decision to the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal (BCCA). The Attorney General of Canada appealed the decision on 
the basis that sections 4(1) and 5(1) of the CDSA were constitutional. PHS appealed the decision 
on the grounds that Justice Pitfield was wrong to dismiss the interjurisdictional immunity claim, 
and secondly, that he erred in finding that s.56 of the CDSA was constitutional.24  
Two judges on the BCCA, Justices Rowles and Huddart, ruled in favor of the claimants 
with respect to both the interjurisdictional immunity and the section 7 claims.25 The federal 
government later appealed the decision of the BCCA to the Supreme Court of Canada, and was 
granted the leave to appeal on June 24th, 2010.26 
 
3.2 The Supreme Court of Canada: Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community 
Services Society [2011] 
 
The Supreme Court of Canada delivered its judgment in PHS Community on September 30th, 
2011. A total of fourteen interveners, all of whom supported the legal arguments advanced by 
PHS, were present at trial, including: the Attorney General of Quebec, the Canadian Nurses 
Association, the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, the Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal 
Network and the Vancouver Coastal Health Authority, among others.27 Similar to both lower 
courts, the SCC was asked to determine whether sections 4(1) and 5(1) of the CDSA were 
inapplicable to Insite insofar as they contravened the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine. They 
 
23 Ibid., at para 27-8.  
24 Young 2011, 235.  
25 Young 2011, 235; Ka Hon Chu 2010, 91.  
26 Ward 2012, 199. 
27 Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134.  
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were further asked to determine whether the relevant provisions violated section 7 and, if 
applicable, whether they constituted a justifiable infringement on Charter rights.28  
  With respect to the interjurisdictional immunity (or division of powers) argument, Chief 
Justice McLachlin, writing for a unanimous Court, determined that in spite of provincial 
jurisdiction over healthcare matters, sections 4(1) and 5(1) of the CDSA were “constitutionally 
valid and applicable to Insite under the division of powers.”29 Thus, the crux of the SCC’s 
decision stemmed from the section 7 claims.  
In terms of section 7, PHS advanced three key arguments: first, that ss. 4(1) and 5(1) 
infringe the right to ‘life, liberty and security;’ second, that the Minister of Health’s refusal to 
extend Insite’s exemption violated section 7 Charter rights; and third, that the prohibition under 
section 4(1) (possession of illicit substances) infringed on the section 7 Charter rights of all drug 
users, as opposed to only Insite’s clientele.30  
In response, the federal government advanced two key arguments. The first argument was 
inherently moral, invoking the idea that because drug users choose to engage in illegal activity, 
that they should be responsible for the repercussions and consequences of their actions (i.e., 
criminal liability). Secondly, the federal government argued that the decision to allow (or 
disallow) the establishment of SIFs is an inherently political decision, and thus does not fall 
within the scope of judicial review under the Charter of Rights. McLachlin C.J. rejected both 
arguments. With respect to the former, she asserted that it was precisely the federal government’s 
actions, as opposed to drug users’ choice, which deprived addicts of their s. 7 rights. With 
respect to the latter, she claimed that while the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction 
 
28 Ibid., at para 36.  
29 Ibid., at para. 73.  
30 Ibid., at 75-7.  
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over how best to treat addiction and drug-related offences, “laws and [state] actions are 
[nonetheless] subject to scrutiny under the Charter.”31 
In PHS Community, McLachlin C.J. concluded that section 4(1) engaged Insite staff’s s. 
7 rights by rendering them liable to imprisonment for the illegal possession of drugs. She further 
claimed that s. 4(1) of the CDSA deprived users of their s. 7 rights; by criminalizing the 
possession of drugs on Insite’s premises, it denied drug addicts access to potentially life-saving 
medical treatment. Chief Justice McLachlin, however, was less convinced that section 5(1) had 
engaged section 7 rights. In particular, she claimed that because neither clients nor staff obtained 
drugs directly from the safe-injection facility, that they were not actually partaking in any 
activities that would fall within the gambit of ‘trafficking’ under s. 5(1).32  
 In light of the objectives of s. 4(1) of the CDSA, namely, public health and safety, 
however, McLachlin C.J. argued that while s. 7 rights were evidently engaged, they had not been 
violated.33 Rather, Chief Beverly McLachlin took issue with the Minister of Health’s refusal to 
grant Insite an exemption, in spite of the evidence demonstrating that, overall, Insite had 
drastically improved the health and lives of addicts in the DTES. The Chief Justice asserted that 
while the Minster of Health has the discretion to allow (or refuse) exemptions for medical and/or 
safety reasons under s. 56, this discretion is not absolute.34 For McLachlin C.J., the Minister of 
Health had an obligation, in deciding whether or not to extend the exemption, to consider the 
available evidence, including the fact that: no deaths had occurred since Insite opened its doors 
in 2003; that the public viewed Insite and its operation/mission rather favorably or, at the very 
least, neutrally; and finally, that Insite had not increased the incidence of crime, relapses and 
 
31 Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 at para 102-03 & 105-06.  
32 Ibid., at para 90, 92 & 95-6.  
33 Ibid., at para 110 & 114.  
34 Ibid., at para 117.  
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overall drug use. McLachlin further asserted that, in considering these facts, the Minister of 
Health would have recognized that “exempting Insite from the application of the possession 
prohibition [did] not undermine the objectives of health and safety, but, [rather,] further[ed] 
them.”35  
According to the Court, the Minister’s decision to deny Insite a further exemption, in 
spite of the evidence demonstrating its advantages, violated the principles of fundamental justice. 
It was arbitrary because it offended the very purpose of the CDSA, namely public safety and 
health. On the other hand, it also violated the principle of gross disproportionality because, 
according to the Court, the benefits associated with granting Insite a further exemption, namely 
reducing the number of fatal overdoes and deaths caused by unsafe consumption practices, far 
outweighed any potential policy benefit(s) derived from criminalizing the possession of drugs.36   
 In issuing its remedy, the Supreme Court contemplated returning the application to the 
Minister of Health, whereby the Minister would reconsider Insite’s application in light of the 
issues raised in PHS Community. Unsatisfied with this option, particularly because the issue at 
stake involved the health and lives of users in the DTES, the SCC decided instead to order a writ 
of mandamus, obliging the Minister to grant an immediate, albeit temporary, exemption to Insite. 
According to the Chief Justice, the mere possibility that the Minister of Health would (yet again) 
refuse Insite’s application justified the Court’s choice of remedy: there is “nothing to be gained 
(and much to be risked) in sending the matter back to the Minister for reconsideration.”37  
At least to some degree, therefore, PHS Community is a clear case of the Supreme Court 
applying an interventionist remedy and of delivering a ‘strong-type’ decision. This becomes 
apparent when one considers that, under s. 56, the Minister of Health is simply required to grant 
 
35 Ibid., at para 119, 122 & 131.  
36 Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 at para 131-36.  
37 Ibid., at 146-50; see also Manfredi and Maioni 2018, 33; see also Agarwal 2011, 41 
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an exemption if, in their opinion, such an exemption is vital to medical and/or scientific efforts, 
or if it is in the public interest to do so. However, nowhere does s. 56 instruct the Minister of 
Health on how they should exercise this discretion, or the criteria they should use in making such 
determinations. 38  Paradoxically, McLachlin C.J. explicitly stated that when “the evidence 
indicates that a supervised injection site will decrease the risk of death and disease, and [where] 
there is little or no evidence that it will have a negative impact on public safety, the Minister 
should generally grant an exemption.”39 In other words, the Supreme Court took the position 
that, only in rare cases, should the Minister of Health refuse to grant future exemptions. 
The Court further listed five criteria that should guide the Minister of Health when 
reviewing applications, including the SIF’s potential impact on crime, the regulatory system and 
financial resources in place, the reasons justifying the ‘need’ for an SIF in any particular 
community, and the community’s approval (or disapproval). 40  In short, the Supreme Court 
maintained that the Minister of Health did not have unfettered discretion in deciding whether or 
not to issue future exemptions. As will be explored, however, Bill C-2, the Harper 
Conservatives’ response to PHS Community, signaled their forceful disagreement with the 
Court’s directives on how, and under what conditions, exemptions would be granted. 
 
3.3  Bill C-2: The Harper Conservatives’ Response to PHS Community 
The Harper Conservatives responded to the Supreme Court’s decision in PHS Community via the 
introduction of Bill C-2 (An Act to Amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (Respect 
for Communities Act)), which received royal assent on June 15th, 2015. While not wholly 
surprising, the federal government’s response is significant for two reasons. First, Chief Justice 
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Beverly McLachlin authored a unanimous decision. The ‘authoritativeness’ associated with 
unanimous decisions means that governments rarely introduce legislative sequels. 41  More 
importantly, the chosen remedy in PHS Community applies exclusively to Insite; the Court took 
issue with the exercise of ministerial discretion, not the statute itself. To some degree, therefore, 
the federal government’s choice to respond to PHS Community suggests that the Harper 
Conservatives interpreted the decision not only as an attempt to overrule the Minister of Health’s 
decision, but also as a direct attack on their policy objectives and their law and order agenda.  
 Arguably, Bill C-2 is a reflection of the unpopularity of the Court’s decision in PHS 
Community. In effect, Bill C-2 renders it relatively difficult, if not entirely impossible, for any 
safe injection facility, save for Insite, to obtain an exemption. Here it is important to recall that, 
prior to the introduction of Bill C-2, the Minister of Health, under section 56 of the CDSA, 
essentially had ‘free rein’ when deciding whether or not to authorize exemptions. It is also 
important to reiterate that, in PHS Community, the Supreme Court claimed that the Minister of 
Health, save for exceptional cases, should ‘generally grant’ exemptions.   
Under section 56.1(3), the centerpiece of Bill C-2, however, twenty-six conditions must 
be met before the Minister of Health can consider, let alone grant, an exemption. For example, it 
requires that a safe injection facility be approved by: municipal governments (under s. 3(c)); 
municipal law enforcement (under s. 3(e)); the lead provincial health authority  (under s. 3(g)); 
the provincial Minister of Public Safety (under s. 3(h)); local health professionals, including 
associations representing the interests of physicians and nurses (under s. 3(o); and by community 
groups residing in municipalities where SIFs are anticipated to operate (s. 3(p)). Objection by 
any of these six groups could, in theory, constitute sufficient grounds to reject applications.42  
 
41 McCormick 2005, 5; Macfarlane 2010, 401; Mathen 2003, 325 & 327. 
42 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debates, 41st Parl, 2nd Sess, (18 June 2015).  
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Sections 3(p) (community groups) and 3(e) (municipal police) are particularly high 
thresholds to satisfy. The fact remains that, at the very least, some Canadians may be hesitant 
towards the idea of having an SIF operate in close proximity to their homes and families. It is 
likely that section 3(p) is an even more difficult requirement to satisfy in neighborhoods where, 
unlike the DTES, poverty is less pervasive, the community is considerably safe, drug use is less 
common (or is relatively well hidden from the public) and/or where illegal drug markets are 
relatively restricted. With respect to section 3(e), it is likely that law enforcement officials, by the 
very nature of their job descriptions, will likely be unsympathetic to SIFs, and may, as a result, 
veto the establishment of SIFs in other jurisdictions. As is the case with the RCMP, law 
enforcement agencies in Ottawa and Toronto have reacted negatively to the idea of expanding 
SIFs in their municipalities; other cities may also have similar experiences.43   
 Additionally, the evidentiary thresholds set forth in sections 56.1(3)(a) and 56.1(3)(j) are 
particularly high. The former requires that applicants submit scientific evidence demonstrating 
the expected health/medical benefits of the SIF, while the latter requires applicants to submit 
evidence detailing the SIF’s safety benefits. The fact remains, however, that the DTES is unique 
in terms of the high concentration of intravenous drug users in the neighborhood, a majority of 
whom have contracted some type of blood borne disease(s) caused by unsafe and unsanitary 
consumption practices. Whereas Insite can convincingly demonstrate the health and safety 
benefits of the SIF – namely, its ability to reduce the risk of disease and death among intravenous 
drug users – in other communities, where income, housing status, health and social services, and 
reported rates of drug use, for example, vary considerably, it may be more difficult to 
“demonstrate the public health [and safety] benefits commensurate with Insite.”44  
 
43 Hyshka, Bubela and Wild 2013, 5. 
44 Hyshka, Bubela and Wild 2013, 5. 
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While the health and safety risks associated with intravenous drug consumption are 
particularly high in the DTES, they are by no means exclusive to this jurisdiction. Other 
Canadian cities, such as Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto and Victoria, have also expressed a desire to 
implement SIFs as a solution to the relatively high rates of injection drug use reported in these 
cities.45 While Bill C-2 does not technically criminalize SIFs, the truth of the matter is that 
section 56.1(3) does, in practice, have the effect of prohibiting the establishment (or expansion) 
of new SIFs in Canada by making it virtually impossible for new SIFs to satisfy the requirements 
necessary to be eligible for Ministerial exemptions.   
Recall that the SCC’s remedy in PHS Community required that the Minister of Health, 
under the Harper Conservatives, grant Insite an immediate exemption. In this respect, they 
complied with the SCC’s ruling. However, in introducing Bill C-2, the Conservative 
government, consistent with its law and order agenda, forcefully asserted its opposition to safe 
injection facilities as a legitimate policy solution to address the rising rates of intravenous drug 
use, disease and overdose in Canada. This is evidenced by the fact that, other than Insite, not a 
single SIF was granted an exemption post-Bill C-2. 46 
Stephen Harper’s successor, Justin Trudeau, however, adopted a more sympathetic 
attitude towards the establishment of SIFs, and towards the SCC’s decision in PHS Community.  
In 2017, the Trudeau Liberals repealed and replaced Bill C-2 with Bill C-37; Bill C-37 reduced 
the requirements listed under s. 56.1(3) from twenty-six to five. 47  These five conditions include 
a summary of: the reasons (for example, health and safety concerns) for submitting the 
application; the potential effect(s) of the SIF on crime rates in the community; any consultations 
held with the community on the prospect of opening an SIF in their neighborhood; the financial 
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resources used to ensure the proper ‘upkeep’ or ‘maintenance’ of the SIF; and lastly, the 
regulatory scheme in place.48 In other words, it complied – nearly word for word – with the 
SCC’s decision in PHS Community.  
In drastically reducing the number of requirements, the Trudeau Liberals publicly 
displayed their desire to be far more ‘open,’ so to speak, towards the possibility of expanding 
SIFs to other communities facing similar health crises as that experienced in the Downtown East 
Side. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that within just a few short months of Bill C-37 
coming into force, the Minister of Health granted the Dr. Peter Centre an exemption under the 
CDSA.49 Presently, a total of forty-three SIFs exist across four different provinces: Alberta (7), 
British Columbia (9), Ontario (23), and Quebec (4).50  
Consistent with Hall’s (2010) theory of the Supreme Court of Canada as an 
‘implementer-dependent’ institution, PHS Community, and the different policy responses 
adopted by the respective Conservative (Bill C-2) and Liberal governments (Bill C-37), 
demonstrates that the popularity of the Court’s decision determines how legislatures respond. In 
PHS Community, the Supreme Court of Canada did not “fling the doors [wide] open” for SIFs in 
Canada.51 This is in part explained by the fact that the McLachlin Court did not rule on the 
constitutionality of trafficking and possession laws per se. By the same token, however, the SCC 
did not “preclude the possibility of further facilities being established.”52 In claiming that the 
Minister of Health ‘should generally’ grant exemptions in cases where, similar to the DTES, 
SIFs would likely have positive effects on the health and safety of drug users in other 
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communities, the SCC was signaling their preference for ‘harm-reduction’ methods, and, more 
specifically, their desire to expand SIFs to other jurisdictions.  
Unsatisfied with the outcome of the case, the Harper Conservatives introduced Bill C-2. 
In so doing, they sought to ensure that the Minister of Health would never, save for extremely 
exceptional circumstances, grant exemptions. On the flipside, Bill C-37 is a clear indication of 
the Trudeau Liberals’ commitment to treating SIFs as a viable policy response to drug addiction 
in Canada. Given the more liberal approach to SIFs adopted by Trudeau’s government via Bill 
C-37 in 2015, it is likely that, had they been in power during the time that the SCC delivered its 
decision in PHS Community, they would have introduced a legislative response far more 
deferential than that adopted by the Harper Conservatives in Bill C-2.   
 Having considered the SCC’s ruling in PHS Community, and the ‘in your face’ legislation 
introduced by the Harper Conservatives in response to the Court’s decision, the remainder of the 
chapter focuses on the constitutional challenge waged in Bedford, which centered on three 
prostitution-related provisions of the Criminal Code. 
 
3.4  Overview of Bedford  
In 2007, Robert Pickton – an infamous serial killer suspected to have been responsible for the 
kidnapping, sexual assault and murder of countless women in the DTES, most of whom worked 
in the sex trade – was convicted on twenty-six counts of murder. Between 1978 and 2001, over 
sixty-nine women disappeared from the DTES, with most of these disappearances going 
unnoticed by law enforcement officials until months (or even years) later.53 On the one hand, the 
Pickton case increased public awareness of the health and safety dangers associated with the sex 
trade – for example, the higher risk of sex workers being victims of sexual and/or physical 
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assault. 54  On the other hand, the case prompted a lively discussion on the possible merits of 
further decriminalizing certain aspects of sex work in Canada.  
 Against this backdrop, the constitutional challenge waged in Bedford centred on three 
prostitution-related provisions of the Criminal Code: ss. 210 (“the keeping of a common bawdy 
house”), 212(1)(j) (“living off the avails of prostitution”) and 213(c) (“communicating for the 
purposes of prostitution in a public space”).55 Section 210, for example, essentially restricts 
sexual exchanges between prostitutes and clients to the client’s home or hotel rooms. In short, it 
denies prostitutes the right to work directly from their home, or from any other fixed location. 
Similarly, section 212 (1)(j), which was presumably enacted to criminalize pimp-related 
activities, has the effect of criminalizing the hiring of staff, for example drivers and bodyguards, 
which can arguably provide for safer working conditions for prostitutes. Additionally, section 
213(1)(c) criminalizes street prostitution and restricts the selling of sex to non-public spaces, 
which can drastically impair sex workers’ ability to screen clients.56  
While prostitution in Canada is not illegal per se, these provisions of the Criminal Code 
render it relatively difficult, and at times unsafe, to engage in prostitution-related activities. 
Taken collectively, ss. 210, 212(1)(j) and 213(1)(c) restrict and/or outright deny access to a 
series of precautionary measures that would significantly improve the health and safety of sex 
workers. Accordingly, the appellants in Bedford, Teri Jean Bedford, Amy Lebovitch and Valerie 
Scott, three former or current sex workers, sought to have all three sections invalidated for their 
inconsistency with section 7 (the right to ‘life, liberty and security’).57 They further argued that s. 
213(1)(c) violated prostitutes’ rights under section 2(b) (freedom of expression).58   
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 In the 1990 Prostitution Reference, the Supreme Court of Canada had previously 
addressed the issue of whether ss. 210 and 213(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, previously known as 
s. 193 and s. 195(1)(c), respectively, violated sections 2(b) and 7 of the Charter.59 In light of the 
objectives of the provisions – in particular, government’s interest in discouraging ‘public 
nuisances’ and in minimizing health/safety concerns associated with prostitution – the SCC 
determined that both provisions constituted a justifiable infringement on Charter rights.60 Given 
the similarities between the Prostitution Reference and the constitutional challenge waged in 
Bedford, and given the principle of legal precedent, the claimants bore the onus of demonstrating 
that, “in light of new evidence and a material change in circumstances,” the issue needed to be 
revisited by the courts.61 To that effect, the claimants advanced two key arguments. First, that the 
prostitution reference exclusively addressed whether or not the provisions violated s. 7’s right to 
‘life,’ but did not consider whether they infringed the right to ‘security.’ They further argued that 
the issues raised in Bedford departed considerably from those addressed in the Prostitution 
Reference, thus warranting judicial intervention; in the former, the central issue was personal 
security, whereas in the latter, the issue centred on economic liberty.62  
  The Attorney General of Canada, who was joined by the Attorney General of Ontario,63 
advanced two arguments: (1) that there was no basis, “in law or new evidence,” that justified the 
court’s reevaluation and reconsideration of the constitutionality of the Criminal Code provisions; 
and (2) that the risks associated with prostitution stem directly from the sex trade (for example, 
third-party consumers), and are thus not directly caused by the Criminal Code prohibitions.64 A 
number of groups, including the Real Women of Canada, the Catholic Civil Rights League and 
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the Christian Fellowship, intervened on behalf of, and supported the arguments raised by, the 
Federal government.65  
 At the Ontario Superior Court, Justice Himel concluded that, in spite of the Prostitution 
Reference, it was appropriate to reconsider the constitutionality of ss. 210, 212(1)(j) and 
213(1)(c) of the Criminal Code. Justice Himel argued that, prior to 1990, the doctrines of 
‘overbreadth’, ‘gross disproportionality’ and ‘arbitrariness’ had not been developed in the s. 7 
jurisprudence, and thus did not figure into the majority’s analysis in the Prostitution Reference. 
Similarly, Justice Himel suggested that new empirical evidence had been made available in 
Bedford, which that had not previously been considered by the SCC. Lastly, she argued that the 
context of the Charter challenge in Bedford departed drastically from the issues raised in the 
Prostitution Reference, thus legitimizing judicial reevaluation.66  
Justice Himel concluded that the provisions deprived the claimants of their right to 
security of the person, and did so in a manner that was inconsistent with the principles of 
fundamental justice: s. 210 was overbroad insofar as it was a ‘blanket’ prohibition on all ‘in-call’ 
sex work, further arguing that the government’s objective of restricting public nuisances 
associated with prostitution was grossly disproportionate to the harms incurred by prostitutes; s. 
212(1)(j) violated all three principles of fundamental justice by criminalizing the hiring of 
personnel, and by preventing sex workers from taking the necessary precautions to increase their 
personal safety; and finally, that s. 213(1)(c) was grossly disproportionate because it hindered 
prostitutes’ ability to screen existing and potential clients. Justice Himel found that the 
provisions violated sections 2(b) and 7 of the Charter, and that the infringements were not 
justified under s. 1. She chose to remedy the violations by immediately invalidating sections 
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212(1)(j) and 213(1)(c), and by severing the word ‘prostitution’ from the definition provided in 
197(1) (in relation to s. 210).67  
The Attorney General of Canada appealed Justice Himel’s decision based on the fact that 
the trial judge had not convincingly demonstrated why the evidence provided by the claimants 
was prioritized (or given greater weight) than that which was presented by government at trial. 
More importantly, they argued that prostitution laws, given the “complex, inconclusive, and 
value-laden nature of empirical evidence,” is a policy area that should be debated in Parliament, 
and should thus be left to the discretion of elected representatives. The majority at the level of 
the Ontario Court of Appeal (OCA) refuted both arguments.68  
In a 4:1 decision, the OCA found that, with respect to section 2(b), the trial judge was 
bound to the legal precedent established by the Supreme Court in the Prostitution Reference.69 
The majority on the Court of Appeal concluded, however, that the ‘living on avails’ and ‘bawdy-
house’ provisions violated s. 7 Charter rights in a manner inconsistent with the principles of 
fundamental justice. While the OCA agreed with the lower court that the word ‘prostitution’ 
should be severed from s. 210, they opted to suspend this declaration for 12 months. Rather than 
invalidate section 212(1)(j), the majority on the Ontario Court of Appeal chose to ‘read-in’ the 
words “in circumstances of exploitation.” With respect to s. 213(1)(c), the majority on the Court 
of Appeal found that while it engaged prostitutes’ section 7 rights – namely, security of the 
person – it did so in a manner that was consistent with the principles of fundamental justice.70  
The decision rendered by the OCA was challenged by the Attorney General of Canada on 
the grounds that ss. 210 and 212(1)(j) are constitutional, and by the respondents who cross-
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appealed on the grounds that s. 213(1)(c) is unconstitutional, and that the remedy granted with 
respect to s. 210 was unjustified.71 On October 25th, 2012, the Supreme Court officially granted 
both parties leave to appeal.72  
 
 3.5  The Supreme Court of Canada: Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford [2013] 
The Supreme Court of Canada delivered its unanimous decision in Bedford, authored by Chief 
Justice Beverly McLachlin, on December 20th, 2013. A total of 24 interveners appeared before 
the SCC, including: the Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society, the 
Attorney General of Quebec, REAL Women of Canada, the Native Women’s Association of 
Canada and the Catholic Civil Rights League.73  
 At trial, the Attorney General of Canada argued that the three prostitution-related sections 
of the Criminal Code were constitutional because the litigants had failed to demonstrate a 
“sufficient causal connection” between the prostitution laws and the harms incurred by sex 
workers. The federal government maintained that the safety and health risks faced by sex 
workers were attributable to prostitutes’ personal choice to engage in prostitution and/or from 
interactions with third parties, such as individuals who purchase sex or pimps. They sought to 
demonstrate that the laws had not, in and of themselves, jeopardized the safety and health of 
prostitutes.74 In response, McLachlin C.J. argued that street prostitutes – many of which suffer 
from substance abuse and/or mental illnesses, and who are habitually victims of poverty – “often 
have little choice but to sell their bodies for money.” The Chief Justice went on to state that 
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while third parties are often the source of violence and abuse, the laws nonetheless increased, 
and contributed to, the safety risks associated with the sex trade.75  
 Having established that s. 7 rights had been engaged, the McLachlin Court went on to 
consider whether the three prostitution laws were consistent with the principles of fundamental 
justice. According to the Chief Justice, a successful s. 7 defence exclusively requires that the 
claimant(s) demonstrate that their life, liberty and/or security has been compromised/impaired as 
a result of the relevant law(s); such an approach solely considers, therefore, the effect of the law 
on limiting a single (perhaps even hypothetical) person’s s.7 rights, as opposed to society more 
generally.76  
The Court found that s. 210 (bawdy-houses) was grossly disproportionate to the 
objectives of the law – namely, minimizing public nuisances associated with prostitution – 
because it had the effect of preventing sex workers from accessing safety-enhancing measures. 
With respect to s. 212(1)(j), the ‘living on avails’ provision, the Supreme Court held that the law 
was overbroad insofar as it was a blanket prohibition that failed to adequately distinguish 
‘exploitive’ from ‘non-exploitive’ relationships. In other words, s. 212(1)(j) had the effect of 
criminalizing the act of hiring staff, such as bodyguards, managers and receptionists, who, unlike 
pimps, would help mitigate the safety risks inherent in sex work. Lastly, the SCC found that s. 
213(1)(c) had the “effect of displacing prostitutes to more secluded, less secure locations,” and, 
as a result, was grossly disproportionate.77  
In Bedford, the Court chose to remedy the constitutional defects by invalidating s. 210 
(insofar as it relates to prostitution), and ss. 212(1)(j) and 213(1)(c). Consistent with the remedy 
granted by the trial judge, the Supreme Court went on to severe the word ‘prostitution’ from the 
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definition of bawdyhouses under s. 197(1) as it applies to s. 210. Given the complex nature of 
prostitution laws, and the potential danger associated with leaving prostitution unregulated in 
Canada, however, the Court chose to suspend its decision for one year.78  
Initially, it appears that, in suspending its declaration of invalidity, the Court 
acknowledged that the “legislature is a forum [better] structured for more expansive debate[s].”79 
Upon closer inspection, however, the Court’s decision to suspend its declaration for twelve 
months can be perceived to be a relatively interventionist remedy. In effect, the Court in Bedford 
failed to explain their justification for issuing a twelve-month suspension, or their reasons for 
believing that a one-year suspension was ample time to address the issues raised by the Court in 
Bedford. In truth, the ‘complex’ and ‘delicate’ nature of prostitution reform required that the 
Court issue a longer suspension to provide the legislatures with the time necessary to craft an 
appropriate legislative response. It is highly plausible, therefore, that the twelve-month 
suspension granted was, in effect, “the Court subliminally [telling] the government that it did not 
expect nor desire significant change.”80 While McLachlin C.J. claimed that the Court’s decision 
in Bedford did not prevent Parliament from introducing new legislation concerning “how and 
where prostitution may be conducted,” it did forcefully assert, however, that the Court would not 
tolerate prostitution laws that, like those addressed in Bedford, would unreasonably infringe on 
prostitutes’ right to security of the person.81 As will be explored in the proceeding section, 
however, the Harper Conservatives responded to the Court’s ‘activist’ decision in Bedford by 
introducing an equally strong legislative response via Bill C-36.   
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3.6  Bill C-36: The Harper Conservatives’ Response to Bedford 
On November 6th, 2014, the Conservative government chose to respond to Bedford via the 
introduction of Bill C-36 (Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act). This outcome, 
however, is not surprising. Following Himel J.’s decision on the Ontario Superior Court, Stephen 
Harper publicly stated his party’s dissatisfaction with the outcome of the case. If need be, the 
Conservative government claimed that they were prepared to introduce a legislative response 
consistent with, and reflective of, their understanding of prostitution as being an inherently 
immoral activity.82  It is important here to recall that, prior to the enactment of Bill C-36, 
prostitution was not in and of itself illegal. Indeed, the constitutional issues raised in Bedford 
centered on the issue of whether the three prostitution-related provisions deprived prostitutes of 
their right to security of the person under s.7 by heightening the risks and potential harms 
associated with the sex trade.  
 In Bedford, the Supreme Court claimed that s. 212(1)(j) was overbroad because it was 
essentially a blanket prohibition that captured both ‘exploitative’ and ‘non-exploitative’ 
relationships. To the extent that it prohibited sex workers from taking precautionary measures, 
such as the hiring of staff (bodyguards, receptionists and drivers), the Supreme Court held that 
the ‘living on avails’ law was unconstitutional. 83  Interestingly enough, s. 286.2(1) (the ‘material 
benefit’ provision) creates a brand new criminal offence whereby any person who “[knowingly] 
receives a financial or other material benefit” derived from the provision of sexual services can 
face up to a maximum of ten years in prison. Further, under s. 286.2(3), any person who “lives 
with or is habitually in the company of” sex workers is presumed to have ‘profited’ from the 
commercial sex trade; they are therefore also liable to imprisonment under s. 286.2(1), unless 
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they can adduce sufficient evidence that proves otherwise.84 In effect, the ‘material benefit’ 
provision captures far more than simply ‘exploitative’ relationships, and, essentially, has the 
exact same effect as the ‘living on avails’ provision that had been struck down in Bedford. The 
bottom line is that sections 286.2(1) and (3) make it unlikely, perhaps even impossible, for sex 
workers to implement safety-enhancing measures; the mere possibility of criminal sanctions is 
sufficient to deter individuals from voluntarily working for, or being employed by, sex 
workers.85  
Additionally, the Supreme Court in Bedford argued that the ‘communication’ provision 
(s. 213(1)(c)) was problematic to the extent that it prevented sex workers from screening clients, 
and because it forced sex workers to work in more isolated and unsafe areas.86 In some respects, 
therefore, Bill C-36 complies with the Court’s ruling. Section 213(1)(1.1), for example, restricts 
the conditions under which communicating “for the purpose of offering or providing sexual 
services” is prohibited. More specifically, prostitutes can now solicit sex in public locations, so 
long as it is does not occur in areas typically frequented by minors, such as parks, schools and/or 
daycares.87 On the other hand, however, s. 213(1) effectively criminalizes the purchasing of sex 
in all public areas. Once again, the effect of the law is essentially the same as that which was 
struck down in Bedford. In prohibiting the purchasing of sex, the new law presumably forces 
prostitutes to work in more remote and dangerous places, creating conditions favorable to the 
expansion of underground commercial sex markets. Moreover, in carrying a penalty of up to five 
years in prison, the new law also has the effect of decreasing overall ‘demand’ for prostitution, 
which will undoubtedly also impair the economic livelihood of sex workers.88  
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Furthermore, by severing the word ‘prostitution’ from s. 197(1), it appears at first glance 
that Bill C-36 complies with the McLachlin Court’s ruling in Bedford. The inclusion of sections 
286.5(1) and (2), however, suggest otherwise. Under section 286.5(1), for example, sex workers 
can financially benefit from, or advertise on behalf of, “their own sexual services.” Similarly, 
under section 286.5(2), sex workers cannot be charged with “aiding, abetting, conspiring or 
attempting” to commit a prostitution-related crime if it relates to the provision of their own 
sexual services.89 While these provisions grant immunity to sex workers, it does so only in the 
context of their own work. They cannot, therefore, advertise on behalf of, or benefit from, 
another sex worker’s sexual transactions. Thus, section 285.5(2) makes it illegal for sex workers 
to work out of the same location, to refer clients to their colleagues and finally, to monitor sexual 
interactions between other sex workers and their respective clients.90 Recall that in Bedford, the 
Supreme Court accepted the trial judge’s finding that bawdyhouses, in allowing sex workers to 
work out of the same location, would provide for safer working conditions. 91  Properly 
interpreted, however, the immunity provisions have the effect of exacerbating the safety and 
health risks associated with the sex trade, which seems to clearly be at odds with the spirit of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Bedford.   
Bedford represents one of the most activist Supreme Court decisions delivered by the 
McLachlin Court. On a number of occasions,92 Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin, writing for a 
unanimous Court, expressed her intolerance for prostitution laws that would prevent sex workers 
from accessing safety-enhancing measures. In spite of this ‘strong-form’ decision invalidating 
three prostitution-related provisions of the Criminal Code, Bedford witnessed an equally, if not 
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stronger, legislative response. Three sections in Bill C-36 – namely, the  ‘material benefit’, 
‘immunity’ and ‘communication’ provisions – reintroduce, with some modifications, the 
provisions invalidated by the Supreme Court in Bedford.  
This finding is not particularly surprising for two reasons. As previously stated, the 
Harper Conservatives had publicly expressed their dissatisfaction with the lower court rulings in 
Bedford. Bill C-36 provided them with the opportunity to vocalize this dissatisfaction. 93 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Bedford was fundamentally at odds with 
the Harper Conservatives’ ‘tough-on-crime’ approach. In this respect, Bill C-36 is consistent 
with Hall’s theory of the Supreme Court of Canada as an ‘implementer-dependent’ institution. In 
this case, the Supreme Court’s capacity to spearhead fundamental policy change was constrained 
by the Harper Conservatives’ forceful disagreement with the Court’s decision in Bedford. Bill C-
36 is reflective of the Harper Conservatives’ unwillingness to treat prostitution as a legitimate 
profession, their distaste for ‘harm-reduction’ approaches, and their intent to prevent the growth 
and flourishment of the sex industry in Canada. Most importantly, Bill C-36 reflects the Harper 
Conservatives’ refusal to grant the SCC the power to make policy determinations with respect to 
salient issues of public policy.  
 
3.7 Judicial Impact and the Harper Conservatives 
In both PHS Community and Bedford, the Supreme Court delivered strong decisions. In the 
former, the Court sought to place constitutional limitations on how and when the Minister of 
Health could issue exemptions for safe injection facilities. In the latter, the McLachlin Court 
invalidated three prostitution-related provisions of the Criminal Code. In so doing, the SCC 
arguably sought to decriminalize and normalize drug use (PHS Community), and to liberalize 
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prostitution laws and the commercial sex trade (Bedford). Undeniably, the Supreme Court 
attempted to judicialize criminal justice policy via its remedial activism. This becomes apparent 
when one considers the highly interventionist remedies applied by the Supreme Court, as well as 
the fact that the SCC delivered unanimous decisions.  
 Initially, a review of PHS Community and Bedford give the impression that the Court 
behaved as a powerful policymaking institution capable of launching fundamental policy reform. 
These significant Charter ‘loses’ thus appear to confirm right-wing judicial critics’ assertion that 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, combined with the Court’s activist approach to 
constitutional review, has resulted in the transfer of policymaking power from elected 
representatives to the judiciary. An analysis of the legislative sequels introduced by the Harper 
Conservatives in response to statutory invalidation, however, tells a different story.  
 In The Hollow Hope, Rosenberg (2008) argued that in order to behave as a powerful 
policymaking institution capable of social and political reform, final appellate courts “must have 
the ability to develop appropriate policies and the power to implement them.”94 As we have seen, 
the Supreme Court of Canada satisfies the first requirement. Undeniably, the McLachlin Court 
played a crucial policy role in PHS Community and Bedford as ‘agenda-setters.’ It did so by 
forcing policy issues – namely, safe injection facilities and prostitution reform – onto the federal 
legislative agenda, issues that may have never – under a different set of conditions – been 
debated in Parliament at that particular time. To some extent, therefore, the McLachlin Court 
functioned as a powerful policymaking institution.  
The question remains, however, did the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in PHS 
Community and Bedford result in fundamental policy change? In response to judicial 
invalidation, the federal legislature had two options at its disposal: comply with the Supreme 
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Court (negative dialogic response), or defy their ruling (positive dialogic response). As Hall 
(2010) suggests, unpopular lateral issues generally result in legislative noncompliance. PHS 
Community and Bedford attest to this claim. In particular, both cases centred on “policy issues of 
critical importance to the Harper government.” 95  More importantly, the ‘harm-reduction’ 
approach adopted by the Supreme Court in both cases was fundamentally at odds with the 
Harper Conservatives’ law and order agenda. It is not surprising, therefore, that in response to 
PHS Community and Bedford, the Conservative government introduced positive legislative 
responses that effectively reversed the judicial decisions.   
Bill C-2, for example, introduced a series of twenty-six conditions that must be met 
before the Minister of Health can grant safe injection facilities exemptions under section 56 of 
the CDSA. Despite the Supreme Court’s call to liberalize SIFs, not a single facility was granted 
an exemption, either by the Harper Conservatives, or the Trudeau Liberals, during the period in 
which Bill C-2 was in force. The same is not true of Bill C-37, however, which repealed and 
replaced Bill C-2. As this chapter has demonstrated, the Trudeau Liberals were more open to the 
idea of establishing safe injection facilities in an attempt to address the growing health and safety 
concerns associated with intravenous drug use in Canada. This is seen in the fact that, post-Bill 
C-37, over forty SIFs have been granted exemptions by the Minister of Health. Likewise, Bill C-
36 effectively reintroduces the same prostitution-related provisions of the Criminal Code 
invalidated by the Supreme Court in Bedford. In effect, Bill C-36 goes one step further in now 
making it a crime to purchase sex, once again forcing sex workers to work in more dangerous 
and secluded areas.  
Put simply, the Harper government chose to introduce legislative responses that explicitly 
defied the Court’s decisions in PHS Community and Bedford, and which remained committed to 
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the original policy objectives of the statutes declared unconstitutional by the Court. Interestingly 
enough, it did so without resorting to the use of the notwithstanding clause. This demonstrates 
that judicial invalidation marks the beginning of a constitutional dialogue; the Court’s invalidate, 
and the legislatures choose when and how to respond. However, Bill C-2 and C-36 also confirm 
that while “governments can lose the Charter ‘battle,’” they can nonetheless “win the policy 
‘war.’”96 While Bedford and PHS Community undeniably frustrated the Harper Conservatives’ 
‘law and order’ agenda, the Court’s remedial activism was offset by the federal government’s 
unwillingness to implement these strong-type judicial decisions. The crucial point here is that 
ordinary legislative majorities can, given the right set of conditions, reverse the potentially 
harmful effects of judicial invalidation.  
Contrary to the position advanced by conservative critics, these cases demonstrate that 
“the judicialization of politics is derivative first and foremost of political, not judicial, factors.”97 
Consistent with Hall’s (2010) theory of the Supreme Court as an ‘implementer-dependent’ 
institution, Bill C-2 and C-36 demonstrate that positive legislative sequels can serve as a check 
on judicial supremacy. This remains true despite the Court’s strong remedial powers under 
section 24(1) of the Charter of Rights. Through its remedial activism, the McLachlin Court 
demonstrated a clear intent to judicialize politics in Bedford and PHS Community. Nonetheless, 
in both cases, the policy impact of the Supreme Court was rather limited. The bottom line is that 
the Supreme Court of Canada lacks the enforcement mechanisms necessary to ensure compliance 
with their decisions. Under the Conservative government, little changed with respect to the 
number of safe injection facilities, and the overall safety of sex workers in Canada.   
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3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed two cases involving salient issues of public policy, namely Bedford 
(prostitution reform) and PHS Community (safe injection facilities). In so doing, it has 
demonstrated that the McLachlin Court intended to judicialize criminal justice policy by 
invalidating three prostitution-related laws in Bedford, and by obliging the federal Minister of 
Health to order an immediate exemption to Insite in PHS Community. Both cases are key 
examples of judicial activism, and reflect the extent to which the McLachlin Court was prepared 
to dive into highly controversial and value-laden policy debates, despite the fact that there 
appeared to be no public consensus on how best to resolve these issues.  
 Drawing on dialogue theory, the chapter has argued that judicial invalidation often leaves 
room for an independent legislative response that ‘reverses, modifies or avoids’ a judicial 
decision.98 While the Court advocated for ‘harm-reduction’ approaches to address the issues of 
safe injection facilities and prostitution reform, the Conservative government’s reply legislation 
is reflective of their preference for ‘crime-reduction’ policies. Properly construed, Bill C-2 and 
C-36 can be classified as negative dialogic responses, or legislative noncompliance.  
The chapter has attempted to demonstrate that conservative critics, in focusing 
exclusively on legal mobilization efforts, have overlooked the crucial role played by the 
legislatures as the designers and implementers of public policy in response to judicial 
invalidation. It has argued that right-wing critics wrongfully assume that because the Supreme 
Court is activist, that this results in fundamental public policy change. However, a review of 
Bedford and PHS Community, as well as their corresponding legislative responses, suggests that 
the policy influence of the McLachlin Court with respect to criminal justice policy was rather 
limited. In short, the McLachlin Court, despite its best efforts to “govern like 
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parliamentarians,”99 lacked the political support, or, alternatively, the implementation powers, 
necessary to enforce their decisions outside of the courtroom.  
 




The Judicialization of Healthcare Policy 
 
 
The chapter focuses on two cases involving healthcare policy, including Carter v. Canada 
(Attorney General) and Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General). Additionally, the chapter 
reviews the Trudeau Liberals’ response to Carter (An Act to amend the Criminal Code (Bill C-
14)), and the Charest government’s response to Chaoulli (An Act to amend the Act respecting 
health services and social services and other legislative provisions (Bill 33)).  
 In Carter, the Supreme Court unanimously struck down sections 14 (ban forbidding 
persons to consent to one’s own death) and 241(b) (prohibition on ‘aiding and abetting’ another 
person to commit suicide) of the Criminal Code on the grounds that they denied competent and 
informed persons suffering from ‘grievous and irremediable’ medical conditions the right to 
physician-assisted death (PAD). In Chaoulli, a narrow majority (4:3) found that Quebec’s ban on 
private health insurance violated section 1 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights (the right to 
‘life, personal security, inviolability and freedom’). The majority maintained that greater 
privatization would remedy the long wait times experienced in the public healthcare sector.   
 Carter and Chaoulli are examples of ‘strong’ judicial decisions where the McLachlin 
Court invalidated primary legislation for its inconsistency with the Canadian and Quebec 
Charters, respectively. In both cases, the Court attempted to judicialize healthcare policy by 
transforming legal rights into health rights. Moreover, in Carter, the SCC delivered a unanimous 
decision authored by ‘the Court,’ signaling a clear policy preference for the legalization of PAD. 
While Chaoulli was a split decision, it also has ‘strong-type’ features. In particular, the majority 
found that the privatization ban violated the Quebec Charter, and not the Canadian one. This 
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decision may in large part be explained by the fact that the majority recognized that, in Quebec, 
where the Canadian Charter of Rights has never been popular, the judicial decision would have a 
greater degree of legitimacy and would therefore be complied with.1  
Despite the McLachlin Court’s attempt to judicialize healthcare policy, this chapter 
demonstrates that relatively little has changed with respect to access to physician-assisted death 
(post-Carter) and the public healthcare system in Quebec (post-Chaoulli). As the chapter 
illustrates, in cases involving lateral issues, the Supreme Court – as an ‘implementer-dependent’ 
institution – requires the support of the non-judicial actors responsible for accepting, and thus 
implementing, the Court’s decision. When the Supreme Court delivers an unpopular judicial 
ruling that is perceived to be an unfavorable policy outcome by the actors responsible for 
implementation, the typical response will be noncompliance. This was the case in both Carter 
and Chaoulli.    
Carter was unpopular with the Harper Conservatives, whereas the Trudeau Liberals 
appeared to be more open to the idea of legalizing physician-assisted death in Canada. The 
Conservatives’ ‘tough on crime’ policy strategies attests to this claim.2 In a public statement 
following Carter, however, the Trudeau government appeared to generally support the judicial 
decision:  “The Supreme Court of Canada’s decision to strike down the ban on physician-assisted 
death was unanimous and unambiguous: the current Criminal Code prohibition infringes on the 
Charter right to life, liberty and security of the person for adults who are mentally competent but 
suffering ‘grievous and irremediable conditions.’”3 
Broadly speaking, the chapter demonstrates that the Liberals complied with Carter 
insofar as Bill C-14 legalizes physician-assisted death for persons who are ‘grievously and 
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irremediably’ ill. Nonetheless, Bill C-14 can be properly classified as legislative noncompliance, 
as the eligibility criteria introduced by the federal government is far narrower than that which 
was preferred by the McLachlin Court. Bill C-14 requires that PAD patients’ medical condition 
have progressed or deteriorated significantly, and that their natural death be ‘reasonably 
foreseeable.’ 4  These are two criteria that were not contemplated by the Court, and which 
arguably have the effect of narrowing the pool of applicants eligible for medial assistance in 
dying (MAID). 
 The most forceful opposition to MAID, however, has come from Canadian healthcare 
professionals who conscientiously object to PAD. As the chapter demonstrates, a majority of 
physicians and nurses across Canada refuse to assist their patients in prematurely terminating 
their lives, even in cases where the patient meets the eligibility criteria introduced in Bill C-14.5  
 As will be explored in the chapter, Carter dealt with a negative right, which simply 
requires that government abstain from interfering with a patient’s decision to terminate their life. 
It did not, however, deal with a positive right. Stated differently, it did not require that the federal 
government, nor healthcare professionals, ensure access for persons who qualify. In short, Carter 
required the support of two non-judicial actors, neither of which fully complied with the Court’s 
decision: the federal government, as the actor responsible for introducing reply legislation, and 
the College of Physicians and Surgeons in each province, as the private actors responsible for 
regulating the conduct of healthcare professionals. 
 Similarly, Bill 33 removes the complete ban on private health insurance in Quebec, and 
thus initially appears to comply with Chaoulli. However, it does so only in the context of three 
elective surgeries, namely hip, knee and cataract surgery. With the exception of these surgical 
 
4 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debate, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, (17 June 2016). 
5 Ross and Sikkema 2016.  
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procedures, therefore, Bill 33 reintroduces a near complete ban on private health insurance, 
which had been struck down by the Court in Chaoulli. For this reason, it can be properly 
classified as legislative noncompliance.  
  The chapter will proceed in the following way. First, it provides an overview of Carter, 
including the facts of the case, the litigants involved and the outcome at trial. It then reviews the 
Supreme Court’s decision. Next, it analyzes the Trudeau Liberals’ response to Carter, Bill C-14. 
Having considered Carter, the chapter will review Chaoulli, which follows a similar pattern to 
that employed in the context of Carter. The chapter then summarizes both cases, and discusses 
the findings. This section attempts to understand the limits of judicial power and of the 
McLachlin Court’s policy impact with respect to healthcare policy.  
 
4.1 Overview of Carter 
In 1972, the federal government decriminalized attempted suicide. However, physician-assisted 
death (PAD), sometimes referred to as medical assistance in dying (MAID), was prohibited 
under the Criminal Code. Under section 241(b), it was a criminal offence to “counsel, aid or 
abet” another person to commit suicide.6 Similarly, under s. 14, it was illegal to ‘consent’ to 
one’s own death.7 As elsewhere, the prohibition on assisted death in Canada has historically been 
premised on strong religious and moral beliefs that suicide is a sin and should be condemned.8  
 In 1993, in Rodriguez, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether sections 
241(b) and 14 of the Criminal Code violated section 7 (‘life, liberty and security’), 12 (‘cruel and 
unusual punishment’) and 15(1) (equality) Charter rights.9 The claimant, Sue Rodriguez, was a 
 
6 Beschle 2013, 563.  
7 Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 at para 19.  
8 Carter and Rodgerson 2018, 780.  
9 Chan and Somerville 2016, 150; Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 33 at para 5; Christie, Slain, Dahlgren 
and Koning 2016, 2.  
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forty-two year old woman who had been diagnosed with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS), a 
neurodegenerative disease with no known cure,10 and was given a maximum life expectancy of 
fourteen months. As her condition worsened, Rodriguez would eventually become fully 
paralyzed, thus losing her ability to carry out day-to-day functions without assistance, such as 
eating, bathing and walking. Rodriguez challenged the constitutionality of sections 14 and 241(b) 
on the grounds that it denied her the right to bodily integrity.11 In a 5:4 decision, the majority on 
the Court found that while s. 241(b) engaged section 7 rights, it did so in a manner that was 
consistent with the principles of fundamental justice. Writing for the majority, Justice Sopinka 
found that the law’s objective – namely, to protect ‘vulnerable’ individuals from being coerced 
into prematurely terminating their life, and to preserve the ‘sanctity of life’ – justified the 
Charter violation.12   
 In 2008, following a number of failed legislative attempts to decriminalize PAD, 13 
Kathleen Carter, a woman suffering from spinal stenosis, sought access to physician-assisted 
death. Lee Carter and Hollis Johnson, the co-plaintiffs in Carter, traveled to a physician-assisted 
suicide clinic in Switzerland (DIGNITAS) where, upon her request, Mrs. Carter was prescribed 
sodium pentobarbital and soon after passed away.14 Against this backdrop, Gloria Taylor, a 
woman who like Rodriguez suffered from ALS, expressed her desire to “die peacefully” with the 
help of a trained medical professional at the time and place of her choosing.15 Accordingly, the 
plaintiffs sought to have s. 241(b) and 14 of the Criminal Code invalidated for their 
inconsistency with s. 7 and s. 15 of the Charter.16   
 
10 Carter and Rodgerson 2018, 778; Baum 2015, 157.  
11 Beschle 2013, 562-63; Baum 2015, 159. 
12 Chan and Somerville 2016, 150; Beschle 2013, 563-64; Baum 2015, 173. 
13 Carter and Rodgerson 2018, 785.   
14 Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 at para 17.  
15 Ibid., at para 12. 
16 Chan and Somerville 2016, 145 & 150.   
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 Given the similarities between Rodriguez and Carter, and given the principle of stare 
decisis, the plaintiffs needed to make a compelling case for why the courts should revisit the 
issue. When the SCC delivered its judgment in Rodriguez, no Western democracy had previously 
legalized physician-assisted suicide (PAS). This was a crucial reason underpinning the majority’s 
decision to uphold s. 241(b).17 Over the next twenty years, however, a number of jurisdictions 
decriminalized and/or legalized this medical practice, including two American states and a 
number of European countries.18 Factoring into the trial judge’s decision to reconsider the issue 
was also the fact that the ‘social landscape’ surrounding physician-assisted death had changed 
since Rodriguez, and because the s. 7 jurisprudence had considerably evolved.19  
 In Carter, the plaintiffs argued that the prohibition on physician-assisted death in Canada 
was fundamentally incompatible with the right to bodily autonomy and self-determination. For 
advocates of PAD, section 241(b) prevents ‘empathetic’ medical professionals from assisting 
‘rational’ and ‘informed’ patients in ending their life. Alternatively, the Attorney General of 
Canada framed ‘PAD patients’ as individuals suffering from depression and/or mental illnesses. 
The federal government, and the Attorney General of British Columbia, argued that patients’ 
mental instability clouded their judgment, and led them to make irrational choices with respect to 
their bodies and lives. Moreover, the federal government argued that the legalization of PAD 
would result in a “concomitant reduction in the quality of palliative care” in Canada.20  
Justice Smith of the British Columbia Supreme Court rejected both arguments raised by 
government. Drawing on the experiences of permissive jurisdictions, she found that the 
Netherlands and Oregon had implemented safeguards “design[ed] to protect the socially 
 
17 Baum 2015, 174; Beschle 2013, 564; Christie et al. 2016, 3. 
18 Beschle 2013, 561; See also Karsoho, Wright, Macdonald and Fishman 2016, 2-3; See also Chan and Somerville 2016, 147. 
19 Rahimi 2017, 459-60. 
20 Karsoho et. al 2016, 6-8.  
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vulnerable,” and that such precautionary measures had drastically decreased the incidence of 
abuse.21 Smith J. found that the prohibition on physician-assisted death did not minimally impair 
on equality rights because it forced disabled persons to resort to inhumane ways of ending their 
lives, such as through starvation and dehydration tactics.22 The trial judge argued that s. 241(b) 
infringed the right to ‘life’ under s. 7 of the Charter because it pressurized “competent, informed, 
grievously and irremediably ill” persons into prematurely ending their lives out of fear that they 
would not physically be able to do so at a later date.23 Smith J. suspended her declaration of 
invalidity for one year, and granted Gloria Taylor a constitutional exemption in the interim.24   
The federal government appealed the decision to the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
(BCCA). They argued that the “trial judge made a palpable and overriding error in concluding 
that the safeguards would minimize the risk associated with assisted dying.”25 Their claim drew 
heavily on Professor Montero’s assertion that the legalization of PAD in Belgium, in spite of the 
safeguards established to protect persons from involuntarily consenting, created a ‘slippery 
slope’ effect. As a result, the federal government maintained that a complete prohibition on PAD 
was necessary.26 In a 2:1 decision, the BCCA found that the trial judge was bound by the 
decision delivered by the Court in Rodriguez and, consequently, reversed the trial judge’s 





21 Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 at para 25 & 27.  
22 Ibid., at para. 29.  
23 Ibid., at para 24 & 30.  
24 Ibid., at para 32.  
25 Ibid., at para 108.  
26 Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 at para 111 & 114 
27 Ibid., at para 34; Rahimi 2017, 459; Chan and Somerville 2016, 147 
 87 
4.2 The Supreme Court of Canada: Carter v. Canada (Attorney General) [2015] 
On February 6th, 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada delivered its much-anticipated decision in 
Carter. In a unanimous decision authored by ‘The Court,’ the SCC argued that the trial judge did 
not err in revisiting the debate on physician-assisted suicide in Canada. According to the Court, 
the s. 7 jurisprudence had evolved significantly since Rodriguez; the principles of overbreadth 
and gross disproportionately did not factor into the Court’s analysis in 1993. Moreover, the SCC 
argued that new evidence had surfaced which had not been available in Rodriguez, and that the 
social landscape with respect to PAD had significantly changed over the last twenty years.28  
 Having established that a ‘material change’ in circumstances warranted judicial 
reevaluation, the Supreme Court considered whether ss. 241(b) and 14 violated s. 7 rights. 
According to the Court, the prohibition on physician-assisted death engaged both liberty and 
security of the person (s. 7) because it denied persons suffering from “grievous and irremediable 
medical condition[s]” the right to make fundamental choices with respect to their life and death, 
and because it unnecessarily prolonged patients’ psychological and physical suffering.29  
In its section 1 analysis that involved the reasonableness of the rights engagement, the 
Court found that the Criminal Code provisions did not minimally impair on section 7 rights. In 
their opinion, the federal government had not convincingly demonstrated why a complete 
prohibition, as opposed to a ‘well-tailored’ system with adequate safeguards, was necessary.30 
Insofar as sections 241(b) and 14 denied “competent adult person[s]” who “clearly consent to the 
termination of life” and who suffer from “grievous irremediable condition[s] that causes 
enduring suffering” the right to physician-assisted death, the McLachlin Court found that the 
 
28 Ibid., at para 44-7. 
29 Ibid., at para 63 & 66.   
30 Ibid., at para 117-19 & 121.  
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provisions unjustifiably infringed on s. 7.31 As a result, the Court declared ss. 241(b) and 14 to be 
unconstitutional. They suspended their declaration of invalidity for 12 months.32  
In 2016, the Supreme Court extended its suspended declaration for an additional four 
months. The Court was rather silent, however, on the reasons justifying their decision for doing 
so.33 A compelling case could be made that they should have allotted the federal government the 
requested time (6 months), especially given that an intervening election was held, and a new 
government had come to power, the same year that they had delivered their judgment in Carter. 
In so doing, the SCC would have provided the Trudeau Liberals with sufficient time to craft an 
appropriate legislative response to address the constitutional issues raised in Carter.34  
There are at least four other features of Carter that stand out as particularly ‘activist.’ 
First, the Court artificially narrowed the objectives of the impugned provisions to ensure a 
favorable outcome.35 At trial, the federal government asserted that the prohibition on PAD had a 
dual purpose, namely to protect the vulnerable and to preserve the sanctity of life.36 In Carter, 
the Court forcefully disagreed: “The object of the prohibition is not, broadly, to preserve life 
whatever circumstances, but more specifically to protect vulnerable persons from being induced 
to commit suicide at a time of weakness.”37 Recall that a law is overbroad if it captures more 
than is necessary to achieve its desired objective. Arguably, the Supreme Court recognized that 
in narrowing the law’s objective, it would render it “more susceptible to being struck down as 
overbroad,” as the prohibition on physician-assisted suicide would capture both ‘vulnerable’ and 
 
31 Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 at para 127.  
32 Ibid., at para 127-28.   
33 Ibid., at para 6.  
34 Macfarlane 2016, 109.  
35 Chan and Somerville 2016, 167.  
36 Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 at para 75.  
37Ibid., at case summary.  
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‘non-vulnerable’ persons.38 By depriving the ‘non-vulnerable’ (rational and informed adults who 
voluntarily consent) the right to PAD, the law would likely violate s. 7. The McLachlin Court 
themselves recognized that, had they accepted that the law’s objective was to  ‘protect the 
sanctity of life,’ it would have been extremely difficult to demonstrate “that the means used to 
further [the law were] overbroad or grossly disproportionate.”39   
Additionally, the remedy issued by the SCC was overly prescriptive; it not only told the 
federal government what they could not do, it also told them what they must do. In Carter, the 
Supreme Court advocated for an approach that placed very few restrictions on physician-assisted 
death in Canada. If adults voluntarily consent, and if they suffer from ‘irremediable’ disabilities, 
then they are entitled to a de facto constitutional right to PAD. The truth of the matter is that the 
Court could have chosen to simply invalidate the provisions. Arguably, this is what they should 
have done given that Carter dealt with a controversial issue of healthcare policy for which the 
Court lacks institutional capacity.40 In being overly prescriptive, the McLachlin Court conveyed 
a very specific message: the SCC had no desire to grant Parliament the opportunity to introduce 
an independent legislative sequel. Indeed, in their concluding remarks, the Court explained that 
while the federal government could introduce a legislative response to address judicial 
invalidation, it had to do so in a way that was “consistent with the constitutional parameters” 
established by the Court in Carter.41  
 Moreover, in Carter, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the Criminal 
Code provisions violated section 7 Charter rights. Properly interpreted, the right to ‘life, liberty 
and security’ of the person is a legal right. Over the course of the Charter’s lifespan, however, 
 
38 Chan and Somerville 2016, 165.  
39 Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 at para 77.  
40 Rahimi 2017, 484-86.  
41 Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 at para 126.  
 90 
the Supreme Court has interpreted section 7 legal rights to also include non-legal rights issues, 
thus expanding the policy areas that can potentially fall victim to judicial invalidation.42 In 
Carter, the McLachlin Court transformed legal rights into health rights. It did so by finding that 
Canadians suffering from ‘grievous and irremediable’ medical conditions could not be deprived 
of their right to terminate their life. Essentially, it was the Court’s broad interpretation of section 
7 which resulted in the invalidation of the Criminal Code provisions, not the wording of section 
7 per se.  
It is also important to reiterate that in Carter, the SCC delivered a unanimous decision 
authored by ‘The Court’ on an inherently divisive issue. Cases involving controversial and 
salient issues of public policy rarely witness unanimous judgments because they “often do not 
admit a simple ‘right answer.’”43 Recall that in Rodriguez, a narrow majority on the Court found 
that the prohibition on physician-assisted death was a justifiable infringement on Charter rights. 
Yet, in Carter, a unanimous Court struck down the very same provisions. This finding, however, 
is not shocking for a number of reasons. First, Justice McLachlin, as she was then, dissented 
from the majority in Rodriguez. Further, since Rodriguez, the Court has experienced a 
considerable degree of turnover; with the sole exception of McLachlin C.J., none of the other 
Supreme Court justices in Carter were members of the bench in Rodriguez. Perhaps more 
importantly, Beverly McLachlin had, since Rodriguez, been appointed as Chief Justice. 
Arguably, McLachlin C.J., now in a position of influence and authority, sought to avoid the legal 
uncertainties that marked the Court’s split decision in Rodriguez. Unlike Rodriguez, the Court’s 
message in Carter was clear: their decision is “final, authoritative, and without ambiguity.”44  
 
42 Macfarlane 2014, 54.  
43 Mathen 2003, 332.   
44 Kelly (In progress), 18.  
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As will be explored in the next section, the Trudeau Liberals responded to Carter by 
introducing Bill C-14, ‘An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments to 
other Acts (medical assistance in dying).’ While Bill C-14 complied in some respects with the 
Court’s decision in Carter, the eligibility criteria introduced by the Trudeau Liberals suggests 
that the federal government preferred a much more restrictive policy approach to physician-
assisted death than that which was advanced by the McLachlin Court. 
 
4.3  Bill C-14: The Trudeau Liberals’ Response to Carter 
June 17th, 2016, the Trudeau Liberals introduced Bill C-14. Section 241.2(1) of Bill C-14 lists a 
number of criteria that must be met before a person is eligible to receive medical assistance in 
dying. Persons qualify for physician-assisted death if they are a competent adult aged 18 or more 
(subsection b) who suffers from a ‘grievous and irremediable’ medical condition (subsection c) 
and who voluntarily requests and consents to prematurely terminating their life (subsections d 
and e).45 In this respect, Bill C-14 copied nearly verbatim the Court’s suggestions in Carter.46  In 
other respects, however, Bill C-14 goes far beyond the Supreme Court’s guidelines. For 
example, to be eligible for MAID, a person suffering from a ‘grievous and irremediable’ 
condition must also be in “an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability,” and is required 
to demonstrate that their natural death is “reasonably foreseeable.” Section 241.2(3) further states 
that patients must wait ten days after having signed the consent form, and that two healthcare 
professionals must certify that the patient meets the requirements for PAD.47   
In Carter, the Court made no mention of these requirements. Rather, the Supreme Court 
argued that it was unconstitutional to deny competent and informed persons who have been 
 
45 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debate, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, (17 June 2016).  
46 Hennigar and Nicolaides 2018, 319.  
47 Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 at para 127.  
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diagnosed with an irremediable medical condition and who, as a result of this condition, 
experience ‘intolerable’ and ‘enduring’ psychological and/or physical suffering, access to 
MAID.48 Bill C-14, therefore, has the effect of denying persons who would have qualified for 
physician-assisted death had the Trudeau Liberals fully complied with the Court. In fact, there is 
some evidence to suggest that the ‘reasonably foreseeable’ requirement is an effective barrier to 
physician-assisted death in Canada. Reports suggest that out of 1,066 requests across several 
provinces, including Quebec, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Alberta and some Atlantic provinces, 
eight per cent of applications were dismissed on the grounds that the applicant did not suffer 
from a terminal illness. An additional fourteen per cent of these applications were unsuccessful 
because the patients had died prior to being granted access, which could in part be “attributed to 
requests being made at a late stage in an individual’s illness.”49  
This finding clearly illustrates the paradox of Bill C-14. While it legalizes physician-
assisted death, it requires that applicants be in the final stages of their lives. This not only 
prolongs their psychological and physical suffering, which was the primary reason why the Court 
struck down sections 241(b) and 14, but it also runs the risk that patients will die before they are 
given the chance to make fundamental determinations with respect to their bodies and lives. For 
example, Julia Lamb, a twenty-five-year-old woman suffering from spinal muscular atrophy, has 
recently waged a constitutional challenge on the basis that the ‘reasonably foreseeable’ criterion 
is unconstitutional. Lamb maintains that the new Criminal Code provisions deprive her of her 
constitutional right, as per the Court’s decision in Carter, to medical assistance in dying because 
her doctors cannot predict with sufficient certainty that her natural death is imminent.50  
 
48 Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 at para 127.  
49 Health Canada 2018.  
50 Sigalet and Baron 2016; Downie 2017, 139.  
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In 2019, a similar case arose in Quebec where two plaintiffs, John Truchon and Nicole 
Gladu, both suffering from grievous and irremediable (but non-terminal) medical conditions 
causing enduring psychological and physical pain, yet each denied their application for access to 
MAID, claimed that the ‘reasonably foreseeable’ requirement introduced by the Trudeau 
Liberals was unconstitutional.51 They maintained that Bill C-14, by rendering patients ineligible 
for medical assistance in dying simply on the basis that they did not suffer from terminal 
illnesses, was tantamount to an absolute prohibition: “[Les demandeurs] soutiennent que 
l’exigence d’une morte naturelle raisonnablement prévisible crée l’équivalent d’une prohibition à 
l’aide médicale à mourir pour toutes les personnes qui, comme eux, ne sont pas en fin de vie.”52  
Ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, the trial judge, Justice Baudouin, found that the ‘reasonable 
foreseeable’ requirement reintroduced a near complete prohibition on medical assistance in 
dying in Canada, which had been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Carter. 
Baudouin J. maintained that, in including the ‘reasonably foreseeable’ requirement, government 
recognized that countless suffering patients would be deemed ineligible, and would therefore be 
denied their constitutional right to a ‘serene’ and ‘dignified’ death. 53  Accordingly, she 
invalidated s. 241.2(2)(d) of Bill C-14, but suspended her decision for six months in an attempt 
to provide government with the necessary time to craft an appropriate legislative response.54   
Following the implementation of Bill C-14, a number of other groups, including MAID 
advocates, healthcare professionals and patients, criticized the Trudeau Liberals for failing to 
comply with the constitutional parameters established by the McLachlin Court in Carter. They 
were of the view that eligibility for physician-assisted death should be based primarily on the 
 
51 Global News. 2019.  
52 Truchon c. Procureur general du Canada, [2019] QCCS 3792 at para 517.  
53 Truchon c. Procureur general du Canada, [2019] QCCS 3792 at para 622 & 633.  
54Downie and Gilbert 2019.  
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extent of the patient’s psychological and physical suffering, rather than the stage of one’s illness. 
Even the Canadian Senate opposed Bill C-14. They too found that the ‘reasonably foreseeable’ 
requirement was too restrictive, and would likely be found to be in violation of the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.55 
Others have taken extreme measures to ensure their eligibility for medical assistance in 
dying. In 2016, shortly after Bill C-14 came into force, Jean Brault, a man suffering from a 
‘grievous and irremediable’ medical condition, voiced his dissatisfaction by launching a hunger 
strike, which consisted of him refusing to eat for fifty-three consecutive days or drink water for 
seven days. Brault’s choice to dehydrate and starve himself was a desperate attempt to meet the 
‘reasonably foreseeable’ criteria necessary to qualify for physician-assisted death.56 This once 
again illustrates the controversy surrounding Bill C-14. By requiring that patients be at the end of 
their life, there is a greater risk that ineligible persons will intentionally self-inflict harm to 
ensure that they meet the requirements necessary to exercise their right to PAD. 
Undeniably, Bill C-14 adopts a more restrictive regulatory scheme that that which was 
envisioned by the Court in Carter. Bill C-14, however, is by no means the only barrier to the 
effective implementation of physician-assisted death in Canada. In Carter, the Court maintained 
that judicial invalidation of the Criminal Code prohibitions would not “compel physicians to 
provide assistance in dying.”57 In other words, Carter dealt with a negative right (the right not to 
have government deny persons of their right to seek medical assistance in dying), not a positive 
right (the right to access or receive medical assistance in dying). This once again illustrates the 
limitations of legal mobilization efforts and of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.   
 
55 Downie and Gilbert 2019. 
56 McKenna 2016.  
57 Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331 at para 132.  
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By its very nature, the legalization of PAD requires that trained healthcare professionals 
be willing to provide these services. Strong moral, ethical and/or religious values premised on 
beliefs that killing and/or suicide are intrinsically wrong could in practice constitute an additional 
barrier for access to physician-assisted death. Generally speaking, all of the provincial physicians 
associations have maintained that healthcare professionals who conscientiously object to the 
provision of MAID are not required to provide these services. All of the provinces, however, 
require that non-participating doctors refer their patients to participating doctors, or, in some 
cases, that they provide their patient with the appropriate information and/or resources necessary 
to exercise this right. Nonetheless, doctors cannot be compelled to provide these services.  
A recent report published by the Canadian Medical Association suggests that a majority 
of healthcare professionals (roughly 63 per cent) conscientiously object to PAD, even in cases 
where patients meet the relatively strict eligibility requirements of Bill C-14. Overall, physicians 
have maintained that there are fundamental differences between withdrawing medically 
necessary services and euthanasia, and have expressed greater reservation with respect to the 
latter. 58 Thus, even with referrals, it may be difficult to find physicians willing to assist patients. 
The final outcome is that, while patients who are ‘grievously and irremediably’ ill are technically 
eligible for medical assistance in dying, relatively few will actually have access to these services. 
The truth of the matter is that a right bodily autonomy and physician-assisted death are 
not synonymous with a duty to ‘mandate’ or ensure access to PAD. 59  Carter dealt with a 
negative right, and did not require that the federal government, nor healthcare professionals, 
provide access to such services. Therein lie the limitations of legal mobilization and of the 
Supreme Court’s policymaking capacity. As an ‘implementer-dependent’ institution that lacks 
 
58 Ross and Sikkema 2016.  
59 Ross and Sikkema 2016.  
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the resources required to enforce their decisions outside of the courtroom, the Supreme Court 
requires that the actors responsible for implementation – in this case, the federal government and 
healthcare professionals, more generally – implement their ruling. When the Supreme Court 
delivers unpopular rulings involving lateral issues, therefore, their policymaking power can be 
tempered via noncompliance on the part of these non-judicial actors, as evidenced post-Carter.  
As the proceeding analysis has demonstrated, the federal government complied with a 
number of elements of the Court’s decision in Carter. To some extent, this was to be expected. 
In their 2015 campaign platform, ‘Real Change: A New Plan For A Strong Middle Class,’ the 
Trudeau Liberals committed themselves to “restor[ing] dignity and respect to the relationship 
between government and the Supreme Court.”60 To a certain degree, therefore, the new federal 
government appeared to be much more ‘Court friendly’ than their predecessors, and thus more 
likely to accept judicial decisions as being authoritative and binding on government. For this 
reason, it is not wholly shocking that physician-assisted death is now legalized in Canada.  
Nonetheless, Bill C-14 also has features of legislative noncompliance, suggesting that the 
Trudeau Liberals preferred a much more restrictive and tailored approach to PAD than that 
which was envisioned by the McLachlin Court. This is evidenced by the fact that patients who, 
like Lamb, Truchon and Gladu, suffer from ‘grievous and irremediable’ medical conditions, are 
not eligible under Bill C-14, but would have likely been eligible had the Liberal government 
fully complied.  
As we have seen, however, Carter required the compliance of two non-judicial actors, the 
federal government and provincial medical associations. This is because, under the division of 
powers, the federal legislature is tasked with “develop[ing] appropriate eligibility criteria and 
safeguards while provinces and territories are responsible for specific policies pertaining to 
 
60 Liberal Party of Canada 2015.  
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administration of health services.”61 As we have seen, the most forceful opposition to PAD has 
come from physicians across Canada who have reserved their right to opt out of providing these 
services, which has evidently had a negative impact on access to physician-assisted death in 
Canada. As of this writing, there exists no conclusive or comprehensive data on the total number 
of physicians who conscientiously object to PAD. The available evidence does suggest, however, 
that non-participating healthcare professionals may pose an additional barrier to the effective 
implementation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Carter.  
What this implies, therefore, is that judicial invalidation of the Criminal Code provisions 
on medical assistance in dying did not result in fundamental policy change. Undoubtedly, the 
Supreme Court behaved as a powerful policymaking institution as ‘agenda-setters.’ This is 
because, through their remedial activism, the McLachlin Court was able to force the federal 
government to reconsider Canada’s prohibition on physician-assisted death. The Court’s 
remedial activism alone, however, is not sufficient to ensure that non-judicial actors comply with 
the judicial decision. The Trudeau Liberals (at least in part), and the College of Physicians and 
Surgeons in each province, did not fully accept, and thus did not fully comply with, Carter. 
Despite its attempts to judicialize healthcare policy, the McLachlin Court’s policy impact, 
therefore, was rather limited. In fact, while MAID is technically legal in Canada as a result of 
Bill C-14, noncompliance on the part of healthcare professionals in Canada has the same effect 
as if it were still criminalized. This is because “the detrimental impact of a lack of access on 
rights-holders that flows from provincial inaction will be functionally equivalent to the harms 
associated with restrictions or prohibitions under criminal law.”62  
 
61 Carter, Rogerson and Grace 2018, 56-7.  
62 Macfarlane 2016, 121.  
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Having considered the Supreme Court’s decision in Carter and the Trudeau Liberals’ 
response, the next section addresses Chaoulli. It will first provide an overview of the public 
healthcare system in Canada and in Quebec before addressing the facts of the case.  
 
4.4 Overview of Chaoulli  
The Canada Health Act (CHA) “supports single-tier universal health coverage.” 63 Accordingly, 
in order to be eligible for federal funding under the CHA, provincial governments have 
introduced a series of laws that: (1) ban extra billing for necessary health services/procedures 
(charging patients an additional amount which is not paid by government); (2) prohibit 
healthcare professionals who have ‘opted-out’ of the public system from charging government 
for medical services rendered; and (3) ban Canadians from purchasing private health insurance 
for medical services which are already offered in the public system.64   
These restrictions have sparked a lively debate between those who favor a single-tier 
system, and those preferring privatization. Medicare advocates often argue that the prohibition 
on private health insurance is necessary in order to ensure that medical services are provided 
based on need, rather than one’s ability to pay. In their opinion, greater privatization would 
deprive the public system of the human and financial resources required to provide adequate and 
efficient medical services to Canadians who cannot afford health insurance. The restrictions on 
privatization in Canada suggest that the federal and provincial governments have, generally 
speaking, always preferred a ‘single-tier’ public system.65 On the other hand, pro-privatization 
advocates have long pushed for a ‘two-tier’ system in Canada. In particular, they have drawn on 
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the experiences of other countries with ‘hybrid’ systems to argue that greater privatization would 
not undermine the public system.66  
The privatization debate became especially heated in the mid-1990s when Canada 
entered into a recession that had a lasting negative impact on its healthcare landscape.67 Federal 
cutbacks had been made with respect to healthcare transfers in an attempt to eliminate budget 
deficits; provincial governments experienced similar debt problems. As a result, hospitals across 
the country were closing their doors at an unprecedented rate, thus causing lengthy wait times in 
the public system. Canada’s economic state during this time served as the impetus driving calls 
to reform Canada’s single-tier healthcare system. In particular, physicians insisted that greater 
privatization would help alleviate the problem of long wait times. 68   
Two provisions prohibit private health insurance in Quebec: section 15 of the Health 
Insurance Act and section 11 of the Hospital Insurance Act. The former prohibits private 
insurance companies from covering medically-necessary services provided for by the public 
system, while the latter prohibits healthcare professionals who have ‘opted-out’ of the public 
system from “contracting for services in publicly-funded hospitals.”69 In 1997, the two plaintiffs 
in Chaoulli, George Zeliotis and Jacques Chaoulli, sought to have both provisions invalidated on 
the basis that they unjustifiably infringed section 7 Charter rights, or, alternatively, that they 
violated section 1 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.70  
George Zeliotis, a sixty-one year old man with a series of health conditions, required hip 
replacement surgery. While awaiting surgery, Zeliotis discovered that Quebec’s healthcare 
policy prevented him from obtaining private health insurance to cover his medical expenses for 
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services already offered and covered in the public system. Zeliotis was also prevented from 
paying participating surgeons directly for healthcare services provided in a public facility.71 
Consequently, he argued that the long wait times in Quebec denied him of his right to receive 
medical care in a timely fashion.72 Jacques Chaoulli, however, was a medical practitioner who 
‘opted-out’ of the public healthcare system, but soon after returned as a general practitioner in a 
walk-in clinic. This decision was in large part based off of the fact that, in Quebec, “the 
disincentives for opting out of the system are very high;” without access to private health 
insurance, relatively few will have the financial means to pay directly for medical services.73 
Although Chaoulli was not Zeliotis’ physician, they ‘joined forces’ in Chaoulli.74 
At trial, the Quebec government argued that a hybrid healthcare regime would result in 
the transfer of human and financial resources from the public to the private system – resources 
that were necessary to maintain universal healthcare coverage in Quebec. Not only would the 
public healthcare system suffer as a result, but it would also deprive those unable to purchase 
private health insurance from receiving the medical attention they are entitled to. Conversely, the 
plaintiffs maintained that greater privatization would drastically reduce long wait times for 
medically-necessary services. After reviewing expert testimonies of a number of healthcare 
professionals, the trial judge, Justice Piché, found that the prohibition on private health insurance 
in Quebec “was necessary to protect the integrity and viability of the public health system.”75 
While recognizing that wait times were problematic, she nonetheless concluded that the 
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prohibition did not violate section 7 Charter rights,76 or s. 1 of the Quebec Charter (the right to 
‘life, personal security, inviolability and freedom’).77   
The claimants appealed the decision to the Quebec Court of Appeal. In a unanimous 
decision, they upheld the judgment rendered at the Quebec Superior Court.78 The decision was 
further appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, which was granted by the Court in May 
2003.79  
While the Charter challenge originated in Quebec, by the time it reached the Supreme 
Court, a number of other provinces, including Manitoba, British Columbia and Ontario, 
intervened on behalf of the Quebec government.80 Additionally, by the time the case made its 
way to the Supreme Court of Canada, two reports were published – the Romanow and Kirby 
reports. The Romanow Report, which emerged out of a Royal Commission on the Future of 
Health Care in Canada, maintained that a ‘single-tier’ healthcare system was necessary in order 
to prevent human and financial resources from being redirected from the public to the private 
market.81 This claim appears to echo the arguments advanced by the Quebec government in 
Chaoulli. Alternatively, the Kirby Report, which originated in the Senate, maintained that greater 
privatization would not deprive the public system of its resources, nor would the public system 
suffer as a result of greater privatization.82 This finding seems to support the arguments raised by 
the claimants. These reports were published in 2002 and, accordingly, only factored into the 
Supreme Court’s decision.83 
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4.5 The Majority on the Supreme Court of Canada: Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney 
General) [2005]  
 
On June 9th, 2005, the Supreme Court of Canada delivered its decision in Chaoulli. Unlike 
Carter, Chaoulli was a split decision (4:3). Accordingly, the section will first review the 
majority’s decision, followed by an overview of the minority’s opinion. Importantly, the 
majority in Chaoulli found that the prohibition on private health insurance in Quebec violated 
section 1 of the Quebec Charter. The Court, however, was evenly split (3:3) on the issue of 
whether the provisions violated the Canadian Charter. Thus, the Court’s “decision did not have 
immediate legal impact outside of Quebec.”84 Nonetheless, the fact that Chaoulli attracted the 
attention of countless other provinces suggests that Quebec was by no means the only province 
with a direct interest in the outcome at trial. 85 An unfavorable outcome would likely force other 
provinces to modify their healthcare policy given that, in the event that similar cases arise in the 
context of other provinces, it is likely that the Court would also find that similar prohibitions on 
private health insurance violated their respective provincial human rights codes. 
In Chaoulli, Justice Deschamps found that section 15 of the Health Insurance Act and 
section 11 of the Hospital Insurance Act engaged both section 7 of the Canadian Charter (the 
right to ‘life, liberty and security’) and section 1 of the Quebec Charter (the right to ‘life, 
security, inviolability and freedom’). In her opinion, both of these provisions prevent Quebecers 
from accessing alternative healthcare options that would permit them to avoid the long wait 
times experienced in the public sector.86 In reviewing the evidence, Justice Deschamps pointed 
to a number of countries where public and private healthcare systems ‘co-exist,’ including 
Austria, the Netherlands, Germany, Australia, the United Kingdom and Sweden. In her opinion, 
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these countries demonstrate that “a wide range of measures [exist] that are less drastic, and also 
less intrusive in relation to protected rights.”87 She further argued that legislative inaction – in 
this case, the Quebec legislatures’ unwillingness to address the issue of long public wait times – 
provides an opportunity for the Court to step in and fill the policy void.88     
Turning to section 1 of the Canadian Charter and section 9.1 of the Quebec Charter, the 
two ‘reasonable limits’ provisions, Justice Deschamps maintained that the objectives of the 
prohibition (to provide/offer quality medical services for Quebecers irrespective of one’s ability 
to pay for these services) was pressing and substantial.89 However, she found that section 15 of 
the Health Insurance Act and 11 of the Hospital Insurance Act did not minimally impair on the 
Quebec Charter, as there were less restrictive means available to the Quebec government.90  
Chief Justice Beverly McLachlin and Justice Major, with Justice Bastarache concurring, 
agreed with Justice Deschamps that the prohibition violated section 1 of the Quebec Charter of 
Human Rights. Contrary to their colleague, however, they also found that section 7 of the 
Canadian Charter had been violated. McLachlin C.J. and Major J. found that the prohibition 
engaged section 7 Charter rights by “failing to provide public health care of a reasonable 
standard within a reasonable time.” 91  In their opinion, the ban on private health insurance 
deprived Quebecers, save for those with the financial means to pay for medical services out of 
pocket, from seeking alternate means of avoiding long wait times in the public sector. They 
further argued that these lengthy wait times subjected patients to prolonged physical and/or 
psychological suffering and, in some cases, increased the risk of complications and/or death.92  
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Looking to other jurisdictions with hybrid healthcare regimes, McLachlin C.J. et al. 
claimed, “there is no real connection in fact between prohibition of health insurance and the goal 
of a quality health system.” 93 In their opinion, two-tier healthcare systems in Germany, the UK 
and Sweden demonstrate that greater privatization provides “their citizens [with] medical 
services superior to and more affordable than the services presently available in Canada.”94 Thus, 
McLachlin C.J. et al. found that the prohibition on private health insurance unjustifiably 
infringed on section 7 of the Canadian Charter. In their opinion, there was no rational connection 
between the prohibition and government’s objectives. They further found that Quebec’s 
healthcare policies were not minimally impairing given the availability of less intrusive options. 
Accordingly, they found that the prohibition violated both section 7 of the Canadian Charter and 
section 1 of the Quebec Charter.95 Taken collectively, the majority on the Court declared section 
15 and 11 to of no force or effect to the extent that the provisions violated the Quebec Charter.96 
As the proceeding analysis has demonstrated, Justice Deschamps and Chief Justice 
McLachlin et al. came to very different conclusions with respect to whether the prohibition 
violated section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights. Nonetheless, all four justices agreed that 
the prohibition violated section 1 of the Quebec Charter. This finding, however, is problematic 
for a number of reasons. First, the majority based their analysis heavily, if not entirely, on the 
findings of the Kirby report. For example, McLachlin C.J. and Major J. reference the Kirby 
Report ten times, while only referencing the Romanow Report once, thus demonstrating a clear 
policy preference for greater privatization in Quebec.97 What is particularly interesting about this 
finding is that the majority drew heavily on the Kirby Report, yet it did not properly consider the 
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quality or credibility of the report’s findings, nor did they explain why, in their opinion, the 
findings of the Kirby Report were more reliable than that of the Romanow Report.98  
An additional factor to consider is that the majority was convinced that other ‘less 
restrictive’ policy options were available to the Quebec government. They based their decision in 
large part on their (perhaps mistaken) belief that, overall, countries with two-tier healthcare 
systems fare better in terms of wait-times. The evidence, however, does not support this 
conclusion. Countries with hybrid healthcare schemes also face similar wait-time issues as those 
experienced in single-tier systems.99 If it were true that two-tier healthcare systems drastically 
reduce wait times, the expectation is that these other countries would not experience similar wait 
time problems as that experienced in single-tier systems.100 Simply put, McLachlin C.J. and 
Major J. do not adduce any concrete empirical data to support the strong claim that two-tier 
systems offer “superior medical services” than single-tier systems. 
This finding seems to confirm that as a legal institution, as opposed to a political one, the 
Supreme Court lacks the ability to properly consider, debate and evaluate the evidence before 
them. Unlike the federal and provincial legislatures, courts lack the institutional capacity to make 
informed decisions with respect to complex and salient issues of public policy. This is seen in the 
fact that the majority was heavily biased in favor of the Kirby Report, as well as the fact that they 
failed to properly evaluate wait-times in other jurisdictions before coming to the bold conclusion 
that Quebec’s healthcare system was overall worse off than countries with hybrid systems.  
It is also important to consider that Justice Deschamps’ analysis focused on the Quebec 
Charter, as opposed to the Canadian one. Her rationale for doing so is that the Quebec Charter 
has a “considerably broader purpose,” meaning that section 15 of the Health Insurance Act and 
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11 of the Hospital Insurance Act would be at an increased risk of being invalidated under the 
Quebec Charter than the Canadian Charter.101 At least to some degree, this choice might also be 
motivated by the majority’s belief that in Quebec, where the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms has never been popular, judicial invalidation would be perceived to have a greater 
degree of legitimacy and authority if it were based on the Quebec Charter. This can be 
evidenced by the fact that McLachlin C.J., along with Justices Bastarache and Major, essentially 
advanced the same arguments as that provided by Deschamps J. Paradoxically, Chief Justice 
Beverly McLachlin et al. found that the prohibition violated both the Canadian and Quebec 
Charters, while Deschamps J. found that it only violated the Quebec Charter.102  
A final factor to consider is that neither the Quebec nor the Canadian Charter includes a 
health rights provision. The majority on the Supreme Court, therefore, relied on legal rights 
provisions in order to make the case that the prohibition on private health insurance deprived 
Quebecers of their health rights. In other words, the majority on the Court adopted a broad 
interpretation of section 7 of the Canadian Charter and section 1 of the Quebec Charter in an 
attempt to provide them with the opportunity to judicialize healthcare policy.  
Having considered the majority’s decision in Chaoulli, the next section reviews that of 
the minority. As will be explored, Binnie et al. were much more deferential to the Quebec 
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4.6 The Minority on the Supreme Court of Canada: Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney 
General) [2005] 
The minority on the Supreme Court of Canada – namely, Justices Binnie and LeBel, with whom 
Fish J. concurred – argued that the majority overstepped in finding that Quebec’s prohibition on 
private health insurance violated either the Quebec Charter (all four justices on the majority), or 
the Canadian Charter (McLachlin C.J., Major J. and Bastarache J.). On multiple occasions, the 
minority criticized the majority for failing to properly evaluate the evidence before them. 
Reviewing the testimony of healthcare specialists, Justices Binnie and LeBel concluded that 
there was no concrete evidence to support the plaintiffs’ (and the majority’s) assertion that a 
transition to a two-tier healthcare system would ‘cure’ Quebec of its long wait times. The 
minority maintained that their colleagues failed to properly investigate the evidence presented at 
trial. Had they done so, they would have recognized that Quebec is not an outlier in terms of long 
wait times; other jurisdictions with two-tier healthcare systems also face similar wait-time 
problems.103 Given the lack of conclusive data to support the claim that greater privatization 
would drastically reduce wait times in Quebec, the minority asserted that the public/private 
policy debate was better left to the discretion of elected and accountable representatives.104 
 The minority further suggested that greater privatization in Quebec would not only “have 
a negative impact on the integrity, functioning and viability of the public system,” but it would 
also undermine government’s objective of ensuring equal and universal healthcare coverage, as 
greater privatization would likely only benefit those “who have the money to afford medical 
insurance and [those who] can qualify for it.”105 In light of this finding, they argued that the 
objective of the law (equal access, irrespective of wealth or status) was rationally connected to 
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the means chosen (the prohibition on private health insurance).106 While Justices Binnie and 
LeBel found that, in some cases, the prohibition might engage section 7 Charter rights because 
long wait lists delay access to essential healthcare services, they maintained that the infringement 
did not violate any of the principles of fundamental justice. 107  Unlike their colleagues, the 
minority asserted that the prohibition on private health insurance in Quebec did not violate 
sections 7 and 1 of the Canadian and Quebec Charters, respectively.  
As the next section demonstrates, in spite of the majority decision’s ‘strong-type’ 
features, the provincial Liberal Party of Jean Charest formally responded to the Supreme Court 
by enacting Bill 33, which was passed on December 13th, 2006.  
  
4.7  Bill 33: Quebec’s Response to Chaoulli 
Approximately one year after the Court handed down its decision in Chaoulli, the Charest 
government formally responded by introducing Bill 33 (An Act to amend the Act respecting 
health services and social services and other legislative provisions). Three provisions of Bill 33 
are relevant for this analysis: sections 41, 42 and 333.3.   
Section 41 of Bill 33 repeals and replaces section 11 of the Hospital Insurance Act. The 
provision states, “no insurer may enter into or maintain an insurance contract that includes 
coverage for the cost of an insured service furnished to a resident.” Insurers who fail to comply 
can be charged a fine ranging between $50,000 and $100,00 (first time offence); repeat offenders 
are liable to fines ranging between $100,000 and $200,000.108 In effect, section 11 reintroduces 
the ban on private health insurance in Quebec.  
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Section 42 of Bill 33 now authorizes Quebecers to purchase private health insurance. 
However, it does so only in the context of three elective surgeries – namely, hip, knee and 
cataract surgery,109 which also happen to be the healthcare procedures with some of the longest 
wait times in the province.110 Bill 33 does leave open the possibility that, in the future, other 
specialized surgeries or procedures will be added to the existing list of insurable medical 
services. Nonetheless, as of now, it does not offer a carte blanche for private insurance.111  
In restricting access to private health insurance to these three surgical procedures, the 
Charest government prevented a parallel private market from developing in Quebec. This is 
because “the [low] number of admissible surgeries” under section 15 of the Health Insurance 
Act, combined with the considerably low demand for these procedures, creates unappealing and 
unfavorable conditions for insurance companies.112 In other words, there is simply not enough 
demand for it to be financially worthwhile for insurers to supply health insurance to Quebecers 
who qualify under section 15. As a result, Quebecers, even those who technically qualify, will 
have no other choice but to turn to the public system, or to pay out of pocket.  
To a certain extent, it appears that the Charest government’s approach to the 
public/private divide conflicts with the majority’s ruling in Chaoulli. In fact, the majority 
maintained that greater privatization would remedy the long wait times experienced in the public 
sector. They never specified, however, that Quebecers had a right to private health insurance 
only in the context of hip, knee and cataract surgeries. McLachlin C.J. et al. were of the view that 
long wait times, irrespective of the type of surgery, increased the risk of irreversible damage or 
death, and thus violated the Quebec Charter.113 Thus, while the Charest government technically 
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complied with the majority in Chaoulli, given that Bill 33 offers an opportunity to expand the 
role of private health insurance in Quebec, it did so “in the narrowest way possible.”114  
Important also is the fact that wait times in the public sector – the primary issue in 
Chaoulli – have not drastically improved, even in the context of knee, hip and cataract surgeries. 
Average wait times for knee (4 months) and hip surgeries (3 months) in Quebec remain 
relatively high; nearly 10 per cent of Quebecers requiring hip or knee replacements have to wait 
at least six months before receiving surgery. Similarly, wait times for cataract surgery have 
marginally improved. Pre- and post-Chaoulli, patients can expect to wait roughly two months.115  
An additional factor to consider is that these medical services (hip, knee or cataract 
surgery) are privately insurable only if they are performed in a specialized medical centre 
(SMC). Section 333.3 of Bill 33 defines a SMC as a healthcare facility (other than a hospital) 
where ‘non-participating’ physicians can provide approved surgical/medical procedures. 116 
Alternatively, participating doctors are eligible for employment in SMCs in cases where public 
hospitals “contract out” specialized medical services to these facilities. However, surgical 
procedures offered in these SMCs cannot be privately insurable. Moreover, participating and 
non-participating physicians cannot be employed in the same specialized medical clinic, nor can 
they share the same resources, staff and/or equipment. Thus, Bill 33 maintains “the ‘wall’ 
between physicians who remain in the public system and those who opt out of it.”117  
A review of Bill 33 demonstrates that while the Charest Liberals complied (in part) with 
the majority in Chaoulli, the policy impact of the Court was rather limited. This section has 
sought to demonstrate that wait times have not drastically improved with respect to knee, hip and 
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cataract surgeries in Quebec – the three elective procedures for which Quebecers can now 
purchase private health insurance. Moreover, Bill 33 introduces conditions unfavorable to the 
development and growth of a robust private health insurance market in Quebec. The fact remains 
that the pool of Quebecers who require these surgeries is too small for it to be financially 
worthwhile for private insurance companies. Taken collectively, this evidence suggests that Bill 
33 can be properly classified as legislative noncompliance.  
The Charest government’s choice to respond in this manner is not surprising. The Liberal 
Party of Quebec’s campaign platform for the 2003 elections demonstrates that healthcare policy 
was a top priority for the Charest government. Access to healthcare based on need, rather than 
Quebecers’ ability to pay, was a key component of their party’s mandate:  “nous croyons à un 
système de santé public, accessible et universel.”118 It is safe to say, therefore, that the majority’s 
decision was fundamentally at odds with the Liberal Party’s healthcare vision, or, stated 
differently, the decision was unpopular among the Quebec National Assembly.  
Having considered the Court’s decision in Chaoulli, and the Charest Liberals’ legislative 
response, the next section details the implications of Carter and Chaoulli with respect to judicial 
power and the McLachlin Court’s policy impact.  
 
4.8  The Policy Impact of the Supreme Court of Canada in Carter and Chaoulli  
As we have seen, the Supreme Court unanimously struck down the federal prohibition on 
medical assistance in dying in Carter on the grounds that it violated section 7 (‘life, liberty and 
security’) Charter rights. Likewise, in Chaoulli, a narrow majority found that the prohibition on 
private health insurance in Quebec violated the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. 
Both of these decisions can be classified as ‘strong-type’ Supreme Court of Canada decisions. In 
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fact, both cases dealt with health rights, which are not technically protected under either the 
Canadian or Quebec Charters. The unanimous Court in Carter, and the majority on the Supreme 
Court in Chaoulli, adopted a broad interpretation of legal rights to ensure that sections 14 and 
241(b) of the Criminal Code, and sections 15 of the Health Insurance Act and 11 of the Hospital 
Insurance Act, respectively, would violate protected rights. In both cases, the Supreme Court of 
Canada attempted to judicialize healthcare policy through its remedial activism. More 
importantly, they sought to create conditions unfavorable to the introduction of independent 
legislative responses. This is evidenced by the fact that in Carter, the Court delivered a 
unanimous decision authored by ‘the Court’ on an inherently divisive issue. Likewise, in 
Chaoulli, the majority recognized that in finding that the ban on private health insurance violated 
the Quebec Charter, as opposed to the Canadian one, it was unlikely that the Quebec legislature 
would introduce a ‘strong-form’ response to address judicial invalidation.  
As a result of these ‘strong-type’ decisions, the SCC is often portrayed to be a powerful 
policymaking institution. These claims have some merit. The Supreme Court – as the final 
appellate court in Canada, and as the ‘guardians of the Constitution’ 119  – participate in 
fundamental debates on salient and controversial issues of public policy. This was the case in 
both Carter and Chaoulli. For some, judicial participation in these debates is cause for concern, 
especially when considering that the Court is an unelected and unaccountable institution, and 
because they lack the institutional capacity to make informed decisions and to balance competing 
interests. 120  In other words, scholars have questioned the legitimacy of judicial review. A 
common mistake in the judicialization literature, however, is the belief that because the Supreme 
Court has the power to strike down legislation, and because they at times do, that “they produce 
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a direct policy impact.”121 Virtually no scholar contests the fact that, as a result of section 24(1) 
(the remedial provision), the Court behaves as a powerful institution. The crucial question 
remains, however, does judicial invalidation lead to fundamental policy change? 
In The Nature of the Supreme Court, Matthew Hall argued that judicial power and policy 
impact is contingent on whether the actor responsible for implementing the Court’s decision 
accepts, and thus enforces, the judicial decision. Hall (2010) maintains that in unpopular lateral 
issues where the Court’s decision is perceived to be an impractical or illegitimate approach to 
public policy, the legislative response will typically be noncompliance.122 This remains true even 
in the context of the ‘strongest’ judicial decisions, such as Carter and Chaoulli.  For instance, the 
Trudeau Liberals introduced Bill C-14 in response to Carter. While the federal government 
implemented certain aspects of the decision, they did introduce a series of eligibility 
requirements that drastically narrowed the pool of applicants eligible for medical assistance in 
dying. Additionally, the high number of non-participating healthcare professionals also 
drastically limited access to MAID, even for patients who meet the eligibility criteria set forth in 
Bill C-14. The most forceful opposition to physician-assisted death, therefore, has come from 
physicians unwilling to provide assistance, not from the statute itself. This suggests that in cases 
dealing with healthcare rights, such as physician-assisted death, the Court requires that the 
federal and provincial legislatures comply with their decision. However, it also requires the 
support of healthcare professionals, which did not occur in the context of Carter.  
Similarly, in Chaoulli, the Liberal Party of Quebec responded by enacting Bill 33, which 
reintroduced a near complete prohibition on private health insurance. Further, long wait times – 
the central issue in Chaoulli – remain abnormally high in Quebec, even in the context of hip, 
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knee and cataract surgery. Moreover, Bill 33 creates conditions unfavorable to the development 
of a private insurance market given the small number of surgeries that are privately insurable. 
Bill 33, therefore, is an example of legislative noncompliance, as the National Assembly crafted 
new legislation in a manner that limited the potential for a parallel private healthcare market to 
develop and flourish in Quebec.  
Two points are important to retain here. First, Bill C-14 (in response to Carter) and Bill 
33 (in response to Chaoulli) demonstrate that the Supreme Court’s power is not absolute. 
Generally speaking, judicial invalidation leaves room for an independent legislative response that 
challenges the Court, even when the Supreme Court delivers decisions that appear to discourage 
positive legislative sequels. This was the outcome post-Carter and Chaoulli. Second, it suggests 
that, in unpopular lateral issues, the SCC’s policymaking power will be limited. When the Court 
delivers decisions that are unpopular with the actors responsible for implementing the judicial 
decision, there is a much greater risk that the legislative response will be noncompliance.123 
Arguably, Bill C-14 and Bill 33 attest to this claim, as the respective federal and provincial 
legislatures introduced strong responses that defied the spirit of the Supreme Court’s rulings.  
 
4.9 Conclusion 
The chapter reviewed two cases involving salient issues of healthcare policy, including 
physician-assisted death (Carter) and private health insurance in Quebec (Chaoulli). It also 
reviewed the legislative responses to Carter and Chaoulli, Bill C-14 and Bill 33, respectively. As 
this chapter has sought to demonstrate, a comparative review of the Supreme Court’s decisions 
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and the corresponding legislative responses confirms Matthew Hall’s (2010) claim that the 
Supreme Court’s policy impact is rather limited in cases involving unpopular lateral issues.124  
 In Carter and Chaoulli, the Supreme Court attempted to judicialize healthcare policy 
through its remedial activism, and through its broad interpretation of legal rights. In Carter, the 
Court maintained that grievously and irremediably ill persons had a right to physician-assisted 
death. While Bill C-14 complies in some respects, it introduces a more tailored (or narrow) 
approach to medical assistance in dying, thus reducing the number of eligible applicants. The 
chapter also demonstrated that an overwhelming number of physicians conscientiously object to 
physician-assisted death, which creates an additional barrier to access PAD. While physician-
assisted death is now technically legal, relatively few Canadians are eligible, and, if they are, 
relatively few are able to find a physician willing to provide these services.  
Similarly, in Chaoulli, a narrow majority on the Court found that sections 15 of the 
Health Insurance Act and 11 of the Hospital Insurance Act violated the Quebec Charter. In 
response, the Charest government enacted Bill 33, which reintroduced a near complete ban on 
private health insurance, with the notable exceptions of knee, cataract and hip surgeries. The 
relatively small number of privately insurable surgical procedures, combined with the relatively 
small number of subscribers for this type of insurance, however, creates a number of 
disincentives for private insurance companies. As a result, patients who require these medical 
procedures will have no other choice but to ‘wait their turn’ in the public system. In other words, 
relatively little has changed with respect to the long wait times in the public system, the crucial 
reason the majority on the Court struck down the provisions to begin with.  
 To summarize, this chapter demonstrated that judicial power is contingent on whether the 
non-judicial actors tasked with implementing the Supreme Court’s decision support the judicial 
 
124 Hall 2010, 17-8.  
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decision. This is because, in lateral issue areas, the Court lacks the enforcement mechanisms 
required to guarantee compliance. In Carter, the Court’s decision was unpopular (in part) with 
the Trudeau Liberals, and, more importantly, with healthcare professionals. In Chaoulli, the 
decision was fundamentally at odds with the Charest government’s universal healthcare model. 
In response, therefore, the respective legislatures introduced positive dialogic sequels that 
significantly constrained the policymaking capacity of the McLachlin Court. The end result is 
that relatively little changed post-Chaoulli and post-Carter. Contrary to the position advanced by 





The Judicialization of Minority Language Education Policy 
in Quebec 
 
The chapter considers two minority-language education rights cases in Quebec where the 
Supreme Court of Canada invalidated sections of the Charter of the French Language for their 
inconsistency with section 23 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms – namely Solski 
(Tutor of) v. Quebec (2005) and Nguyen v. Quebec (Education, Recreation and Sports) (2009). 
In Solski, the McLachlin Court maintained that a quantitative approach to the ‘major part’ 
criterion used for evaluating certificates of eligibility for instruction in English in Quebec was 
unconstitutional. Likewise, in Nguyen, the Court found that the absolute prohibition on bridging 
schools in Quebec was an unjustifiable infringement on section 23 Charter rights (minority-
language education). The chapter also reviews the Quebec government’s response to Solski and 
Nguyen, Bill 115 (An Act following upon the court decisions on the language of instruction) and 
the corresponding regulations (Regulation respecting the criteria and weighting used to consider 
instruction in English received in a private educational institution not accredited for the purpose 
of subsidies).  
The chapter demonstrates that Solski and Nguyen are two examples of cases involving 
unpopular lateral issues. In other words, these cases concern a policy area (minority-language 
education) where the Quebec National Assembly, the non-judicial actor responsible for 
implementing these decisions, perceives the Supreme Court’s ruling to be an impractical or 
undesirable policy outcome. Indeed, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has never 
been popular in Quebec, particularly for the Francophone community. By and large, Quebecers 
perceived the inclusion of section 23 (the minority-language rights provision) as the unwarranted 
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intrusion of the federal government, and the Supreme Court of Canada, in a policy area crucial to 
preserving Quebec’s unique linguistic and cultural status in Canada and in North America.1 
Similarly, the Quebec National Assembly has historically been highly critical of judicial 
invalidation of provisions of the Charter of the French Language. This is evidenced by the fact 
that the typical response of the Quebec government to statutory invalidation of minority-
language education laws, irrespective of party affiliation, has been legislative non-compliance.2  
In both Solski and Nguyen, the McLachlin Court authored unanimous decisions that 
initially appeared to be clear legal victories for the Anglophone and Allophone communities in 
Quebec. This celebration, however, was short lived. As this chapter argues, there are two 
features of Bill 115 (and its corresponding regulations) that stand out as examples of legislative 
non-compliance, or as positive dialogic sequels: first, it reintroduces the quantitative approach to 
the ‘major part’ requirement which was invalidated by the Court in Solski; and second, it 
reintroduces a near complete ban on bridging schools in Quebec, which had been invalidated by 
the McLachlin Court in Nguyen. In effect, the objective of Bill 115 is the exact same as Bill 86 
(quantitative approach) and 104 (bridging schools), which had been previously struck down by 
the Supreme Court: to prevent the growth of the Anglophone community in Quebec by 
restricting access to instruction in English in Quebec to the existing Anglophone community. Put 
simply, the policy impact of the Supreme Court of Canada in both cases was rather limited; Bill 
115 ensures that relatively few, if any, non-Anglophone applicants will be eligible for instruction 
in English in Quebec.   
 The chapter will proceed in the following way. First, it provides a historical overview of 
minority-language education rights in Quebec. It points to some of Quebec’s early policy 
 
1 Richez 2014, 192.  
2 Kelly 2018, 252. 
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developments with respect to language laws, focusing specifically on the Charter of the French 
Language. It then offers a summary of Solski (Tutor of) v. Quebec, including an overview of the 
litigants involved, the relevant provisions and the lower court decisions. Next, the chapter 
provides a textual analysis of the Supreme Court’s decision in Solski. Following a similar 
pattern, the chapter then analyzes Nguyen v. Quebec (Education, Recreation and Sports). After 
reviewing both cases, the chapter evaluates the legislative response to Solski and Nguyen – Bill 
115 and its corresponding regulations. Finally, the chapter discusses the implications of Bill 115 
with respect to judicial power and the McLachlin Court’s policy impact.  
 
5.1 Minority Language Education Rights in Quebec 
In the 1960s and 70s, immigration rates in Canada began to drastically rise. Until 1969, 
Allophones had the ‘freedom to choose’ whether to receive their primary and/or secondary 
education in either English or French in Quebec. 3  Accordingly, an alarming number of 
immigrants had been enrolling in English public schools, resulting in a substantial decline in the 
overall number of French-speaking Quebecers in the province. High enrolment rates in English 
public schools, combined with a declining birthrate among the Francophone population in 
Quebec, served as the impetus driving reforms to language education laws in the province. In 
particular, the Quebec government perceived the growing Anglophone community to be a direct 
threat to the French language and culture.4 It is important here to note that the preservation and 
flourishment of the French language has always been a top priority for Quebec governments, 
irrespective of party affiliation.5  
 
3 Tetley 1982, 192; See also Kelly 2018, 253.  
4 Tetley 1982, 191; Conrick 2005, 9-10.  
5 Kelly 2018, 252.  
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 In 1974, Liberal Premier Robert Bourassa introduced Bill 22, the Official Language Act. 
Bill 22 required that students demonstrate “sufficient knowledge” in French or English in order 
to be eligible to receive their education in either language. Furthermore, it maintained that 
students who did not have “sufficient knowledge” of either English or French – in other words, 
immigrants – would only be eligible to receive their education in Quebec in French.6 
Three years later, in an attempt to preserve Quebec’s linguistic identity and unique 
culture, the Parti Québécois introduced Bill 101, also known as the Charter of the French 
Language. Under section 73 of Bill 101, students were eligible to attend an English public or a 
subsidized private elementary or secondary school only if either one of their parents had been 
educated in English in Quebec, or if their siblings (or they themselves) had been previously 
enrolled in an English school in Quebec. The objectives of section 73 were twofold: to oblige the 
Allophone and Francophone communities to receive their education in French, and secondly, to 
ensure that only existing members of Quebec’s Anglophone community would have a right to 
receive their education in English. 7 While widely supported by French-speaking Quebecers, 
Anglophones were particularly dissatisfied with the outcome of Bill 101.   
 In 1980, Quebec held a referendum on the issue of Quebec’s sovereignty. While defeated, 
the Quebec referendum exacerbated existing tensions between Quebec’s two linguistic 
communities. 8  Shortly thereafter, the Trudeau government, without the consent of Quebec, 
introduced the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Quebec government was 
particularly hostile to the Charter, namely because of the inclusion of the minority language 
rights provision (section 23). Sections 23(2) and (3) of the Charter state that, where numbers 
warrant, the children or siblings of linguistic minorities whom have been educated in either 
 
6 Kelly 2018, 253.  
7 Kelly 2018, 253; Chouinard 2018, 234.  
8 Chouinard 2018, 235.  
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official language in Canada have the right to receive their primary and/or secondary education in 
the minority language in their province of residence.9  
Section 23 stands out when compared to other enumerated rights and freedoms insofar as 
it is the only provision in the Charter that deals with a positive right, and that “directly applies to 
an area of provincial jurisdiction (language and education policy) [and which] targets a specific 
province (Quebec).”10 Moreover, the language rights provision is among a select few Charter 
rights where the notwithstanding clause (section 33) does not apply.11 Arguably, in excluding 
section 23 from the legislative override, the Trudeau government sought to ensure that, in the 
likely event that the courts would strike down Quebec’s ‘controversial’ language laws, the 
Quebec government would have no formal override powers at their disposal.12  
Rightfully so, Quebecers perceived section 23 as a direct attack on Quebec’s linguistic 
and cultural distinctiveness, and as the Trudeau government’s unwarranted interference in a 
policy area critical to preserving Quebec’s autonomy.13 In the weeks following the enactment of 
the Charter, Camille Laurin, speaking on behalf of the Parti Québécois, maintained that “section 
73 of Bill 101 would continue to apply in full force” in spite of the Charter.14 In 1984, two years 
after the Charter came into force, the constitutionality of section 73 was questioned in Protestant 
School Boards. In a unanimous decision delivered by ‘The Court,’ the SCC struck down section 
73 for unjustifiably infringing on Anglophones’ s. 23 rights; the Court maintained that Canadians 
educated in English had a right to receive their education in English in Quebec. In Protestant 
School Boards, the Supreme Court of Canada also “considered the political intention of [section 
 
9 Canadian Heritage 2017, 5-6.  
10 Kelly 2018, 250.  
11 Richez 2014, 226; Gagnon and Laforest 1993, 479; Tetley 1982, 212; Riddell and Morton 1998, 485. 
12 Kelly 2018, 253-54.  
13 Richez 2014, 192.  
14 Tetley 1982, 210.  
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23 of the Charter] and concluded that it had been drafted with the explicit intention of 
invalidating section 73 [of Bill 101].”15 
At the outset, it appears as though the Supreme Court’s decision in Protestant School 
Boards constituted a significant blow to the Quebec government’s objective of protecting its 
unique culture and language. As will be discussed in further detail in the proceeding section, this 
was not the outcome. In response to the Court’s decision, the Quebec government introduced a 
series of amendments to its language laws. These changes to the Charter of the French 
Language, however, were further challenged in Solski (2005) and Nguyen (2009).  
 
5.2 Overview of Solski 
In 1993, the Quebec government responded to the Court in Protestant School Boards by 
introducing Bill 86, which amended section 73 of the Charter of the French Language.16 Section 
73 states that “children, at the request of their parents, may receive” their education in English if 
either of the child’s parents, the child’s siblings or the child themself had previously completed 
the “major part of [their] elementary or secondary instruction” in Canada in English.17 The 
choice of wording is significant for a number of reasons. First, the inclusion of the words ‘may 
receive’ indicates that these rights are not absolute; eligibility is conditional on the Minister of 
Education’s willingness to authorize such persons to receive their education in English in 
Quebec. Second, the major part requirement departs from the wording of s. 23 of the Canadian 
Charter. Recall that s. 23 states that, where numbers warrant, members of linguistic minorities 
who have “received or [are] receiving” their primary or secondary education in Canada have a 
 
15 Kelly 2018, 254 & 257-58; see also Chouinard 2018, 236-37.  
16 Kelly 2018, 257.  
17 Solski (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R 201 at para 12.  
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right to minority-language instruction in their province of residence.18  In stark comparison, s. 
73(2) states that persons are eligible to receive their education in English in a public institution in 
Quebec only if they have completed the “major part” of their education in English in Canada. In 
making such determinations, the Minister of Education focused exclusively on the number of 
months the child spent in an English school. Other factors, for example, learning disabilities, 
were not given due consideration.19 
In Solski, the constitutionality of s. 73 was challenged by three families – the Solski, 
Casimir and Lacroix families – all of whom had been denied eligibility certificates on the 
grounds that their children had not completed the “major part” of their education in Canada in 
English. In 1990, the Solski family temporarily moved to Quebec for work purposes. During this 
time, the children had been granted exemptions to receive their education in English. In 1993, the 
Solski family decided that they would permanently stay in Quebec, and applied to have their 
children receive their education in English. Their children were deemed ineligible because they 
had spent more time in French schools (34 months) than in English schools (24 months). 
Similarly, Edwidge Casimir’s two children had been enrolled in St. Elizabeth School, which 
offered a French-immersion program; fifty per cent of their curriculum was in English, and fifty 
per cent was in French. She applied to have her children receive their education in English, but 
was also denied on the basis that her children were ineligible. The final appellant, Marie Lacroix, 
received her education in Quebec in French. One of her two children attended an unsubsidized 
private French school for two years, and was then enrolled in an unsubsidized private French-
 
18 Canadian Heritage 2017, 5.  
19 Kelly 2018, 257; Solski (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R 201 at para 25.  
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immersion school (sixty per cent of the classes were in English, and 40 per cent in French). They 
were also denied an eligibility certificate.20  
The Solski family, the primary plaintiffs in the case, sought to have section 73 of Bill 86 
invalidated for its inconsistency with s. 23 of the Charter. They argued that the ‘major part’ 
requirement deprived their children of their right to complete their secondary-school education in 
English in Quebec, and that the law was overly restrictive insofar as it “narrow[ed] the category 
of eligible rights holders” under s. 23 of the Charter.21 The trial judge on the Superior Court of 
Quebec found that section 73 was inconsistent with the intentions of the framers, as the Charter 
did not stipulate the duration of time that must be spent in an English school in Canada in order 
to be eligible for minority-language education in Quebec. Thus, the trial judge invalidated 
section 73 on the basis that it was an unjustifiable infringement on Charter rights.  
Unsatisfied with the outcome at trial, the Attorney General of Quebec appealed the 
judgment to Quebec’s Court of Appeal. Once again, the justices found that section 73 was 
unconstitutional because it provided the Minister of Education unfettered discretion in 
determining whether children were entitled to receive their education in English in Quebec.22  
The decision was further appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
 
5.3 The Supreme Court of Canada: Solski (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General) [2005] 
On March 31st, 2005, in a unanimous decision authored by ‘The Court’, the SCC delivered their 
decision in Solski. At trial, the Attorney General of Quebec argued that a purely quantitative 
approach to the ‘major part’ criterion was sufficient to ascertain whether applicants met the 
eligibility requirements set forth in section 73(2) of Bill 86. The Quebec government further 
 
20 Solski (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R 201 at para 13-16.  
21 Ibid., para 17.  
22 Ibid., at para 17-8. 
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argued that provinces have exclusive jurisdiction over minority-language education rights and, as 
a result, have the power to legislate accordingly. Drawing on the wording of section 23(2) of the 
Charter of Rights, the Court maintained that nowhere did the language provision draw 
distinctions based on the amount of time a child spent in an English educational institution. 
Likewise, section 23(2) does not stipulate that the amount of time spent in an English school 
must be greater than that spent in a French school in order to be eligible.23 
While the Court recognized that minority-language rights in Quebec was a “sensitive 
issue,” they nevertheless argued that that the “strict mathematical” (or quantitative) approach, 
i.e., the number of months spent in an English school, used by the Minister of Education to 
ascertain whether the child satisfied the ‘major part’ requirement unjustifiably infringed on s. 
23(2) Charter rights.24 The Court found that the quantitative approach placed too much emphasis 
on the time a child spent in an English educational institution, while not giving sufficient 
consideration to the “past and present educational experience” of applicants.25 The Court argued 
that a qualitative, contextualized and case-by-case approach to the ‘major part’ criterion would 
constitute as a justifiable infringement on Charter rights. They further listed a number of criteria 
that must guide the Minister of Education in making such determinations, including: the amount 
of time that a child spent in French and/or English school; whether the child suffers from 
learning disorders or other disabilities that may impair their capacity to learn; their educational 
stage; and lastly, the number as well as nature of English education programs in the province.26  
In remedying the constitutional violation, the Court severed the ‘major part’ requirement 
and replaced it with the less restrictive requirement of ‘substantial part.’ According to the 
 
23Solski (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R 201 at para 41.  
24Ibid., at para 5, 26-8 & 35.    
25 Ibid., at para 28.  
26 Ibid., at para 26-28, 38 & 41.  
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McLachlin Court, applicants had to have spent a ‘considerable’ amount of time in an English 
school in Canada in order to be eligible for instruction in English in Quebec.27 The Court did not, 
however, stipulate the time frame required to satisfy the ‘substantial part’ criterion, but they did 
caution against the use of “artificial educational pathways” to meet this requirement.28 In other 
words, the Supreme Court argued that students who were enrolled in English school for short 
periods of time, for example, several weeks or months, failed to meet the ‘substantial part’ 
threshold established by the Court in Solski.29  
There are a number of ‘strong-form’ features of the Supreme Court’s decision in Solski 
that are important to consider. In Solski, the Court chose to severe the statute by removing the 
‘major part’ requirement of section 73 and replacing it with the less intrusive criterion of  
‘substantial part.’ In theory, the Court could have chosen to invalidate the legislation, thus 
leaving up to the Quebec legislature to fashion an independent response to address the 
constitutional infirmities raised by the Court. Instead, the McLachlin Court chose to cure the 
rights violations themselves. In most cases, judicial severance does not fundamentally alter the 
objectives of the legislation, and could thus be adequately described as “mere housekeeping.”30 
In this case, however, judicial amendment has the potential to undermine the Quebec 
government’s objective of preserving the French language in Quebec. This is because the 
‘substantial part’ requirement is a much lower threshold than the ‘major part,’ thus leaving open 
the possibility that a greater number of applicants will qualify to receive their education in 
English in Quebec than would have otherwise been possible had the original version been upheld 
by the Court.  
 
27 Ibid., at para 51.  
28  Kelly 2018, 259.  
29 Solski (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R 201 at para 28, 39 & 56.  
30 Kelly (In progress), 25.  
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 The choice of remedy is especially significant when one considers the fractious 
relationship between the Supreme Court of Canada and the Quebec government that has 
developed in the context of minority-language education laws. Over the last sixty or so years, 
Quebec governments, irrespective of party affiliation, have tended to be particularly hostile to 
the idea of letting the Supreme Court intrude into this core area of provincial jurisdiction, 
specifically when considering that language laws are essential for preserving the French 
language in Quebec. It is not surprising, therefore, that the common theme of legislative 
responses to judicial invalidation of minority language laws in Quebec has been non-compliance. 
This perhaps explains why the Court opted for a more interventionist remedy in Solski, and why 
the Supreme Court delivered a unanimous decision in the name of ‘The Court.’ Simply put, the 
Court sought to do everything in its power to ensure that the Solski decision would be complied 
with, as the decision was authoritative (‘The Court’) with an imposed remedy.  
Moreover, the Supreme Court found that a ‘purely quantitative’ approach to the ‘major 
part’ requirement was unconstitutional. The Court went on to list a number of criteria that must 
factor into the Minister of Education’s decision to grant or refuse applications for eligibility. 
Thus, the Court not only told the Quebec government what they could not do with respect to 
minority-language education, they also established the constitutional parameters of Ministerial 
discretion. In this respect, the Court behaved more as a policymaker, or as a “de facto third 
chamber,” than as a court responsible for resolving constitutional disputes between parties.31  
 As will be explored in section 5.6, the Quebec government introduced Bill 115 in 
response to the Supreme Court’s decision in both Solski and Nguyen. Accordingly, the chapter 
will first provide an overview of Nguyen v. Quebec (Education, Recreation and Sports), and will 
 
31 Kelly (In progress), 10.  
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also consider the Supreme Court’s decision in Nguyen, before proceeding to analyze the 
legislative response.  
 
5.4 Overview of Nguyen  
In 2002, the Parti Québécois, under the leadership of Bernard Landry, introduced Bill 104, which 
modified section 73 of the Charter of the French Language in an attempt to address the growing 
issue of bridging schools in the province.32  The objective of Bill 104 was to deny students who 
were registered in ‘bridging schools’ – in other words, students temporarily enrolled in 
unsubsidized private English schools for short periods of time with the intent to later transfer to 
public English schools – the right to complete their education in a public English primary and/or 
secondary school in Quebec. Properly understood, bridging schools constituted a ‘legislative 
loophole’ that would provide students who would otherwise be ineligible to attend public or 
subsidized English schools an opportunity to bypass the eligibility requirements set forth in 
section 73.33  
In 2004, 131 families challenged the constitutionality of section 73 of Bill 104 on the 
grounds that it violated s. 23 of the Charter of Rights.34 Although Canadian citizens, the parents 
of these children did not receive their primary school education in Canada, presumably because 
they immigrated after having completed their studies. Consequently, all of the families had 
enrolled their kids in unsubsidized private English schools in an attempt to satisfy the eligibility 
requirements of s. 73, and thus to eventually register their children in public English schools in 
Quebec. All of the requests had be denied by the Minister of Education.35   
 
32 Quebec, National Assembly, 36th Legis, 2nd Sess, (13 June 2002), page 3.  
33 Chouinard 2018, 240; See also Nguyen v. Quebec (Education, Recreation and Sports), [2009] 3 S.C.R. 208 at para 38.  
34 Kelly 2018, 259; Ibid., at para 13.  
35 Nguyen v. Quebec (Education, Recreation and Sports), [2009] 3 S.C.R. 208 at para 9.  
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The Administrative Tribunal of Quebec (ATQ) first heard the Nguyen case. They 
concluded that the amendments to section 73 were constitutional. At the Quebec Superior Court, 
the trial judge upheld the Tribunal’s decision, which was later appealed to the Quebec Court of 
Appeal. In a 2:1 decision, the Court of Appeal found that s. 73 unjustifiably deprived the 
appellants of their s. 23 Charter rights by denying them the possibility “to continue their 
educational pathways in English in a public school or a subsidized private school.” 36  The 
Attorney General of Quebec later appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Canada. 
   
5.5  The Supreme Court of Canada: Nguyen v. Quebec (Education, Recreation and 
Sports) [2009] 
The Supreme Court of Canada delivered its unanimous decision authored by Justice LeBel in 
Nguyen on October 22nd, 2009. Drawing on section 23 of the Charter, the Supreme Court 
asserted that the minority-language rights provision did not stipulate the type of institution 
(private or public) that was required to satisfy the “is receiving or received” requirement. Justice 
LeBel maintained, however, that when students enroll in bridging schools for the sole purpose of 
“artificially qualifying […] for admission to the publicly-funded English-language school 
system,” that they have failed to demonstrate a “genuine educational commitment” to the 
minority language.37 In some respects, therefore, the Court recognized that bridging schools 
could pose a significant threat to government’s objective of protecting Quebec’s distinct 
linguistic character.  
 In its section 1 analysis, which considered the reasonableness of the rights infringement, 
the Court found that the objectives of Bill 104 were ‘pressing and substantial’ in light of 
 
36 Ibid., at para 14-5.  
37 Ibid., at para 32 & 36.  
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Quebec’s unique linguistic status in Canada and in North America. However, they found that the 
blanket prohibition on bridging schools did not minimally impair on Charter rights. The Court 
maintained that, given the relatively low number of students who had artificially enrolled in 
unsubsidized private schools with the intent to later transfer to the English public school system, 
the absolute prohibition was “overly drastic.” Section 73 of Bill 104, therefore, could not be 
saved by section 1 of the Charter.38   
The Court’s section 1 analysis is problematic because it rests on the misconception that 
while the use of bridging schools poses a threat to the French language in Quebec, the 
seriousness of the problem does not warrant a blanket prohibition on bridging schools. The 
evidence, however, suggests otherwise. In Quebec, the use of bridging schools had become more 
and more common over the years. For example, in the 2002-03 academic year, roughly 2100 
students attended unsubsidized private English schools in Quebec in an attempt to qualify for 
public instruction in English. Only five years later, this figure nearly doubled. 39  Given this 
finding, it is likely that, without an absolute prohibition on bridging schools, this figure would 
steadily increase over the years. As a result, it would pose a more serious risk to the French 
language in Quebec. Perhaps more importantly, an absolute prohibition on bridging schools 
would prevent successive generations from being eligible to receive their instruction in a public 
English school in Quebec simply on the basis that their parents had completed the ‘major part’ of 
their education in an unsubsidized private English school. Arguably, therefore, the Supreme 
Court mistakenly downplayed the severity of the problem of bridging schools in Quebec in an 
attempt to ensure a favorable outcome at trial.   
 
38 Nguyen v. Quebec (Education, Recreation and Sports), [2009] 3 S.C.R. 208 at para 40-2.  
39 Kelly 2018, 258.  
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Upon closer inspection, the Supreme Court’s section 1 approach, particularly their less-
restrictive means analysis, is also problematic because it significantly impaired Quebec’s ability 
to prohibit the use of bridging schools, “a policy tool that would have been helpful in integrating 
newcomers into the French public culture.”40 In other words, the Nguyen decision increased the 
likelihood that members of the Allophone community would resort to the use of bridging schools 
in an attempt to circumvent existing restrictions on minority-language education laws in the 
province.  
Consistent with its approach in Solski, the Court advocated for a qualitative, and, in their 
opinion, less restrictive approach to bridging schools. In particular, the Court urged the Minister 
of Education to consider three factors when determining whether applicants’ educational 
pathway demonstrated a ‘genuine commitment’ to the minority language, including: the amount 
of time spent at the educational institution, the program in place at that particular school and the 
school’s nature and history.41 The Court, however, did not specify the amount of time that a 
student must spend in an unsubsidized private English school in order to demonstrate an 
authentic commitment to an English educational pathway. Citing the Court’s decision in Solski, 
Justice LeBel reasserted, however, that a “short period of attendance” at such institutions was 
insufficient to meet the threshold.42  
Arguably, the Supreme Court was overly (and unnecessarily) prescriptive in its judgment. 
In Nguyen, the Court suggested, albeit implicitly, that the only way the prohibition on bridging 
schools would constitute as a justifiable infringement on section 23 Charter rights was if the 
National Assembly complied with the constitutional parameters established by the Court in its 
 
40 Richez 2014, 217.  
41 Nguyen v. Quebec (Education, Recreation and Sports), [2009] 3 S.C.R. 208 at para 44.  
42 Ibid., at para 29.  
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decision. In this respect, the McLachlin Court overstepped its constitutional role in Nguyen by 
behaving more as a policymaker than as a final appellate court. 
In spite of Nguyen’s ‘strong-type’ features, the Supreme Court opted to suspend its 
declaration of invalidity for one year to provide the Quebec government with the appropriate 
time to fashion a legislative response. Despite having found that s. 73 unjustifiably infringed on 
section 23 of the Charter, the Court did not immediately grant the applicants eligibility 
certificates. Rather, the Court demanded that the applicants of the 131 families be returned to, 
and reconsidered by, Quebec’s Minister of Education “in light of the criteria established in Solski 
and in this judgment.”43 The Supreme Court, however, immediately granted Satbir Bindra (one 
of the claimants in Nguyen) a certificate of eligibility.44 
Undeniably, the Supreme Court’s decision in Solski and Nguyen were clear constitutional 
loses for the Quebec government. Nonetheless, the National Assembly of Quebec responded to 
the Court by introducing Bill 115, which outright defied the Supreme Court’s rulings. As will be 
explored, the Court’s policy impact was thus rather limited. 
 
5.6 Bill 115: Quebec’s Response to Solski and Nguyen 
In 2010, the Quebec government formally responded to both Solski (quantitative approach to 
‘major part’ requirement) and Nguyen (prohibition on unsubsidized private schools) via the 
introduction of Bill 115 (An Act following upon the court decisions on the language of 
instruction). Three provisions of Bill 115 are relevant for the purposes of this analysis – namely, 
section 73.1, which was amended in response to Solski, and sections 78.2 and 12.2, which were 
added in response to Nguyen. This section also reviews the regulatory framework introduced by 
 
43 Ibid., at para 46-7.  
44 Ibid., at para 47.  
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the Charest government in response to both Solski and Nguyen i.e., the Regulation respecting the 
criteria and weighting used to consider instruction in English received in a private educational 
institution not accredited for the purposes of subsidies. Bill 115, and the corresponding 
regulations, demonstrates the extent to which minority-language education laws, and the 
preservation of the French culture and language, more generally, are a top priority for the 
Quebec government. 
Section 73.1 of Bill 115 permits the use of an analytical (or regulatory) framework when 
making determinations with respect to certificates of eligibility for public instruction in English 
in Quebec. In particular, section 73.1 indicates that the “framework may, among other things, 
establish rules, assessment criteria, a weighting system, a cutoff or a passing score and 
interpretive principles.”45 On the other hand, section 78.2 prohibits the use of bridging schools, 
or unsubsidized private schools, for the sole purpose of circumventing minority-language 
education laws in Quebec. Moreover, section 12.2 grants the Minister of Education the power to 
deny applications on the grounds that “doing so would allow the circumvention of section 72 of 
the Charter of the French language or of other provisions of that Act governing eligibility for 
instruction in English.” Section 12.2 also states that the Minister of Education, in an attempt to 
prevent the artificial use of bridging schools, can “subject a permit to any condition the Minister 
judges necessary.”46  
At first glance, it appears as though the Charest government complied with the Court’s 
decision in both Solski and Nguyen. Section 73.1, for example, authorizes the use of a more 
comprehensive and ‘qualitative’ approach for assessing the eligibility criteria and, in this respect, 
addresses the concerns raised by the Court in Solski. Similarly, section 12.2 states that the 
 
45 Quebec, National Assembly, 39th Legis, 1st Sess, (19 October 2010).  
46 Quebec, National Assembly, 39th Legis, 1st Sess, (19 October 2010). 
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Minister of Education ‘may refuse’ certificates of eligibility, thus removing the absolute 
prohibition on bridging schools found to be unconstitutional by the Court in Nguyen.47 Taken 
collectively, these three provisions permit a contextualized or case-by-case evaluation of 
certificates, and thus give the impression that the Quebec government complied with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Solski and Nguyen. A review of the regulatory framework used to 
assess whether applicants meet the ‘major part’ criteria, however, suggests quite the opposite.  
In order to be eligible to apply for a certificate of eligibility, applicants must receive a 
minimum weighted score of 15 points. The points are calculated based on three criteria: (1) the 
‘schooling’ division, which considers the amount of time spent in an English school, the 
programs offered at the institution, and any other relevant criteria pertaining to the student’s 
education; (2) the ‘consistent, true commitment’ division, which considers the ‘authenticity’ of 
the student’s educational pathway; and (3) the ‘specific situation and overall education’ division, 
which considers the motivations underpinning the choice to apply for a certificate of eligibility, 
the applicant’s educational stage and whether the child’s parents were educated in another 
language other than English (i.e., Allophones).48 
English private educational institutions are classified as either type A, B or C.  Points are 
allocated depending on the total number of years for which the applicant attended an 
unsubsidized private school, as well as the percentage of English and French instruction offered 
at that particular school. Private English schools are classified as type ‘A’ if more than 60 per 
cent of its students obtained a certificate of eligibility. They are also classified as type ‘A’ if at 
least 70 per cent of the student body completes their elementary and secondary education at the 
same institution, and if a minimum of 70 per cent of the school’s curriculum is offered in 
 
47 Quebec, National Assembly, 39th Legis, 1st Sess, (19 October 2010). 
48 Quebec, Regulation respecting the criteria and weighting used to consider instruction in English received in a private 
educational institution not accredited for the purposes of subsidies, C-11, r. 2.1, s. 73.1.   
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English. All schools that offer a French immersion program where less than 60 per cent of the 
student body has a certificate of eligibility are classified as type ‘C’ institutions. Type ‘C’ 
institutions are further broken down into three categories: ‘C1’ (less than 25 per cent of students 
have eligibility certificates), ‘C2’ (between 26 and 40 per cent of students have eligibility 
certificates) and ‘C3’ (between 41 and 59 per cent of students have eligibility certificates). 
Educational institutions that do not meet the criteria for type ‘A’ or ‘C’ automatically fall into the 
type ‘B’ category. There are three subcategories for type ‘B’ institutions: B1, B2 and B3. The 
same percentages listed for C1, C2 and C3 schools apply to B1, B2 and B3 schools, 
respectively.49  
For division 1, students must be enrolled in type ‘A’ institutions for a minimum of three 
years to be awarded 15 points. For ‘B2’ and ‘B3’ schools, students must have completed a 
minimum of seven years in order to attain sixteen and twenty-one points, respectively. However, 
students enrolled in schools classified as ‘B1’ must complete a minimum of seven years to 
receive thirteen points – two points shy of the required fifteen. The breakdown for type ‘C’ 
schools is as follows: C1 schools require a minimum of seven years for 8 points; C2 schools 
require a minimum of seven years for 11 points; and C3 schools require a minimum of seven 
years for 14 points. It is important to note, however, that up to five points are awarded for special 
needs students who suffer from some type of learning or physical disability. 50 In Solski, the 
Court urged the Minister of Education to consider whether the student suffered from any learning 
impairments that may place them at a comparable disadvantage when compared to their peers. In 
this respect, the regulations comply with Solski.  
 
49 Quebec, Regulation respecting the criteria and weighting used to consider instruction in English received in a private 
educational institution not accredited for the purposes of subsidies, C-11, r. 2.1, s. 73.1.   
50 Quebec, Regulation respecting the criteria and weighting used to consider instruction in English received in a private 
educational institution not accredited for the purposes of subsidies, C-11, r. 2.1, s. 73.1.   
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Division 2 (‘consistent, true commitment) considers two factors, namely the number of 
years the applicant and/or their sibling(s) spent in a French institution. For each year that a child 
spends in a French elementary school, three points are deducted; if the child spends more than 
two years in a French school, five points are deducted for each additional year. For secondary 
students, the applicant is penalized five points per year; if the applicant is enrolled in a French 
school for more than two years, eight points are deducted per additional year. Division 2 also 
considers the number of years the applicant’s sibling(s) were enrolled in a type ‘A’ educational 
institution. A maximum of twenty points are awarded to applicants whose sibling(s) spent more 
than nine years in these schools. However, no additional points are awarded for students whose 
sibling(s) were enrolled in any type ‘B’ or ‘C’ schools. Applicants are also penalized if their 
sibling previously attended a French institution. The point scale ranges between -2 points 
(maximum 1 year in a French school) and -30 points (9 or more years in a French school). 
Moreover, under division 3 (‘specific situation and overall education’), families are interviewed 
and are assigned a score ranging between -8 and +8 points. Points are awarded based off of the 
interviewee’s assessment of the authenticity of the applicant’s commitment to the minority 
language.51  
 To summarize, applicants are given points based on the three divisions and, in order to 
be eligible to apply to receive public instruction in English, students must receive a minimum 
score of 15 points. Generally speaking, the point system, particularly for divisions 1 and 2, are 
based primarily on the number of years that the applicant, and, if applicable, their sibling(s), 
attended an English and/or French educational institution. In Solski, the Supreme Court 
maintained that a strictly mathematical or quantitative approach to the ‘major part’ requirement 
 
51 Kelly 2018, 264; Quebec, Regulation respecting the criteria and weighting used to consider instruction in English received in 
a private educational institution not accredited for the purposes of subsidies, C-11, r. 2.1, s. 73.1.   
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was unconstitutional. The McLachlin Court further suggested that in the in the event that a child 
completes the first half of their primary education in French (for example, grades 1 through 3), 
and the second half of their primary education in English (for example, grades 4 through 6), that 
these students “have formed a sufficient link with the minority language community,” and, as a 
result, have a right to receive their education in English in Quebec.52 Furthermore, in Solski, the 
Court claimed that the Minister of Education should also “consider what education came first.”53 
The fact remains, however, that under the new regulations, students are penalized for having 
attended a French primary and/or secondary school, even if they did so for a brief period of time. 
Moreover, the new regulations do not consider the amount of time that has elapsed since the 
student was enrolled in French school, nor does it consider the sequence of enrollment – for 
example, whether the child was first educated in French or in English.  
Related also is the fact that students attending ‘B2’ or ‘B3’ private English schools must 
be enrolled for at least seven years in order to meet the 15-point weighted score. In Solski, the 
Court maintained that attendance at a private English educational institution for short periods of 
time would not constitute as having demonstrated an authentic commitment to the minority 
language.54 While the Supreme Court did not specify a specific cutoff point, it is highly unlikely 
that the Court expected applicants to spend more than half of their primary and/or secondary 
school education in a private English school in order to qualify for public instruction in English.  
A second point worth mentioning is that division 3 grants the Minister of Education wide 
latitude in determining whether or not attendance at a particular unsubsidized private school 
demonstrates a ‘genuine commitment’ to an English educational pathway. More specifically, 
scores are assigned based off of the interviewee’s subjective opinion as to whether or not the 
 
52 Solski (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R 201 at para 37.  
53 Ibid., at para 42.  
54 Nguyen v. Quebec (Education, Recreation and Sports), [2009] 3 S.C.R. 208 at para 29.  
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student enrolled in an approved educational institution with the sole purpose of circumventing 
minority-language education laws in Quebec. 55  However, in Solski, the Supreme Court 
maintained that if “children are in a recognized education program regularly and legally, they 
will in most cases be able to continue their education in the same language.” 56  Division 3 
conflicts with the Supreme Court’s decision in Solski insofar as it leaves open the possibility that, 
even if a child is enrolled in a private English school ‘regularly and legally,’ they may 
nonetheless be denied a certificate of eligibility on the grounds that the Minister of Education 
believes the child was enrolled in a bridging school for the sole purpose of creating a fictitious 
educational pathway.  
Furthermore, the point system for divisions 1 and 2 are heavily biased in favour of 
students enrolled in type ‘A’ institutions. Stated differently, type ‘A’ schools are the “surest path 
to fifteen points.”57 Typically, however, type ‘A’ schools tend to be prestigious educational 
institutions with abnormally high yearly tuition fees. The Catégories des établissements privés 
non-subventionnés (EPNS) for the 2018-19 school year, for example, demonstrates that only four 
schools – namely, St-Georges, Lower Canada College, Sterling Education and the Section 
(secondary school) – qualified as type ‘A.’58 With the exception of Sterling Education, all of the 
schools average between $21, 000 and $23, 000 per academic year. Recall that in order to meet 
the 15-point threshold, students must be enrolled in a type ‘A’ school for a minimum of three 
years. Assuming that the child (or their sibling(s)) were not previously enrolled in a French 
educational institution, it would cost approximately $66, 000 to be eligible to simply apply.  
 
55 Kelly 2018, 264.  
56 Solski (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R 201 at para 47.  
57 Kelly 2018, 263.  
58 Quebec, Catégories des établissements privés non subventionnés (EPNS), 2018-19.  
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What this suggests is that type ‘A’ schools will generally be financially inaccessible to 
middle and lower class families, thus preventing them from applying for certificates of 
eligibility. While the EPNS ranking varies from year to year, a review of EPNS lists for previous 
schools years suggests that type ‘A’ schools tend to have some of the highest tuitions in the 
province, and tend to be located in predominantly Anglophone neighborhoods in Montreal, such 
as the Westisland and Westmount. As Kelly (2018) rightfully argues, this finding “strongly 
suggests that [type ‘A’ schools] may not be accessible for Allophones.”59 It can also be argued 
that students enrolled in type ‘A’ schools typically come from wealthy families who have the 
finances to permit their children to complete their education in these institutions. In other words, 
it is likely that those most likely to benefit from the new regulations have no desire, nor intent, to 
transfer their children to public schools. It appears, therefore, that with the notable exception of 
families who can “buy their children and their descendants a right to publicly funded English 
schooling,” Bill 115 and the corresponding regulations effectively prohibit the use of bridging 
schools in Quebec.60  
To reiterate, while attending a type ‘A’ institution significantly increases ones chances of 
being granted a certificate of eligibility, there is no guarantee that this will be the outcome. The 
truth of the matter is that in order to qualify to apply for a certificate of eligibility – let alone be 
granted the certificate – the applicant must first earn fifteen points. As we have seen, the chances 
of meeting this requirement are highly unlikely. Even if a student meets the fifteen-point 
threshold, there is still the very real possibility that the Minister of Education will nonetheless 
refuse the application. Bill 115, properly understood, reintroduces a near complete ban on 
bridging schools (the central issue in Nguyen), and restores the quantitative approach to the 
 
59 Kelly 2018, 264.  
60 Richez 2014, 227-28. 
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‘major part’ requirement (the central issue in Solski). For these reasons, the regulations can be 
properly described as legislative noncompliance.  
Having considered the Quebec government’s legislative response to Solski and Nguyen, 
the remaining of the chapter details some of the broader implications of Bill 115 with respect to 
judicial power and policy impact post-Charter. In so doing, it highlights some of the existing 
limitations in the judicialization of politics literature in Canada.  
 
5.7 Judicial Impact and Minority Language Education in Quebec 
A common narrative in the judicial policymaking literature in Canada is that the Supreme Court 
behaves as a powerful policymaking institution.61 To some degree, this is true. Section 24(1), the 
remedial provision of the Charter, grants certain courts wide latitude in determining how to 
remedy rights violations. By entrusting the courts with the power to review legislation for its 
consistency with the Charter, it places the Supreme Court “at centre stage in some of Canada’s 
most dramatic [and contentious] policy debates.”62 This was the case in Solski and Nguyen, 
where the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the quantitative approach to the 
‘major part’ requirement and the blanket prohibition on bridging schools in Quebec infringed 
section 23 Charter rights. In both cases, the McLachlin Court invalidated Quebec’s minority-
language education laws on the basis that they unjustifiably infringed on section 23 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Supreme Court chose to invalidate Bill 86 and 
104, despite recognizing that doing so would significantly impair Quebec’s capacity to legislate 
in a policy area crucial to preserving its linguistic and cultural distinctiveness. In this respect, the 
Court’s power is uncontestable.  
 
61 Monahan 2001, 387; Kelly 2005, 35; Morton 1992, 627; Morton and Knopff 2000, 22.   
62 Songer 2008, 6.  
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A common misconception in the judicialization of politics literature, however, is that, 
“short of invoking the notwithstanding clause,” the legislatures cannot reverse or modify 
unpopular judicial rulings. 63 This creates the false impression that the legislatures have no other 
choice but to comply with the Supreme Court. Bill 115 (and the relevant regulations) suggests 
that this may not the case. Here, it is important to remember that the section 23 Charter rights are 
immune from the legislative override, yet Solski and Nguyen nonetheless witnessed strong 
legislative responses. The bottom line is that, in Canada, formal channels of disagreement, such 
as section 33, are but one option available to the legislatures in choosing how and when to 
respond to judicial invalidation. 
 Moreover, a review of Bill 115 and its corresponding regulations suggests that judicial 
power is not absolute. The truth of the matter is that judicial invalidation often marks the 
beginning of a constitutional dialogue between the legislatures and the Court. While the Supreme 
Court of Canada has the power to remedy rights violations, it is fundamentally up to the 
legislatures in choosing whether or not to introduce an independent legislative response to 
address judicial invalidation. As the designers and implementers of public policy, the Quebec 
government had two options at their disposal: comply with the Court (negative dialogic sequel), 
or challenge the Court (positive dialogic sequel). These two options have fundamentally different 
implications for judicial power and policymaking. When the provincial legislature complies with 
judicial rulings, they treat the Supreme Court’s ruling as final and authoritative. In these cases, 
therefore, the Supreme Court behaves as a powerful policymaking institution. Conversely, when 
they challenge the Court by ineffectively implementing judicial decisions, or by outright 
 
63 Kelly (In progress), 13.  
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ignoring judicial directives, the legislature is in a position to constrain the Court’s policymaking 
power.64    
 As we have seen, Bill 115 and its corresponding regulations are clear examples of ‘in 
your face’ (or positive) legislative responses that defy the spirit of the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Solski and Nguyen. In particular, the Charest government’s legislative response effectively 
reintroduced the provisions of the Charter of the French Language deemed to be 
unconstitutional by the Court. For example, the regulations ensure that relatively few, if any, 
Canadians will be eligible to apply for certificates of eligibility, in effect reintroducing a near 
complete ban on bridging schools in Quebec. It also defies the Supreme Court’s ruling by 
reintroducing a quantitative approach to ascertaining the ‘major part’ requirement, which is 
based heavily on the number of years spent at an English and/or French educational institution. 
Accordingly, Bill 115 can be properly classified as legislative noncompliance, or as a positive 
dialogic sequel introduced in response to judicial invalidation.  
This decision, however, is not surprising. Both cases dealt with lateral policy issues that 
required that the Quebec legislature comply with, and implement, the Court’s rulings. Perhaps 
more importantly, and unsurprisingly, both cases proved to be unpopular with the Charest 
government. As previously suggested, Quebec governments, irrespective of party affiliation, 
have historically been hostile to the idea of letting the Supreme Court of Canada call the policy 
shots. This is especially true of cases dealing with minority-education language laws in Quebec, 
a policy area that the Quebec government has a strong political attachment to. Consistent with 
Hall’s (2010) theory of the Supreme Court of Canada as an ‘implementer-dependent’ institution, 
this suggests that, under certain conditions – namely, when Charter cases involve unpopular 
 
64 Macfarlane 2012, 44; Macfarlane 2018, 11.  
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lateral issues – the Court’s power will be offset by the legislature’s unwillingness to comply 
with, and thus implement, the judicial decisions.  
The crucial point here is that, despite the Supreme Court’s ‘strong-type’ decisions in 
Solski and Nguyen, relatively little has changed with respect to minority-language education laws 
in Quebec. While the Supreme Court’s decision in Solski and Nguyen “made it more difficult for 
Quebec to further the multinational character of Canadian citizenship,”65 it did not result in 
fundamental policy change. This is because, in both cases, the Supreme Court of Canada lacked 
the political support necessary to “bring their decisions to life.”66 Put simply, despite a series of 
legal victories in favor of the Allophone and Anglophone communities in Quebec, the policy 
impact of the Court post-Solski and Nguyen was rather limited.   
 
5.8 Conclusion 
The chapter reviewed two cases involving minority-language education rights in Quebec – Solski 
(2005) and Nguyen (2009). It also analyzed the legislative response to both cases, namely Bill 
115 and the corresponding regulations. In doing so, this chapter has sought to demonstrate that 
despite the Court’s remedial activism, i.e., the invalidation of Bill 86 (Solski) and Bill 104 
(Nguyen), little changed with respect to minority-language education laws in Quebec. Properly 
construed, Bill 115 is a classic example of legislative defiance, or as a positive legislative sequel 
to address judicial invalidation.  
This is seen in the fact that under the new regulations, the ‘major part’ requirement is still 
heavily based on the number of years that an applicant spends in a French and/or English school, 
which the Court maintained was unconstitutional in Solski. Similarly, the new regulations ensure 
 
65 Richez 2014, 230.  
66 Rosenberg 2008, 26.  
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that relatively few applicants, if any, will meet the eligibility requirements, thus effectively 
banning the use of bridging schools in Quebec. Once again, this conflicts with the Court’s 
finding in Nguyen that a blanket prohibition on bridging schools was unconstitutional. As this 
chapter has demonstrated, the new regulations favor students attending type ‘A’ institutions – 
educational institutions that are financially inaccessible for a majority of Canadian families. 
Moreover, applicants are required to receive a weighted score of 15 points in order to be eligible 
to apply. This does not guarantee, however, that the Minister of Education will grant these 
applicants a certificate of eligibility. In other words, Bill 115 has the exact same effect as Bill 86 
and 104, which had been previously struck down by the McLachlin Court: to contain the existing 
Anglophone community by ensuring that all newcomers are educated in French in Quebec.  
As this chapter has demonstrated, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms has always been 
unpopular among French Quebecers and the Quebec National Assembly, more specifically. 
What this suggests is that the Supreme Court’s decision in Solski and Nguyen was fundamentally 
at odds with the Quebec government’s policy objective of preserving the French language and 
culture, therefore explaining why the final outcome was legislative noncompliance.  
Thus, and contrary to the position advanced by right-wing judicial critics, this 
demonstrates that judicial activism often marks the beginning of an interinstitutional dialogue 
between the Court and the federal or provincial legislatures. Bill 115 attests to the claim that the 
Court’s remedial activism rarely precludes provincial or federal legislatures from introducing 
independent legislative responses to address judicial invalidation. It also suggests, however, that 
conservative critics have exaggerated the extent of judicialization in Canada, and the power and 
policy impact of the Supreme Court post-Charter. While the Supreme Court plays an important 
role as ‘agenda-setters,’ they lack the power to implement their decisions outside of the 
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courtroom. Despite the Court’s multiple attempts to judicialize minority-language education 











Conclusion: McLachlin’s ‘Legacy’ 
The thesis project reviewed six cases involving salient and controversial issues of public policy 
where the McLachlin Court invalidated primary legislation (statutes) for its inconsistency with 
either the Quebec (Chaoulli) or the Canadian Charter. The six cases involved three core policy 
areas of federal or provincial jurisdiction, including criminal justice (Bedford and PHS 
Community in chapter 3), health (Chaoulli and Carter in chapter 4) and minority-language 
education policy in Quebec (Solski and Nguyen in chapter 5). Utilizing dialogue theory as the 
analytical framework, complemented with a modified approach to Matthew Hall’s theory of the 
Supreme Court of Canada as an ‘implementer-dependent’ institution, the thesis project sought to 
measure the policy impact and clout of the McLachlin Court (2000-2017), and to explore the 
conditions under which the Supreme Court behaves as a powerful policymaking institution. 
More specifically, it analyzed legislation introduced by Parliament or the Quebec legislature in 
response to judicial invalidation in an attempt to understand whether (and to what extent) the 
Court’s Charter decisions influenced the design and implementation of public policy.  
With the sole exception of Chaoulli, all of the cases under review were unanimous 
decisions delivered by the Supreme Court, two of which (Carter and Solski) were authored by 
‘The Court.’ Habitually, unanimous or ‘strong-type’ judicial decisions resulting in statutory 
invalidation rarely witness positive legislative responses because they are often perceived to be 
authoritative, final and legally binding on government.1 The expectation, therefore, is that federal 
and/or provincial legislatures will not respond in these cases, or, in the event that they do, they 
will most likely introduce negative dialogic sequels reflective of legislative compliance. 
 
1 McCormick 2005, 5; Macfarlane 2010, 401; Mathen 2003, 325 & 327. 
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Important also is the fact that cases involving Charter rights rarely result in unanimous decisions 
because they often deal with complex and controversial policy issues, and thus welcome dissent. 
Arguably, therefore, when the Supreme Court delivers unanimous decisions on inherently 
divisive issues, such as those chosen for the purposes of the case studies, their primary objective 
is to ensure that the decision is unambiguous and will therefore be complied with.2  
While Chaoulli was a split decision (4:3), its ‘strong-type’ features also leave the 
impression that the majority sought to do everything in its power to ensure that the decision 
would be complied with. In effect, the majority based their decision on the Quebec Charter of 
Human Rights, as opposed to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The justification for 
doing so was that the former had a “broader purpose,” implying that section 15 of the Health 
Insurance Act and section 11 of the Hospital Insurance Act would be at an increased risk of 
being invalidated.3 It is also likely that this choice stems from the majority’s recognition that the 
judicial decision “would have greater legitimacy if it were founded principally on a rights-based 
document emanating from that province,” especially given that the Canadian Charter has never 
been popular in Quebec.4 For these reasons, Chaoulli can also be classified as a ‘strong-type’ 
judicial decision. 
In all six cases under review, we witnessed the McLachlin Court attempt to judicialize 
politics, albeit to varying degrees. Stated differently, we witnessed the Supreme Court of Canada 
dive into controversial and salient issues of public policy, despite lacking the institutional 
expertise required to properly evaluate and debate these issues. Nonetheless, the responsible 
federal or provincial legislatures responded to each judicial decision by introducing positive 
dialogic sequels, in spite of the fact that the Supreme Court’s decisions appeared to leave little 
 
2 Mathen 2003, 322, 324 & 332.  
3 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 at para 25. 
4 Bateman 2006, 321.  
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room for independent legislative responses. Indeed, if one considers the outcome of the cases 
alone, it appears that the Supreme Court under Beverly McLachlin’s leadership behaved as a 
powerful policymaking institution. A textual analysis of the legislative responses introduced to 
address judicial invalidation, however, suggests otherwise.  
Chapter three, for example, has shown that in Bedford and PHS Community, the Supreme 
Court sought to liberalize access to safe injection facilities (SIFs) in Canada, and attempted to 
normalize prostitution and create safer working conditions for sex workers, respectively. In 
response to Bedford and PHS Community, the Harper Conservatives – a government who had 
openly vocalized its preference for ‘crime-reduction’ approaches – introduced equally strong 
legislative responses that explicitly defied the Supreme Court’s rulings. A review of Bill C-2 
(PHS Community) demonstrated that, contrary to the Supreme Court, the Harper Conservatives 
preferred to limit the prospect of expanding SIFs to other jurisdictions facing similar drug 
addiction problems as that experienced in the Downtown Eastside. In effect, Bill C-2 introduces 
twenty-six conditions that must be met before safe injection facilities are eligible to apply for an 
exemption under the CDSA, thus making it virtually impossible for any SIF to operate free from 
criminal prosecution. The fact that not a single safe injection facility, other than Insite, was 
granted an exemption by the federal Minister of Health post-Bill C-2 confirms this.  
Similarly, Bill C-36 reintroduces, albeit with some minor modifications, the prostitution-
related provisions invalidated by the McLachlin Court in Bedford. In particular, the ‘material 
benefit’ and ‘advertising’ provisions of Bill C-36 render it relatively difficult, borderline 
impossible, for sex workers to hire staff such as bodyguards and receptionists, to work in the 
same location as other sex workers, or to advertise on behalf of their colleagues. Arguably, this 
has the effect of exacerbating the potential safety and health risks associated with the sex trade, 
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one of the primary reasons the Supreme Court struck down the prostitution-related provisions of 
the Criminal Code to begin with. Additionally, while the ‘communicating’ provision no longer 
makes it a criminal offence for sex workers to solicit their own work in public spaces, Bill C-36 
now makes it a criminal offence to purchase sex. As the chapter demonstrated, this not only has 
potentially harmful effects on the economic livelihood of sex workers, but it also increases the 
risk that sexual transactions will take place in more secluded or remote areas out of fear that ‘sex 
purchasers’ will be convicted under the Criminal Code. For these reasons, Bill C-36 is a classic 
example of a positive dialogic sequel.  
 Chapter four reviewed two cases involving healthcare policy, including Chaoulli (private 
health insurance in Quebec) and Carter (medical assistance in dying). In both cases, the 
McLachlin Court attempted to judicialize healthcare policy by transforming legal rights into 
health rights. While neither the Quebec nor Canadian Charters include a health rights provision, 
a unanimous Court in Carter, and a slim majority in Chaoulli, found that the absolute prohibition 
on physician-assisted death violated the Canadian Charter, and that the ban on private health 
insurance violated the Quebec Charter, respectively. As the chapter demonstrated, however, the 
Court’s decisions proved to be unpopular with the actors responsible for implementing these 
judicial decisions, which ultimately constrained the McLachlin Court’s capacity to launch 
fundamental policy reform. 
 In the context of Carter, the chapter showed that while Bill C-14 complies in some 
respects with the Court’s decisions, it also has features of legislative noncompliance. For 
instance, Bill C-14 legalizes physician-assisted death in Canada for persons who are ‘grievously 
and irremediably’ ill, and thus complies with Carter. To a certain degree, this outcome was to be 
expected given that the Trudeau Liberals have positioned themselves to be much more ‘Court 
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friendly’ than the Harper Conservatives, and thus more likely to introduce negative dialogic 
sequels to address judicial invalidation. To be eligible for medical assistance in dying, however, 
Bill C-14 also requires that the patient’s medical condition have deteriorated significantly, and 
that the applicant’s natural death be “reasonably foreseeable.”5 Recall that the Supreme Court did 
not consider these two criteria. The effect of Bill C-14, therefore, is that less people will be 
eligible for PAD than would have otherwise been the case had the Trudeau Liberals fully 
complied with Carter.  
The chapter has also shown that cases involving multiple non-judicial ‘implementers,’ 
such as Carter, “complicates matters” because they often require that one actor “acknowledge 
the legality of the action” (in this case, the federal government), while also requiring that another 
actor “ensure access to the services” (in this case, provincial medical associations and healthcare 
professionals).6 This suggests that doctors who conscientiously object to physician-assisted death 
– in other words, medical professionals who, for moral or religious reasons, refuse to assist 
eligible candidates in prematurely terminating their lives – serve as an additional barrier to 
MAID.  
In effect, Carter dealt with a negative right, or the right not to have government interfere 
with a person’s choice to receive medical assistance in dying. It did not, however, concern the 
positive right to receive this assistance. This suggests that Canadian healthcare professionals 
cannot be forced into providing MAID, and, as we have seen, the available evidence suggests 
that a majority of doctors refuse to aid patients in terminating their lives, even in cases where the 
patients are eligible under Bill C-14.7 Put simply, the Trudeau Liberals and Canadian healthcare 
professionals, the actors responsible for enforcing the judicial decision, fundamentally disagreed 
 
5 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons Debate, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, (17 June 2016). 
6 Kelly (In progress), 27.  
7 Ross and Sikkema 2016. 
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with the outcome at trial, or, at the very least, certain aspects of the Court’s decision, and have 
thus failed to fully implement the judicial decision. The truth of the matter is that there is 
virtually little to no difference between the state of physician-assisted death in Canada pre- and 
post-Bill C-14; without the compliance of healthcare professionals, relatively few will be able to 
exercise their right to PAD, even though it is now technically legal in Canada.8  
 Similarly, in response to Chaoulli, the Quebec government enacted Bill 33, which 
reintroduced a near complete ban on private health insurance. With the sole exception of knee, 
hip and cataract surgeries, Bill 33 prohibits Quebecers from buying private health insurance for 
medically-necessary procedures already covered and offered in the public healthcare system. 
Arguably, this choice was motivated by the Quebec National Assembly’s unwillingness to create 
conditions favorable to the expansion of a duplicate private healthcare market in Quebec. Given 
the relatively low number of admissible procedures and, as a result, the small pool of applicants 
eligible for private insurance, Bill 33 offers little to no incentives for private insurers to operate 
in Quebec. 9  The outcome, therefore, is that little changed with respect to privatization of 
healthcare insurance, or long wait-times in Quebec post-Chaoulli, despite the Court’s finding 
that the privatization ban violated the Quebec Charter.  
 Chapter five reviewed two cases involving minority-language education rights: Solski and 
Nguyen. In Solski, in a unanimous decision authored by ‘the Court,’ the SCC found that the 
‘major part’ requirement (or the purely quantitative approach) used by the Minister of Education 
to ascertain whether or not applicants were eligible to receive their education in a public English 
school in Quebec was unconstitutional. In Nguyen, the Court found that the absolute prohibition 
on bridging schools violated section 23(1), the minority-language education provision of the 
 
8 Macfarlane 2016, 121.  
9 Labrie 2015; See also Manfredi and Maioni 2018, 112. 
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Charter. Uncontestably, both of these cases proved to be unpopular with the actors responsible 
for enforcing the Supreme Court’s decision, the Quebec National Assembly. In Quebec, the 
Charter of Rights has never been popular. Perhaps more importantly, minority-language 
education policy in Quebec has always been perceived to be a crucial policy area for preserving 
the province’s linguistic and cultural distinctiveness; 10  historically, the Quebec National 
Assembly has always had a strong political attachment to minority-language education policy.  
 It is not surprising, therefore, that in response to Solski and Nguyen, the Charest 
government introduced Bill 115. As the chapter demonstrated, Bill 115 initially appears to be a 
negative dialogic response. However, a textual review of the corresponding regulations 
demonstrates that Bill 115 can be properly classified as legislative noncompliance. In order to be 
eligible to simply apply for minority-language education, let alone be granted the certificate, Bill 
115 requires that applicants first obtain a minimum weighted score of 15 points. For divisions 1 
(‘schooling’) and 2 (‘consistent, true commitment’) of the regulations, points are awarded based 
on the number of years that the applicant and, if applicable, their siblings, attended an English 
school. Likewise, students are penalized depending on the number of years they (or their 
siblings) attended a French school. In effect, Bill 115 reintroduces the quantitative approach 
deemed to be unconstitutional by the McLachlin Court in Solski.  
The regulations also reintroduce a near complete ban on the use of bridging schools in 
Quebec. Bill 115 is heavily biased in favour of type ‘A’ institutions, which also happen to be 
English private schools with some of the highest yearly tuition fees in Quebec, and tend to be 
located in predominantly Anglophone neighborhoods. This not only suggests that type ‘A’ 
educational institutions may be financially inaccessible for middle- and lower-class families, it 
 
10 Richez 2014, 192. 
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also suggests that these schools “may not be accessible for Allophones.” 11  In short, the 
regulations have the effect of reintroducing a near complete ban on bridging schools, save for 
students with the financial means required to attend type ‘A’ institutions. 
 Taken collectively, these six case studies have addressed two limitations in the existing 
literature on judicial power and the Court’s policy influence.  For starters, it has demonstrated 
that conservative critics have mistakenly assumed that, because the Supreme Court of Canada 
plays a more important and direct policy role post-1982 than ever before in the history of the 
institution, and because they have occasionally struck down primary legislation for violating 
protected rights, that this automatically results in fundamental policy change. Undeniably, the 
inclusion of a strong remedial provision in the Charter (section 24(1)) empowers the Court as 
‘agenda-setters.’ By its very nature, judicial invalidation forces issues onto legislative agendas, 
which may not have otherwise been debated in Parliament or provincial legislative assemblies. 
To some degree, therefore, the Court behaves as a powerful policymaking institution.12  
The common mistake, however, is to equate judicial invalidation (or agenda-setting) with 
the capacity to influence public policy outcomes. As the thesis has demonstrated, this is not 
always the case. As an ‘implementer-dependent’ institution, the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
policy clout is contingent on whether the judicial decision involves a vertical (where judicial 
actors are tasked with implementing the Court’s ruling) or lateral policy area (where non-judicial 
actors are required to implement the Court’s ruling), and, in the case of the latter, whether the 
decision is popular.13  
The fact remains that different types of dialogic responses have different implications for 
judicial power and policymaking. The Supreme Court behaves as a powerful policymaking 
 
11 Kelly 2018, 264. 
12 Kelly (In progress), 7-8.  
13 Hall 2010, 15-8.  
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institution in cases where the federal and/or provincial legislatures introduce negative dialogic 
responses, or fail to respond altogether. This is because the legislatures allow the Court, by 
default, to dictate public policy outcomes. The same is not true, however, of positive dialogic 
responses where the responsible legislature introduces reply legislation that significantly departs 
from the directives of the Court, and which remains committed to the original policy objectives.  
Additionally, the thesis demonstrated that when the Supreme Court delivers unpopular 
decisions involving lateral policy issues, specifically when such cases deal with controversial 
and important issues of public policy, there is a much greater risk that the legislative response 
will be noncompliance. In all six cases under review, the McLachlin Court issued decisions that 
conflicted with the policy objectives of the responsible legislature, thus explaining why they 
responded by introducing positive dialogic sequels. The bottom line is that the Supreme Court of 
Canada lacks the tools required to enforce their decisions outside of the courtroom, suggesting 
that they cannot compel either the federal or provincial legislatures to introduce reply legislation 
that complies with their decisions.14 The extent of the Court’s policy influence, therefore, rests 
on the popularity of the judicial decision, and the degree of deference that the federal and/or 
provincial legislatures are willing to grant to the Court.  
A second limitation has been the heavy focus on ‘formal channels of disagreement,’ such 
as sections 1 (the reasonable limits provision) and 33 (the notwithstanding clause) of the 
Charter.15 In so doing, scholars have overlooked the ‘non-formal’ alternatives available to the 
legislatures to interact or respond to unpopular Supreme Court decisions. In all six cases under 
review, we witnessed the responsible legislature introduce positive legislative responses to 
counteract judicial invalidation, without resorting to the use of the notwithstanding clause. This 
 
14 Rosenberg 2008, 26.  
15 Kavanagh 2015, 1010 & 1038; See also Kelly (In progress), 13.  
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seems to confirm dialogue theorists’ assertion that judicial invalidation often leaves room for the 
federal and/or provincial legislatures to introduce an independent legislative response that 
significantly departs from the Court’s directives.16 This remains true even in the context of the 
most forceful, authoritative or ‘strong-type’ decisions delivered by the Supreme Court of Canada 
that may initially appear to preclude any possibility of introducing independent legislative 
responses.  
To reiterate, all six cases under review can be classified as ‘strong-type’ judicial 
decisions that resulted in the invalidation of primary legislation in core policy areas of provincial 
and federal jurisdiction. Stated differently, they are clear examples of federal or provincial 
governments losing significant Charter ‘battles.’ Nonetheless, all six cases were followed by 
equally strong (if not stronger) legislative responses that either did not comply altogether, or 
ineffectively implemented, the judicial rulings. Despite losing in the courtroom, the federal and 
provincial governments, as the designers and implementers of public policy in response to 
judicial invalidation, crafted reply legislation that allowed them to “win the policy ‘war.’”17 
Indeed, a textual review of the legislative responses demonstrates that the policy status quo has 
not changed drastically with respect to physician-assisted death, prostitution reform, safe 
injection facilities, private health insurance and minority-language education policy in Quebec, 
despite the McLachlin Court’s best attempts to behave as a powerful policymaking institution via 
its remedial activism. This suggests that the policy influence and impact of the McLachlin Court 
was rather limited.  
Despite its contributions, the thesis suffers from a number of limitations. First, the 
relatively low number of case studies conducted provides only a partial picture of judicial power 
 
16 Hogg, Bushell-Thornton and Wright 2007, 45. 
17 Kelly (In progress), 31.  
 156 
and the judicialization of politics during the McLachlin era. Future studies could use a similar 
analytical framework as that which was developed in the thesis in an attempt to understand 
whether the study’s findings apply to other Charter cases involving unpopular lateral issues. In 
other words, they can use Hall’s (2010) theory of final appellate courts as ‘implementer-
dependent’ institutions to understand how, given the right set of circumstances, even the most 
forceful judicial decisions can be counteracted by the federal and/or provincial government’s 
unwillingness to create conditions hospitable to the judicialization of politics.  
A second limitation is that the study exclusively analyzed cases involving primary 
legislation. Given the study’s focus on the policy impact of the McLachlin Court, however, the 
exclusion of secondary legislation, conduct cases and reference questions was justified. 
Nonetheless, future studies can build off of the findings of the present research by exploring 
whether similar patterns of legislative noncompliance exist in the context of unpopular lateral 
cases involving judicial invalidation of secondary legislation. This would arguably provide a 
more complete picture of judicial power and the Supreme Court’s policy impact post-
introduction of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  
A final limitation is that the chapter on criminal justice policy focused on two cases 
involving judicial invalidation during the Harper era, thus giving the impression that the findings 
are biased. The truth, however, is that the Harper government was in power for nearly a decade. 
That is to say, they served as the incumbent government for a majority of the years that Beverly 
McLachlin served as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada. At least with respect to 
Charter cases involving criminal justice policy invalidated by the McLachlin Court, therefore, 
future work will, generally speaking, also focus heavily on legislative responses introduced by 
the Harper Conservatives.  
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Related also is the fact that the cases involving provincial areas of jurisdiction (Chaoulli, 
Solski and Nguyen) were cases involving the Quebec government. As Appendix 3 demonstrates, 
however, there were only eight cases where the responsible provincial government introduced 
legislation in response to judicial invalidation during the McLachlin era. Three of these eight 
cases involved the Quebec government, which also happen to be the only cases involving two 
core areas of provincial jurisdiction – health and education policy. In other words, the three 
provincial cases were selected based off of the fact that they deal with some of the most 
controversial and salient policy issues reviewed by the McLachlin Court.  
In spite of its limitations, the present study contributes to the judicialization literature in 
Canada by demonstrating that the federal and/or provincial legislatures can constrain judicial 
power via legislative noncompliance. Importantly, the findings of the present research can serve 
to incentivize scholars to move beyond legal mobilization studies, and, instead, to understand 
how and when legislatures react to judicial invalidation, and what this means for judicial power 
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Appendix 1 (McLachlin Court’s Charter Docket) 
 
# Case Year Charter Challenge 
1 Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator  2017 Primary legislation 
2  
 
B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Association v. British  
Columbia (Attorney General) 2017  Primary legislation  
3 R. v. Paterson 2017 Police conduct 
4 R. v. Peers 2017 Judicial conduct/decision 
5  Lajeunesse (Re)  2017  
 
Judicial conduct/decision (Question is moot)  
6 R. v. Hunt 2017 Judicial conduct/decision 
7 R. v. Antic  2017 Primary legislation 
8 R. v. Cody 2017 Trial delay 
9 India v. Badesha 2017 Minister of Justice conduct/decision 
10  
 
Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural 
Resources Operation) 2017  Ministerial conduct/decision  
11 Association of Justice Counsel v. Canada (Attorney General) 2017 Employer imposing workplace policy 
12 R. v. Marakah 2017 Police conduct 
13 R. v. Jones 2017 Police conduct 
14 R. v. Boutilier 2017 Primary & judicial conduct/decision 
15 R. v. Gagnon 2016 Police conduct 
16  R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali  2016  
 
Judicial conduct/decision (sentencing)  
17  R. v. Lloyd  2016  
 
Primary & Judicial conduct/decision 
(sentencing)  
18 Canada (National Revenue) v. Thompson 2016 Ministerial application 
19 Canada (Attorney General) v. Chambre des Notaires du Quebec 2016 Primary legislation 
20 R. v. Saeed 2016 Police conduct 
21  R. v. Vassell  2016  
 
Trial delay (prosecutorial misconduct)  
22  R. v. Williamson  2016  
 
Trial delay (prosecutorial misconduct)  
23  R. v. Jordan  2016  
 
Trial delay (established new framework)  
24 R. v. K.R.J. 2016 Primary legislation 
25 R. v. Cawthorne 2016 Primary legislation 




Police conduct & court conduct/decision  
27  
 
Conférence des juges de paix magistrats du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney 
General) 2016  Primary legislation  
28 R. v. Rowson 2016 Police conduct  
29 R. v. Diamond 2016 Police conduct 
30 British Columbia Teachers' Federation v. British Columbia 2016 Primary legislation 
31 Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General) 2015 Primary legislation 
32 Meredith v. Canada (Attorney General) 2015 Primary legislation 
33 Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan 2015 Primary legislation 
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34 Carter v. Canada  2015 Primary legislation 
35 Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of Canada 2015 Primary & secondary legislation 
36 Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General) 2015 Secondary legislation (regulations) 
37  R. v. Sanghera  2015  
 
Trial delay (prosecutorial misconduct)  
38 R. v. Nur 2015 Primary legislation 
39  
 
Association des Parents de l'école Rose-des-Vents v. British Columbia 
(Education) 2015  Judicial conduct/decision  
40 Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General) 2015 Prosecutorial misconduct  
41  
 
Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v. Yukon 
(Attorney General) 2015  Judicial conduct/decision & School Board  
42 R. v. Kokopenace 2015 Jury bias/partiality 
43  Kahkewistahaw First Nation v. Taypotat   2015  
 
Secondary legislation (Kahkewistahaw 
Election Code) 
44 Canada (Attorney General) v. Barnaby 2015 Ministerial discretion 
45 R. v. Smith 2015 Primary & secondary legislation 
46 Guindon v. Canada 2015 Primary legislation 
47 Goodwin v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) 2015 Primary legislation 
48 R. v. Moriarity  2015 Primary legislation 
49 R. v. Appulonappa 2015 Primary legislation 
50 R. v. MacDonald 2014 Police conduct 
51 R. v. Koczab 2014 Police conduct 
52 Canada (Attorney General) v. Whaling 2014 Primary legislation 
53 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Harkat  2014 Primary legislation 
54  R. v. Anderson  2014  
 
Crown's constitutional obligation & 
prosecutorial discretion 
55 R. v. Spencer 2014 Police conduct 
56 R. v. Taylor 2014 Police conduct 
57 R. v. Mian 2014 Police conduct 
58  R. v. Mack  2014  
 
Police conduct & judicial conduct/decision  
59 R. v. Conception 2014 Judicial conduct/decision 
60 R. v. Mohamed 2014 Judicial conduct/decision  
61 Kazemi Estate v. Islamic Republic of Iran 2014 Primary legislation 
62 Wakeling v. United States of America 2014 Primary legislation & police conduct 
63 R. v. Day 2014 Police conduct 
64 R. v. Fearon 2014 Police conduct 
65 Quebec (Attorney General) v. A 2013 Primary legislation 
66 Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott 2013 Primary legislation 
67 R. v. MacIntosh 2013 
 
Trial delays (prosecutorial misconduct) 
68 R. v. Levkovic  2013 Primary legislation  
69 Divito v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) 2013 Primary legislation 
70 R. v. MacKenzie 2013 Police conduct 
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71 R. v. Chehil 2013 Police conduct 




Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. United Food and 
Commercial Workers, Local 401  
2013 
  
Primary & secondary legislation 
  
74 Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford 2013 Primary legislation 
75 S.L. v. Commission scolaire des Chênes 2012 Ministerial conduct/decision 
76 Doré v. Barreau du Québec 2012 Secondary legislation (code of ethics) 
77 R. v. Tse 2012 Primary legislation 
78 R. v. Bellusci 2012 Judicial conduct/decision 
79 R. v. Cole 2012 Police conduct 
80 R. v. St-Onge Lamoureux 2012 Primary legislation 
81 R. v. Nedelcu 2012 Prosecutorial misconduct (evidence) 
82 R. v. Aucoin 2012 Police conduct 
83  Sriskandarajah v. United States of America   2012  
 
Ministerial discretion & prosecutorial 
discretion 
84 R. v. Khawaja (companion case to sriskandarajah) 2012 Primary legislation 
85 R. v. N.S.  2012 Judicial conduct/decision 
86  Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General)  2011  
 
Secondary legislation (rules of practice & 
directives) 
87  R. v. Ahmad  
 
2011  Primary legislation  
88 Withler v. Canada (Attorney General) 2011 Primary legislation 
89 Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser 2011 Primary legislation 
90 R. v. Loewen 2011 Police conduct 
91 Alberta v. Elder Advocates of Alberta Society 2011 Government (inflation of prices) 
92  R. v. Campbell  2011  
 
Police conduct & judicial conduct/decision  
93 R. v. Nixon 2011 Prosecutorial misconduct (plea deal) 
94 Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v. Cunningham  2011 Primary legislation 
95  
Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society 
  2011  
 
Primary legislation & ministerial discretion  
96 R. v. Coté 2011 Judicial conduct/decision  
97 R. v. Whyte 2011 Judicial conduct/decision 
98 R. v. J.Z.S. 2010 Trial (testimonial competence)  
99 
  
Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr 





Canadian intelligence services (CSIS and 
DFAIT); Crown actions   
100 R. v. Nasogaluak 2010 Police conduct & judicial discretion 
101 R. v. Beaulieu 2010 Judicial conduct/discretion  
102 R. v. Morelli 2010 
 
Police conduct & judicial conduct/discretion  
103 R. v. National Post 2010 Police conduct  
104 Toronto Star Newspaper Ltd. V. Canada 2010 Primary legislation 
105  R. v. Conway  2010  
 
Court conduct (*administrative tribunals)  
106  Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v. Criminal Lawyers' Association  2010   
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Primary legislation & Ministerial decision  
107 R. v. Nolet 2010 Police conduct 
108 Vancouver (City) v. Ward 2010 Court decision (damages awarded) 
109 R. v. Cornell 2010 Police conduct 
110 R. v. Willier 2010 Police conduct 
111 R. v. Sinclair 2010 Court conduct  
112 R. v. McCrimmon 2010 Police conduct 
113  Globe and Mail v. Canada (Attorney General)  2010  
 
Court (court order) & prosecutorial 
misconduct (cross-examination) 
114 R. v. Gomboc 2010 Police conduct 
115 DesRochers v. Canada (Industry) 2009 Court conduct/decision 
116 Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v. Canada 2009 Primary legislation & Crown conduct 
117 R. v. Patrick 2009 Police misconduct 
118 R. v. Godin 2009 Prosecutorial misconduct (trial delay) 
119  A. C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services) 2009 Primary legislation 
120  
 
Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v. Canadian Federation of 
Students - BC Component 2009  Secondary legislation   
121 R. v. Suberu 2009 Police conduct  
122 R. v. Shepherd 
2009 
Police conduct 
123 R. v. Harrison 2009 Court conduct/decision 
124  R. v. Grant  2009  
 
Police conduct & judicial conduct/decision  
125 Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony 2009 Secondary legislation 
126  R. v. Bjelland  2009  
 
Prosecutorial misconduct (relevant info) & 
court conduct/decision 
127 Nguyen v. Quebec (Education, Recreation and Sports) 2009 Primary legislation 
128 R. v. Ferguson 2008 Court conduct/decision 
129  
 
Société des Acadiens et Acadiennes du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc. v. 
Canada 2008  Police conduct  
130 R. v. Kang-Brown 2008 Police conduct 
131 R. v. A.M.  2008 Police conduct 
132 Lake v. Canada (Minister of Justice) 2008 Minister of Justice (discretion) 








Police conduct (CSIS) & court 
conduct/decision   
135 R. v. Wittwer 2008 Court conduct/decision 
136 Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2008 Police conduct (CSIS officers) 
137 R. v. Kapp 2008 Secondary legislation 
138 Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2007 Primary legislation 
139 Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop 2007 Primary legislation 
140 R. v. Bryan 2007 Primary legislation 
141 British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Christie 2007 Primary legislation 




Health Services and Support - Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. v. 
British Columbia 2007  Primary legislation  
144 Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI-Macdonald Corp 2007 Primary & secondary legislation 
145 Baier v. Alberta 2007 Primary legislation 
146 R. v. Clayton 2007 Police conduct 
147 R. v. Singh 2007 Police conduct 
148  Multani v. Commission Scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys   2006  
 
Council of commissioners of school board  
149 R. v. Chaisson 2006 Police conduct & judicial conduct/decision 
150 R. v. Rodgers 2006 Primary legislation 
151  United States of America v. Ferras; United States of America v. Latty  2006  
 
Primary legislation & Court 
conduct/decision (extradition judge) 
152  
United Mexican States v. Ortega; United States of America v. Fiessel 
(companion to 151) 2006  
 
Primary legislation   
153 R. v. Krieger 2006 Court conduct/decision 
154  R. v. Decorte  2005  
 
Police conduct (First Nations Constables)  
155 UL Canada Inc. v. Quebec (Attorney General) 2005 Secondary legislation 
156 Solski (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General) 2005 Primary legislation 
157 Gosselin (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General) 2005 Primary legislation 
158 R. v. Chow 2005 Police conduct 
159 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General) 2005 Primary legislation 
160 R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias 2005 Primary legislation & Police powers 
161 Toronto Star Newspaper Ltd. V. Ontario 2005 Court conduct/decision (court orders) 
162  
 
Medovarski v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and immigration); 
Esteban v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2005  Court conduct/decision (appeal)  




Secondary legislation  
164  R. v. Pires; R. v. Lising  2005  
 
Police misconduct (cross-examination of 
peace officer denied) 
165  R. v. Henry  2005  
 




R. v. Wiles  2005  Primary legislation  
167  
Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada 
(Attorney General) 2004  Primary legislation  
168 
 
Harper v. Canada (Attorney General) 2004 Primary legislation 
169 Application Under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re) 2004 Primary legislation 
170 R. v. Demers 2004 Primary legislation 
171  
 
Congrégation des témoins de Jéhovah de St-Jérôme-Lafontaine v. 
Lafontaine (Village) 2004  Secondary legislation  
172 R. v. Mann 2004 Police conduct  
173 Martineau v. M.N.R.  
2004 
Primary and secondary legislation 
174 Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E.  
2004 
Primary legislation 
175 Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development) 2004 Primary legislation 
176 R. v. Tessling 2004 Police conduct 
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177 Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General) 2004 Primary legislation 
178 Reference Re Same Sex Marriage 2004 Reference case 
179 Siemens v. Manitoba (Attorney General) 2003 Primary legislation 
180 R. v. P.A. 2003 Prosecutorial misconduct (trial delay) 
181  R. v. Buhay   2003  
 
Police conduct & court decision/conduct  
182 Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General) 2003 Primary legislation 
183 Ell v. Alberta 2003 Primary legislation  
184 Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General) 2003 Primary legislation 
185 R. v. Smith  2003 Court conduct/decision 
186 R. v. Johnson 2003 Court conduct/decision 
187 R. v. Edgar 2003 Court conduct/decision  
188  
 
Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia 
(Workers' Compensation Board) v. Laseur 2003  Primary & secondary legislation  
189 R. v. S.A.B.  2003 Primary legislation  
190 Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education) 2003 Court conduct/decision 
191 Vann Niagara Ltd. V. Oakville (Town) 2003 Secondary legislation 
192  Maranda v. Richer  2003  
 
Police conduct & court conduct/decision  
193 R. v. Taillefer; R. v. Duguay 2003 Prosecutorial misconduct (Crown) 
194 Beals v. Saldanha 2003 Court conduct/decision 
195 R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine 2003 Primary legislation  
196 R. v. Clay 2003 Primary legislation 
197  Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)  2002  
 
Primary legislation & ministerial discretion  
198  
Ahani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (**applies 
framework in Suresh) 2002  Ministerial discretion  
199  R. v. Law  2002  
 
Police misconduct & court conduct/decision  
200 Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance); Rice v. New Brunswick  2002 Primary legislation 
201 R. v. Guignard 2002 Secondary legislation 
202 R. v. Fliss 2002 Police conduct 




Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General); White, 




Primary legislation  
205 R. v. Hall 2002 Primary legislation 
206 Sauvé v. Canada 2002 Primary legislation 
207  R. v. Noël  2002  
 
Prosecutorial misconduct (Crown cross-
appeal) 
208 Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General) 2002 Primary legislation 
209 R. v. Ling 2002 Court conduct/decision  
210  R. v. Jarvis  2002  
 
Ministerial discretion & court 
conduct/decision 
211 Quebec (Attorney General) v. Laroche 2002 Police conduct 
212 Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh 2002 Primary legislation 
213 Gosselin v. Québec (Attorney General) 2002 Secondary legislation 
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214 R. v. Latimer 2001 Court conduct/decision 
215 R. v. Sharpe 2001 Primary legislation 
216 United States v. Burns 2001 Ministerial discretion  
217 United States of America v. Tsioubris 2001 Court conduct/decision 
218 United States of America v. Shulman 2001 Court conduct/decision 
219 United States of America v. Kwok 2001 Ministerial discretion 
220 United States of America v. Cobb 2001 Court conduct/decision 
221 R. v. Ruzic 2001 Primary legislation 
222 R. v. Dutra 2001 Prosecutorial misconduct (trial delay) 
223 Therrien (Re) 2001 Ministerial decision 
224  R. v. Pan; R. v. Sawyer  2001  
 
Primary legislation & secondary legislation  
225 R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd.  2001 Primary legislation 
226  R. v. Jabarianha  2001  
 
Prosecutorial misconduct (Crown cross-
appeal) 
227 R. v. Hynes 2001 Court conduct/decision 
228 R. v. Golden 2001 Police conduct 
229 R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc 2001 Court conduct/decision 
230 Smith v. Canada (Attorney General) 2001 Police conduct 
231 Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General) 2001 Primary legislation 
232  Arsenault-Cameron v. Prince Edward Island  2000  
 
Ministerial discretion & French Language 
Board  
233 Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) 2000 Primary legislation 
234  Lovelace v. Ontario  2000  
 









Primary legislation & court 
conduct/decision 
236 Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission) 2000 
 
Human rights commission (lengthy delay) 
237 R. v. Darrach 2000 Primary legislation 
238 Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. K.L.W.  2000 Primary legislation 







Appendix 2 (Charter Cases Involving Primary Legislation during McLachlin Era) 
 
# Case Year Government Outcome 
1 Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator 2017 Provincial (Alberta) Upheld  
2  
 
B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Association v. British 
Columbia (Attorney General) 2017  Provincial (British Columbia)  Upheld  
3 R. v. Antic  2017 Federal Upheld 
4 R. v. Boutilier 2017 Federal  Upheld 
5 R. v. Lloyd 2016 Federal Invalidated 
6 Canada (Attorney General) v. Chambre des Notaires du Quebec 2016 Federal Invalidated 
7 R. v. K.R.J. 2016 Federal Invalidated (in part) 
8 R. v. Cawthorne 2016 Federal Upheld 
9  
 
Conference des juges de paix magistrats du Québec v Quebec 
(Attorney General) 2016  Provincial (Quebec)  Invalidated (in part)  
10 British Columbia Teachers' Federation v. British Columbia  2016 Provincial (British Columbia) Invalidated  
11  
 
Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney 
General) 2015  Federal  Invalidated   
12 Meredith v. Canada (Attorney General) 2015 Federal Upheld 
13 Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan 2015 Provincial (Saskatchewan) Invalidated 
14 Carter v. Canada 2015 Federal Invalidated 
15  
 
Canada (Attorney General) v. Federation of Law Societies of 
Canada  2015  Federal  Invalidated  
16 R. v. Nur 2015 Federal Invalidated 
17 R. v. Smith 2015 Federal Invalidated 
18 Guindon v. Canada 2015 Federal Upheld 
19  Goodwin v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles)   2015  Provincial (British Columbia)  
 
NEW ARP scheme; not 
necessary to deal with 
constitutionality  
20 R. v. Moriarity 2015 Federal Upheld 
21 R. v. Appulonappa 2015 Federal Invalidated 
22 Canada (Attorney General) v. Whaling 2014 Federal Invalidated  
23 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Harkat  2014 Federal Upheld 
24 Kazemi Estate v. Islamic Republic of Iran 2014 Federal Upheld  
25 
  







On issue of 
constitutionality Court was 
split 3:3 
26 Quebec (Attorney General) v. A 2013 Provincial (Quebec) Upheld 
27 Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott 2013 Provincial (Saskatchewan) Upheld 
28 R. v. Levkovic  2013 Federal Upheld  
29 Divito v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) 2013 Federal Upheld  
30  
 
Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. United Food 
and Commercial Workers, Local 401 2013  Provincial (Alberta)  Invalidated  
31 Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford 2013 Federal Invalidated 
32 R. v. Tse 2012 Federal Invalidated  
33 R. v. St-Onge Lamoureux 2012 Federal Invalidated 
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34 R. v. Khawaja (companion case to sriskandarajah) 2012 Federal  Upheld  
35 R. v. Ahmad 2011 Federal Upheld  
36 Withler v. Canada (Attorney General) 2011 Federal Upheld  
37 Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser 2011 Provincial (Ontario) Upheld 
38  
 
Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v. 
Cunningham  2011  Provincial (Alberta)  Upheld   
 
39  Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society   2011  Federal  
Overturned Minister's 
decision  
40 Toronto Star Newspaper Ltd. V. Canada 2010 Federal Upheld  
41  
 
Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v. Criminal Lawyers' 
Association 2010  Provincial (Ontario)  Upheld   
42 Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v. Canada 2009 Federal  Upheld  
43  A. C. v. Manitoba (Director of Child and Family Services) 2009 Provincial (Manitoba) Upheld  
44 Nguyen v. Quebec (Education, Recreation and Sports) 2009 Provincial (Quebec) Invalidated  
45 R. v. D.B.  2008 Federal Invalidated 
46 Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2007 Federal Invalidated  
47 Canada (Attorney General) v. Hislop 2007 Federal Invalidated 
48 R. v. Bryan 2007 Federal  Upheld  
49 British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Christie 2007 Provincial (British Columbia) Upheld 
50  
 
Health Services and Support - Facilities Subsector Bargaining 
Assn. v. British Columbia 2007  Provincial (British Columbia)  Invalidated  
51 Canada (Attorney General) v. JTI-Macdonald Corp 2007 Federal Upheld 
52 Baier v. Alberta 2007 Provincial (Alberta) Upheld  
53 R. v. Rodgers 2006 Federal Upheld  
54 United States of America v. Ferras; United States of America v. Latty 2006 Federal Upheld 
55  
 
United Mexican States v. Ortega; United States of America v. Fiessel 
(companion to 151) 2006  Federal  Upheld   
56 Solski (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General) 2005 Provincial (Quebec) Invalidated (in part) 
57 Gosselin (Tutor of) v. Quebec (Attorney General) 2005 Provincial (Quebec) Upheld  




59 R. v. Orbanski; R. v. Elias 2005 Federal Upheld  
60 R. v. Wiles 2005 Federal Upheld  
61  
 
Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada 
(Attorney General)  2004  Federal   Upheld  
62 Harper v. Canada (Attorney General)  2004 Federal Upheld 
63 Application Under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re) 2004 Federal Upheld 
64 R. v. Demers 2004 Federal Invalidated 
65 Martineau v. M.N.R.  2004 Federal Upheld  
66 Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E.  2004 Provincial (Newfoundland) Upheld 
67 Hodge v. Canada (Minister of Human Resources Development) 2004 Federal Upheld 
68 Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General) 2004 Provincial (British Columbia) Upheld 
69 Siemens v. Manitoba (Attorney General) 2003 Provincial (Manitoba) Upheld 
70 Trociuk v. British Columbia (Attorney General) 2003 Provincial (British Columbia) Invalidated 
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71 Ell v. Alberta 2003 Provincial (Alberta) Upheld 
72 Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General) 2003 Federal Invalidated 
73  
 
Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova 
Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Laseur 2003  Provincial (Nova Scotia)  Invalidated  
74 R. v. S.A.B.  2003 Federal Upheld 
75 R. v. Malmo-Levine; R. v. Caine 2003 Federal Upheld 
76 R. v. Clay 2003 Federal Upheld 
77 Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2002 Federal Upheld  
78  
 
Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance); Rice v. New 
Brunswick  2002  Provincial (New Brunswick)  Invalidated   
79 Lavoie v. Canada  2002 Federal Upheld 
80  
 
Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney General); White, 
Ottenheimer & Baker v. Canada (Attorney General); R. v. Fink 2002  Federal  Invalidated   
81 R. v. Hall 2002 Federal Invalidated (in part) 
82 Sauvé v. Canada 2002 Federal Invalidated  
83 Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General) 2002 Federal Invalidated  
84 Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh 2002 Provincial (Nova Scotia) Upheld  
85 R. v. Sharpe 2001 Federal Invalidated  
86 R. v. Ruzic 2001 Federal Invalidated 
87 R. v. Pan; R. v. Sawyer 2001 Federal Upheld  
88 R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd.  2001 Provincial (Quebec) upheld  
89 Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General) 2001 Provincial (Ontario) Invalidated 
90 Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) 2000 Federal Upheld 
91 R. v. Morrisey 2000 Federal Upheld  
92 R. v. Darrach 2000 Federal Upheld  
93 Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. K.L.W.  2000 Provincial (Winnipeg) upheld  
94  
 
Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of 






Appendix 3 (Legislative Responses) 
 
1  R. v. Lloyd  2016  Federal  
 
Majority 6:3 Repealed   
2  
Canada (Attorney General) v. 
Chambre des Notaires du Quebec 2016  Federal  Unanimous  No response  
3  R. v. K.R.J.  2016  Federal  
 




Conference des juges de paix 













British Columbia Teachers' 


















Mounted Police Association of 








 (An Act respecting labour relations in the federal public sector;  




Saskatchewan Federation of 








Amended & repealed certain provisions (Amendments to Essential  
Services Process)  
8  Carter v. Canada  2015  Federal  Unanimous  
 
Bill C-14 An Act to amend the Criminal Code 




Canada (Attorney General) v. 






















Bill C-69 (Penalties for the Criminal Possession of Firearms Act);  
did not become law *  
11 R. v. Smith 2015 Federal Unanimous No response  
12 R. v. Appulonappa 2015 Federal Unanimous No response  
13  
 
Canada (Attorney General) v. 




Alberta (Information and Privacy 
Commissioner) v. United Food and 











Canada (Attorney General) v. 
Bedford 2013  Federal  Unanimous  Bill C-36 Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act   
16  R. v. Tse  2012  Federal  Unanimous  
 
Amended (Response to the Supreme Court of Canada  
Decision in R. v. Tse Act) 
17  R. v. St-Onge Lamoureux  2012  Federal  Majority 5:2 
 
Bill C-46: An Act to amend the Criminal Code (offences relating to  
conveyances) and to make consequential amendments to other Acts  
18  
Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS 
Community Services Society  2011  Federal  Unanimous  
 
Bill C-2 (An Act to Amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act  




Nguyen v. Quebec (Education, 







Bill 115 An Act Following upon the court decisions on the language  
of instruction & Regulations C-11, r. 2.1   
20 
  












Charkaoui v. Canada (Citizenship 








Bill C-3 An Act to amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
(certificate and special advocate) and to make a consequential 
 amendment to another Act  
22  
Canada (Attorney General) v. 





Health Services and Support - 














Assn. v. British Columbia  
24 
  
Solski (Tutor of) v. Quebec 








Bill 115 An Act Following upon the court decisions on the language of 
instruction & Regulations C-11, r. 2.1   
25  
Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney 
General) 2005  
Provincial 
(Quebec) Majority 4:3  
Bill 33 (An Act to amend the Act respecting health services and social services  
and other legislative provisions) 
26  R. v. Demers  2004  Federal  Unanimous  
 
Bill C- 22 An Act to amend the Criminal Code (mental disorder) and  
to make consequential amendments to other Acts, 2005 
27 
  
Trociuk v. British Columbia 




























Bill C-3 (Chapter 24) An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act and  







Nova Scotia (Workers' 
Compensation Board) v. Martin; 
Nova Scotia (Workers' 




















Mackin v. New Brunswick 
(Minister of Finance); Rice v. New 


















Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. 
Canada (Attorney General); White, 
Ottenheimer & Baker v. Canada 

















32  R. v. Hall   2002  Federal  
 
Majority 5:4  No response   
33 
  











34 Ruby v. Canada (Solicitor General) 2002 Federal Unanimous No response 
35  R. v. Sharpe  2001  Federal  
 
Majority 6:3  
 
No response  
36 R. v. Ruzic 2001 Federal Unanimous No response 
37  
 
Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney 
General) 2001  
Provincial 




Little Sisters Book and Art 
Emporium v. Canada (Minister of 
Justice) 
2000 
  
Federal 
  
Majority 6:3 
  
No response 
  
 
